Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D.

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 24A1153
• Status: Relating-to

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________

No. 24A1153 _________________

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D. V. D., ET AL. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION [July 3, 2025]

On April 18, 2025, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts preliminarily enjoined the Government from removing “any alien” to a “country not explicitly pro- vided for on the alien’s order of removal” without following certain procedures designed to enable the alien to seek re- lief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100−20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. No. 25−cv−10676, ECF Doc. 64, pp. 46−47. The Dis- trict Court later found that the Government had violated that injunction by failing to provide six class members a “meaningful opportunity” to assert CAT claims before such removal. ECF Doc. 118, p. 1. On May 21, the District Court issued an “order on remedy,” directing the Government to follow specified procedures with respect to those individu- als, tailored to the circumstances. ECF Doc. 119. The Gov- ernment sought a stay of the April 18 injunction before our Court. On June 23, we stayed the April 18 preliminary injunc- tion pending disposition of any appeal and petition for writ of certiorari. Later that day, however, the District Court issued a minute order stating that the May 21 remedial or- der “remain[ed] in full force and effect,” “notwithstanding” our stay of the preliminary injunction. ECF Doc. 176. The only authority it cited was the dissent from the stay order. The Government has moved for “an order clarifying” our 2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.

stay. Motion for Clarification. It argues that the stay of the April 18 preliminary injunction divests the May 21 reme- dial order of enforceability. Respondents argue that the District Court correctly understood the May 21 order to re- main in effect—despite our stay of the preliminary injunc- tion it purported to enforce—because the May 21 order ef- fectively operates as a remedy for civil contempt. The motion for clarification is granted. Our June 23 order stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction in full. The May 21 remedial order cannot now be used to enforce an injunc- tion that our stay rendered unenforceable. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (explaining that a review- ing court’s stay order “divest[s]” the district court “order of enforceability”). Even if we accepted respondents’ charac- terization of the May 21 order, such a remedy would serve to “coerce” the Government into “compliance” and would be unenforceable given our stay of the underlying injunction. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303 (1947); see id., at 295 (“The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued and a fortiori when the injunction or restraining order was be- yond the jurisdiction of the court.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Despite the dissent’s provocative language, see post, at 6 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), a claim that a lower court has failed to give effect to an order of this Court is properly ad- dressed here. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493, 497 (1978) (per curiam) (“A litigant who . . . has obtained judgment in this Court after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several layers of courts, should not be required to go through that entire process again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court.”); see United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 446 (1859). “Assuming as we do” that the Dis- trict Court will now conform its order to our previous stay and cease enforcing the April 18 injunction through the May 21 remedial order, we have no occasion to reach the Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

Government’s other requests for relief. Cf. Deen v. Hick- man, 358 U. S. 57, 58 (1958) (per curiam). If the Govern- ment wishes to seek additional relief in aid of the execution of our mandate, it may do so through mandamus. See In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 255 (1895) (explain- ing that any matter “disposed of by” decree of this Court must be carried “into execution, according to the mandate,” by the courts below). Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

KAGAN, J., concurring

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D. V. D., ET AL. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION [July 3, 2025]

