Department of State Police v. Kerry McAuliffe.
This text of Department of State Police v. Kerry McAuliffe. (Department of State Police v. Kerry McAuliffe.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-276
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE
vs.
KERRY MCAULIFFE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Kerry McAuliffe, the defendant, appeals from a decision and
order of the Appellate Division of the District Court Department
upholding a finding that he was responsible for failing to have
a vehicle inspection sticker under G. L. c. 90, § 20. We
affirm.
Background. On February 23, 2024, a Massachusetts State
Police trooper saw a vehicle changing lanes without using a turn
signal. The trooper pulled the vehicle over, determined that it
did not have an inspection sticker, and issued the defendant a
citation for failure to have an inspection sticker, a number
plate violation, and failure to signal. At a District Court hearing on June 27, 2024, the defendant
argued as to the failure to have an inspection sticker that he
was not responsible because he had been improperly cited.
Specifically, the defendant argued that the citation issued to
him by the trooper listed a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20B
(emphasis added), a statute repealed in 1967, rather than G. L.
c. 90, § 20. The District Court judge heard testimony from the
trooper that the defendant admitted at the time of the stop that
he did not have an inspection sticker. The defendant also
conceded that, during the traffic stop, the trooper informed the
defendant verbally of the violation for which he was being
cited. The judge concluded that the defendant had proper notice
that he was cited for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20, and
found the defendant responsible.
A panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the District
Court judge's finding that the defendant was responsible for the
failure to have an inspection sticker. The panel reasoned that
the text "90/20/B" on the citation was an "administrative" code
and that the defendant was verbally informed of the reason for
the citation, by the trooper, prior to the hearing.1 This appeal
followed.
1 The District Court docket shows that the Appellate Division held a hearing, but the panel's decision states it reviewed "the record before us, including the audio recording of the judicial hearing." Neither brief refers to an evidentiary
2 Discussion. The defendant argues on appeal that he cannot
be found responsible because he was erroneously charged under
G. L. c. 90, § 20B, a repealed statute, and that the panel of
the Appellate Division erred in concluding that "the reference
to '90/20/B' is just administrative coding." Appellate review
of civil motor vehicle infractions is limited to questions of
law. Burlington Police Dep't v. Hagopian, 100 Mass. App. Ct.
720, 726 (2022); G. L. c. 90C, § 3 (A) (5). Assuming, without
deciding, that the defendant has framed a question of law, our
review is constrained to the question whether the citation gave
the defendant sufficient notice of the statute he was accused of
violating.
We pause to address the fact that the defendant's
contentions are inadequate to rise to the level of appellate
argument. While we are not insensitive to the challenges of
proceeding as a self-represented litigant, such litigants are
bound by the same rules and requirements as represented parties
and are responsible for presenting the materials necessary to
permit meaningful appellate review. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a),
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019); Brossard v. West Roxbury
Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184 (1994). The
defendant failed to meet this standard and has advanced
hearing, and no transcript was provided; nothing turns on this discrepancy.
3 arguments without citation to any legal authority. See Mass.
R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
See also Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423
Mass. 1, 6 n.4 (1996) (conclusory statements in brief do not
rise to level of appellate argument); Zora v. State Ethics
Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993) (same).
Notwithstanding, we choose to address whether the evidence
sufficed to establish that the defendant knew he was cited for a
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20. Review of the citation shows
that under the section labeled "OFFENSE(S)," in a column titled
"description of offense," the defendant was accused of
"INSPECTION STICKER, NO * c90, § 20." This adequately alleged a
violation of § 20 and provided notice to the defendant of the
infraction for which he was cited. Under a column titled
"CHAP/SEC/SUB," the citation also states "A. 90/20/B"; the
defendant argues that the "90/20/B" is a reference to the
repealed statute, G. L. c. 90, § 20B. We disagree. In another
field, describing another infraction with which the defendant
was charged (that is not at issue here), the citation reads
"90/14B," referencing G. L. c. 90, § 14B. Comparing the two
fields shows that no forward slash is used between the number
and the letter when a section of a statute containing a letter
4 is referenced.2 Therefore, we conclude that that the Appellate
Division did not err and we affirm the finding that the
defendant was responsible for the violation of G. L. c. 90,
§ 20.3
Decision and order of the Appellate Division affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Desmond & Allen, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: June 12, 2026.
2 Although it does not affect our conclusion that the citation adequately charged a violation of § 20, we note that the "/B" in this column is mysterious. One might expect a subsection to be listed there, but § 20 has no subsections. Those who draft and fill out these forms should take care to do so in a manner that can leave no confusion about the charged offense.
3 The defendant raises several other issues in his brief, but as far as we can tell, they were not raised in the Appellate Division. They are not mentioned in the panel's decision and are not properly before us. Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006) ("An issue not raised or argued below may not be argued for the first time on appeal" [citation omitted]).
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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