Department of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa County

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Department of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa County

113 So. 3d 1074, 2013 WL 2436416, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 8924

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 5, 2013

DocketNo. 1D12-3929

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 113 So. 3d 1074 (Department of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Department of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa County, 113 So. 3d 1074, 2013 WL 2436416, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 8924 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) Final Order. The Final Order declared certain DJJ rules relating to cost sharing for secure detention invalid exercises of DJJ’s authority; specifically, DJJ’s interpretations of “final court disposition” and “actual costs.” We find the ALJ correctly determined that DJJ’s interpretations were improper.

If the language of a statute “is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute should be given its plain meaning.” Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Using the basic tenet of in pari materia to construe together statutes relating to the same or similar subject matter does not imply ambiguity. See Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265-66 (Fla.2008) (not resorting to statutory construction, but acknowledging entire sections must be read together); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act read by itself or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject is clear, certain, and unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law according to its terms.”) (quoting State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973)).

Here, a plain reading of “final court disposition” cannot, as DJJ asserts, limit the term to “commitment.” Likewise, “actual costs” cannot mean a figure derived through, as counsel for DJJ put it, a “complicated” formulaic scheme. A plain reading of this clear term indicates otherwise. We need not comment further, other than to commend the ALJ’s extensive and accurate analysis of the rules in question.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

CLARK and MARSTILLER, JJ, and BOLES, W. JOEL, Associate Judge, concur.

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PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) Final Order. The Final Order declared certain DJJ rules relating to cost sharing for secure detention invalid exercises of DJJ’s authority; specifically, DJJ’s interpretations of “final court disposition” and “actual costs.” We find the ALJ correctly determined that DJJ’s interpretations were improper.

If the language of a statute “is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute should be given its plain meaning.” Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Using the basic tenet of in pari materia to construe together statutes relating to the same or similar subject matter does not imply ambiguity. See Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265-66 (Fla.2008) (not resorting to statutory construction, but acknowledging entire sections must be read together); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act read by itself or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject is clear, certain, and unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law according to its terms.”) (quoting State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973)).

Here, a plain reading of “final court disposition” cannot, as DJJ asserts, limit the term to “commitment.” Likewise, “actual costs” cannot mean a figure derived through, as counsel for DJJ put it, a “complicated” formulaic scheme. A plain reading of this clear term indicates otherwise. We need not comment further, other than to commend the ALJ’s extensive and accurate analysis of the rules in question.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

CLARK and MARSTILLER, JJ, and BOLES, W. JOEL, Associate Judge, concur.

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113 So. 3d 1074, 2013 WL 2436416, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 8924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-juvenile-justice-v-okaloosa-county-fladistctapp-2013.

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