JUSTICE KAGAN, concurring. I voted to deny the Government’s previous stay applica- tion in this case, and I continue to believe that this Court should not have stayed the District Court’s April 18 order enjoining the Government from deporting non-citizens to third countries without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 9–18). But a majority of this Court saw things differently, and I do not see how a district court can compel compliance with an or- der that this Court has stayed. See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294–295 (1947); Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 24–26 (1887). Because continued enforcement of the District Court’s May 21, 2025 order would do just that, I vote to grant the Government’s motion for clarifica- tion. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. D. V. D., ET AL. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION [July 3, 2025]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting. The United States may not deport noncitizens to a coun- try where they are likely to be tortured or killed. Interna- tional and domestic law guarantee that basic human right. In this case, the Government seeks to nullify it by deporting noncitizens to potentially dangerous countries without no- tice or the opportunity to assert a fear of torture. Because the Fifth Amendment, immigration law, federal regula- tions, and this Court’s precedent unambiguously prohibit such no-notice deportations, see DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 15–18), a Federal District Court issued a classwide prelim- inary injunction barring the Government from removing noncitizens without notice and adequate process. The Government appealed, and pending its appeal re- peatedly violated the District Court’s order. See id., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 2–9). Meanwhile, the Government sought an emergency stay of the injunction from this Court. In its briefing, the Government took a kitchen-sink approach, ar- guing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant classwide injunctive relief, that it also lacked jurisdiction over individual plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process Clause, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice or a hearing before their removal. Without citing any of these arguments, or indeed providing any legal justification, this 2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.

Court granted the Government its requested stay. Now, the Government returns for more. At issue in its latest filing is a month-old remedial order, which the Dis- trict Court issued after the Government attempted illegally to deport eight class members to South Sudan. The reme- dial order required the Government to provide those noncit- izens, whom it is currently holding in Djibouti, with the pro- cess to which the Constitution and federal law entitled them: adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. No. 25–cv–10676 (D Mass., May 21, 2025) ECF Doc. 119. Fol- lowing this Court’s unreasoned stay of the original prelimi- nary injunction, the District Court issued a minute order explaining that its remedial order (which the Government did not appeal, and whose validity this Court therefore did not consider) remained in effect. ECF Doc. 176. Rather than complying with the remedial order, the Government immediately returned to this Court, purporting to seek “clarification” of the stay. What the Government wants to do, concretely, is send the eight noncitizens it illegally removed from the United States from Djibouti to South Sudan, where they will be turned over to the local authorities without regard for the likelihood that they will face torture or death. Because “ ‘the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings,” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3), the Government’s no-notice removals are undoubtedly illegal, see D. V. D., 606 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 15–18) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). In simple terms, the Govern- ment requests that the Court remove an obstacle to its achieving those unlawful ends. That obstacle, again, is the District Court’s remedial order, which it issued to resolve the Government’s violations of the preliminary injunction this Court later stayed. The Government now asks this Court to hold that the stay invalidated the remedial order. In substance, of course, the Government’s new request for Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

relief has nothing to do with clarification, so this Court has no business considering its merits now. The Court’s Rules make plain where the Government should have pressed its argument about the nature and validity of the remedial or- der: before the lower courts. See this Court’s Rule 23(3) (“Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, an appli- cation for a stay will not be entertained unless the relief requested was first sought in the appropriate court or courts below”); cf. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (emphasizing need to comply with Rule 23, and criticizing this Court for granting relief when it was “doubtful” that the applicants’ request to the lower courts had been adequate). The Gov- ernment undisputedly did not comply with that Rule. Litigants may alternatively seek an “extraordinary writ,” such as an injunction, even without complying with Rule 23. See this Court’s Rule 20(1). Yet that relief is available only if it would “aid . . . the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.” Ibid. Far from maintaining our jurisdiction, vacating the District Court’s remedial order risks doing the opposite: de- stroying jurisdiction over the noncitizens the Government intends to deport without notice or process. The Govern- ment thus plainly cannot satisfy Rule 20’s requirements, ei- ther. Finally, even the majority does not believe that the Government is entitled to mandamus relief. Although Members of today’s majority have previously insisted that “this Court should follow established proce- dures” when granting emergency relief, A. A. R. P., 604 U. S., at ____ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5), the Court now ignores its Rules to grant the Government its desired “clarification” immediately. The majority suggests (relying on an argument the Government did not make) that a remedy for civil contempt is not enforceable when the 4 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.

underlying injunction has been stayed.1 Ante, at 2. Per- haps that should be the rule, but the question appears to be a matter of first impression in this Court. In support of its view, the majority cites a single line of dictum in United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947), which says that the right to remedial relief for civil contempt “falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.” Id., at 295. “Preliminary injunctions, however, do not con- clusively resolve legal disputes,” and neither do temporary stay orders. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6). Accordingly, this Court’s stay certainly did not “prove” that the District Court’s injunction was “errone- ously issued.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 295.2 Given that the majority can muster no more than a sen- tence of 80-year-old dictum in support of today’s holding, the District Court can hardly be faulted for reaching a con- trary conclusion. The District Court, moreover, had only moments to decide the question, for (unlike this Court) it —————— 1 To be clear, even the majority today does not dispute that “[v]iolations

of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal, . . . or though the basic action has become moot.” United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294 (1947) (citing Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14 (1887), and Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911)). Civil contempt orders in turn “may . . . be em- ployed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” 330 U. S., at 303–304. The majority appears to construe the District Court’s order as serving the former purpose. See ante, at 2. 2 After first adopting the Government’s characterization of its request

as one for “clarification,” see ante, at 1–2, the majority later appears to justify its premature intervention by treating it as a request for manda- mus relief, see ante, at 2 (“[A] claim that a lower court has failed to give effect to an order of this Court is properly addressed here”). Even the majority, however, does not believe that mandamus relief is warranted. Its reliance on General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493 (1978) explains why. There, a District Court disobeyed a clear instruction “specifically addressed” in this Court’s opinion. Id., at 496. Here, this Court did not see fit to provide the District Court with any instructions. Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

realized that the lives and safety of eight noncitizens were at stake. Any suggestion that the District Court failed to carry “ ‘into execution’ ” this Court’s mandate (which said no more than that the Government’s application was “granted”) is patently inappropriate. Cf. ante, at 3. That the Government accuses the District Court, whose orders it has consistently ignored, of “unprecedented defiance,” is more extraordinary still. Motion for Clarification 1. Even now, the Government seeks to defy this Court’s clear hold- ings that it must afford noncitizens with due process of law before removing them. In the end, the majority ignores the Court’s Rules for seeking emergency relief and creates new law on civil con- tempt, all to allow the Government to circumvent the ap- pellate process with respect to an order it continues to defy. In so doing, the Court focuses on dictum in Mine Workers at the cost of discarding that case’s central message: “ ‘An in- junction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction . . . and served upon persons made parties therein . . . must be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be.’ ” 330 U. S., at 293–294. For all that, moreover, the majority does not actually clarify its prior decision. The majority says it expects “that the District Court will now conform its order to our previous stay,” ante, at 2, but it refuses to explain what such con- formity would involve. As a result, today’s order not only excuses (once again) the Government’s undisguised con- tempt for the Judiciary; it also leaves the District Court without any guidance about how this litigation should pro- ceed. The District Court cannot adjudicate plaintiffs’ seri- ous due process claims on their merits without ensuring, by way of injunctive relief, its jurisdiction over the case. Yet this Court refuses to explain what injunctive relief, if any, it believes the District Court can issue. Perhaps the majority hopes that, in light of its content- less stay order, the District Court will simply give up on 6 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.

adjudicating this case. But if this Court wishes to permit the Government to flout the fundamental rights guaran- teed by the Due Process Clause, it cannot avoid accounta- bility for that lawlessness by tasking the lower courts with inventing a rationale. The Court’s continued refusal to jus- tify its extraordinary decisions in this case, even as it faults lower courts for failing properly to divine their import, is indefensible.

* * * “In a democracy, power implies responsibility. The greater the power that defies law the less tolerant can this Court be of defiance. As the Nation’s ultimate judicial tri- bunal, this Court, beyond any other organ of society, is the trustee of law and charged with the duty of securing obedi- ence to it.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 312 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). This Court continues to invert those principles. Today’s order clarifies only one thing: Other litigants must follow the rules, but the administra- tion has the Supreme Court on speed dial. Respectfully, I dissent.