Department of Revenue v. Rombough
This text of 650 P.2d 76 (Department of Revenue v. Rombough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant appeals from the tax court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering him to file individual income tax returns for the years 1977 to 1980. Defendant seeks to have the writ quashed on the grounds that he is not a person required to file. Defendant further claims that the standard applied by the tax court to deny his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was erroneous. Finally, defendant claims that a writ of mandamus cannot issue ordering the filing of a tax return.1 We uphold the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
The defendant when he became an ordained minister of the Life Science Church took a vow of poverty which included a gift or assignment of any future income. Therefore, he contends that any income earned after that date is tax exempt. The failure to so find, he argues, constitutes a violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2 and 3 of the Oregon Constitution.2 We find no such violation. All persons are taxable on income earned by them in their individual capacities, as opposed to their capacities as agents of a church. See Kelley v. Commmissioner, 62 T.C. 131 (1974). See also McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468 (1981). The test for agency is comprised of several factors showing the extent to which the activity is required by the church. Among these factors are the degree to which the activity is ordinarily associated with [480]*480the duties of members of the church, the requirements of the church, and the degree of direction and control exercised by the church. Rev Rui 77-290, 1977-2 CB 26, Rev Rul 68123, 1968-1 CB 35. The taxpayer in this case engaged in the practice of naturopathic and chiropractic medicine prior to 1977 when he was ordained. The church had no control over his practice. The church did not in any way require the activity. The activity is not ordinarily associated with church duties. We therefore find that the assignment of income incorporated into the vow of poverty was not effective to render it exempt. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S Ct 144, 85 LEd 75 (1940). The income is therefore taxable to the taxpayer as the wage earner. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S Ct 241, 74 LEd 731 (1930).
Defendant further claims that the tax court applied an erroneous standard to his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 Defendant filed a return containing his name, address, social security number and exemptions, but as to the other questions on the return, “objected” on the grounds that his answers might incriminate him. Defendant attached a memorandum to his return giving as a reason for his objections the possibility that the information requested might be used to help detect an offense or “to build a false and malicious case against me and help establish probable cause by misinterpretation of ambiguous circumstances.” The tax court judge found that defendant’s assertion was not based upon a real possibility that submitting answers would subject the taxpayer to criminal prosecution and ordered the filing of tax returns for the years in question.4 We find that the tax court judge [481]*481correctly, properly and lawfully rejected defendant’s claim. Defendant asserted that “something in his past” might lead to criminal prosecution and that information sought on the return might be used to build a case against him. A court should view the circumstances to determine whether it is evident from the implications of questions, in the setting in which they are asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. If it is not evident that there is a danger that injurious disclosure could result, the party claiming the privilege must make some showing that there is a real and substantial hazard of self-incrimination in responding to a question. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S Ct 814, 95 LEd 1118 (1951). It is well settled that mere declaration that a response might be incriminatory does not constitute a sufficient showing under the fifth amendment. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 37 S Ct 621, 61 LEd 1198 (1917.) We find that defendant’s mere assertion that his answers to all questions on a tax return might lead to criminal prosecution does not constitute a sufficient showing to justify upholding his fifth amendment claim.
[482]*482Finally, defendant claims that a writ of mandamus is not proper to compel the filing of a tax return. The legislature has expressly authorized such method of compelling the filing of tax returns. ORS 314.365.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
650 P.2d 76, 293 Or. 477, 1982 Ore. LEXIS 980, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-revenue-v-rombough-or-1982.