Department of Revenue v. Estate of Poehlmann
Opinion
The Washington Department of Revenue appeals a ruling that it is not entitled to collect a penalty for the tardy filing of a state estate tax return. We reverse.
[264]*264Karl Poehlmann died December 31, 1985. Later, the personal representative of his estate was required to file federal and state estate tax returns on the same day. Former RCW 83.100.050(1).1 It is conceded that the personal representative failed to file either return on time.
The penalty for tardily filing the federal return was 5 percent of the tax due for each month that the return was late, not to exceed 25 percent of the tax due: 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service was authorized to waive this penalty if the tardiness was due to reasonable cause rather than willful neglect. 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1).
The penalty for tardily filing the state return was described by state law as follows:
If the report provided for in RCW 83.100.050 is not filed within the time periods specified, then the personal representative shall pay, in addition to the interest provided in this section, a penalty equal to five percent of the tax due in respect to the transfer for each month beyond the time periods that the report has not been filed, but no penalty so imposed may exceed a total of twenty-five percent of the tax.
(Italics ours.) Former RCW 83.100.070(2) (Laws of 1981, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 7, § 83.100.070(2)). State law made no provision for waiver of the penalty.
After Poehlmann's personal representative tardily filed the federal return, the IRS found reasonable cause and waived the federal penalty. However, the State Department of Revenue concluded that it lacked the authority to waive [265]*265the state penalty, and it demanded that the state penalty be paid. The estate disputed that the state penalty was due, and the matter was brought before the Superior Court. That court ruled for the estate, and the State appealed.
We hold that the state penalty is due. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning prevails. PUD 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 110 Wn.2d 114, 118, 750 P.2d 1240 (1988). The plain meaning of former RCW 83.100.070 is that the described penalty must be paid, and that the State Department of Revenue has no authority to waive it.
Poehlmann's estate argues (1) that because the state statute involves a penalty, it must be strictly construed against the government, Uhl Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1940); (2) that when this is done, the waiver of the federal penalty by the IRS becomes equivalent to an extension of time to file the federal return that was due; and (3) that an extension for federal purposes was also an extension for state purposes because of RCW 83.100.050(1).2 We disagree. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, strict or otherwise, PUD 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, supra; Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O'Neal, 100 Wn.2d 256, 262, 668 P.2d 585 (1983), and waiving a penalty is simply not equivalent to extending the time for filing a return. Because of RCW 83.100.050(1), the third proposition would be correct if an extension had been granted by the IRS, but none ever was.
Reversed.
Worswick, C.J., and Alexander, J., concur.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
818 P.2d 616 (Department of Revenue v. Estate of Poehlmann) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.