Department of Transportation v. Land

Supreme Court of Georgia

Department of Transportation v. Land

362 S.E.2d 372, 257 Ga. 657, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 1027

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedDecember 2, 1987

Docket44196

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 362 S.E.2d 372 (Department of Transportation v. Land) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Department of Transportation v. Land, 362 S.E.2d 372, 257 Ga. 657, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 1027 (Ga. 1987).

Pincite

Opinion

Smith, Justice.

This case is before us by grant of the writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals. The question is whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in its interpretation and application of OCGA § 32-2-6. The opinion of the Court of Appeals as set out in Dept. of Transp. v. Land, 181 Ga. App. 94 (351 SE2d 470) (1986), correctly states the law of Georgia on this subject and we adopt and affirm the judgment subject to the following three paragraphs.

If the allegations contained in the petition are found to be true, i.e., that the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Whitfield County were jointly involved in the installation, maintenance, and control of the traffic light in question, it would make the DOT and the county joint tortfeasors and jointly and severally liable. The county is liable up to the $500,000 liability insurance it purchased. Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 391 (330 SE2d 95) (1985).

*658 Decided December 2, 1987. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles M. Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Brewton, for appellant. Mitchell, Coppedge, Wester, Bisson & Miller, Warren N. Coppedge, Jr., Kinney, Kemp, Pickett, Sponcler & Joiner, F. Gregory Melton, for appellee.

Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 (361 SE2d 146) (1987) answers the motion to reinstate the DOT as a named party defendant. The fact that DOT is not named as an insured does not mean that insurance protection for the claim is not provided. Price specifically states that the claim is covered to the extent of the insurance provided to employees of DOT, and if they are named in the complaint, then it is proper to name DOT as a party defendant. Therefore, DOT can be a named party defendant. In addition to the waiver of immunity to the extent of insurance coverage, DOT is also liable as provided in OCGA § 32-2-6.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is affirmed except as to that part of the opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of DOT as a named party.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

All the Justices concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Smith, Justice.

This case is before us by grant of the writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals. The question is whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in its interpretation and application of OCGA § 32-2-6. The opinion of the Court of Appeals as set out in Dept. of Transp. v. Land, 181 Ga. App. 94 (351 SE2d 470) (1986), correctly states the law of Georgia on this subject and we adopt and affirm the judgment subject to the following three paragraphs.

If the allegations contained in the petition are found to be true, i.e., that the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Whitfield County were jointly involved in the installation, maintenance, and control of the traffic light in question, it would make the DOT and the county joint tortfeasors and jointly and severally liable. The county is liable up to the $500,000 liability insurance it purchased. Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 391 (330 SE2d 95) (1985).

*658 Decided December 2, 1987. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles M. Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Brewton, for appellant. Mitchell, Coppedge, Wester, Bisson & Miller, Warren N. Coppedge, Jr., Kinney, Kemp, Pickett, Sponcler & Joiner, F. Gregory Melton, for appellee.

Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535 (361 SE2d 146) (1987) answers the motion to reinstate the DOT as a named party defendant. The fact that DOT is not named as an insured does not mean that insurance protection for the claim is not provided. Price specifically states that the claim is covered to the extent of the insurance provided to employees of DOT, and if they are named in the complaint, then it is proper to name DOT as a party defendant. Therefore, DOT can be a named party defendant. In addition to the waiver of immunity to the extent of insurance coverage, DOT is also liable as provided in OCGA § 32-2-6.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is affirmed except as to that part of the opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of DOT as a named party.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

All the Justices concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

362 S.E.2d 372, 257 Ga. 657, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 1027, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-transportation-v-land-ga-1987.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack