Department of Highways of Louisiana v. United States

159 F. Supp. 341, 141 Ct. Cl. 715, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 104
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 5, 1958
DocketNo. 339-52
StatusPublished

This text of 159 F. Supp. 341 (Department of Highways of Louisiana v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Department of Highways of Louisiana v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 341, 141 Ct. Cl. 715, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 104 (cc 1958).

Opinion

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, prior to February 3, 1949, applied to the Federal Government for permission to build a bridge across the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, near Houma, Louisiana. It submitted a map and plans showing the location of the proposed bridge as well as its structural details. The Government gave public notice to all interested persons, and held hearings on the question of whether the permission should be granted. On February 3,1949, the Chief of Engineers of the Army, and on February 4,1949, the Secretary of the Army, approved the plans. The certificate of approval said that it was granted pursuant to Title V of the General Bridge Act of 1946, section 502, 60 Stat. 847, 33 U. S. C. 525 (b). It also said that it would be null and void if construction of the bridge was not begun within one year.

On the plaintiff’s application, the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army in 1950 extended the time within which construction might be commenced to February 4,1952, and the time for completion of the bridge to February 4, 1954. In reliance upon the permit which it had been given, the plaintiff made a contract with a construction company which, on July 24,1950, commenced work on the construction of the bridge. Its work was performed under the supervision of the Army Engineers’ District Engineer at New Orleans, Louisiana.

On August 24, 1950, the District Engineer telegraphed to the plaintiff a notice that all work on the bridge should be suspended; that the District Engineer had given public notice that he was going to recommend changes in the plans. In response to this telegram the plaintiff wrote the District Engineer objecting to the proposed changes unless the Government was to pay the cost already incurred in obtaining the rights of way, and in the plaintiff’s obligations to the contractor for work already done. Over the plaintiff’s protests, the Chief of Engineers on September 12 and the Sec[717]*717retary of the Army on September 19,1950, signed a “second permit” granting the plaintiff permission to erect a different type of bridge at a different location. The plaintiff was then obliged to abandon all work previously done by it and its contractor, secure new rights of way for bridge approaches, move power lines and incur other expenses in addition to the increased costs created by the new type of bridge specified in the permit. The plaintiff claims to have suffered a loss of $41,383.29. The petition does not allege that the federal officials concerned acted maliciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably.

The plaintiff’s suit is based upon the theory that the permit granted to it, and later revoked, was a contract, and that its revocation was a breach of contract. The plaintiff suggests also that its suit may be one for just compensation for the taking of a property right, and thus founded upon the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Congress, under its power to regulate interstate commerce, has power to legislate concerning the construction of bridges over navigable waters. Until 1884 Congress enacted no such legislation, and such bridges were built under authorizations granted by the states. 23 Stat. 133, 148. By sections 9 and 10 of the Act of August 11, 1888, 25 Stat. 424, 425, the Secretary of War was authorized to order the alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation. In cases arising under later statutes of similar import, it has been held that such orders of tne Secretary of War do not constitute a taking of the bridge owners’ property and that the United States was not obliged to compensate the owner for the cost of alteration or removal of the bridge. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364.

By the Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U. S. C. 401, it was for the first time required that one who proposed to erect a bridge over navigable waters first obtain the consent of Congress, and the approval of his plans by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. The Act of March 23, 1906, 34 Stat. 84, contained a similar provision, section 491 of 33 U. S. C. Both the 1899 Act (33 U. S. C. 502) and the [718]*7181906 Act (83 U. S. C. 494) contained provisions which, expressly authorized the Secretary of War to, after hearing, order the alteration of bridges to remove obstructions to navigation, such alteration to be made at the expense of the owner. These sections applied to bridges authorized by Congress, and the plans of which had been approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, as well as those which had been built under State authority, before Federal permission was required. These sections also made it a crime for the owner of a bridge to fail to make alterations ordered by the Secretary of War.

In the Act of June 21, 1940, 54 Stat. 499, 33 U. S. C. 517, Congress for the first time provided for the apportionment of costs between the owner and the Government, when bridges were ordered to be altered. But that statute applied only to railroad bridges, or to combined railroad and highway bridges. In 1952 the apportionment statute was amended to include highway bridges owned by a state. 66 Stat. 733; 33 U. S. C. 516. This amendment came after the events involved in this suit, and the plaintiff does not assert any rights under it.

In 1946 Congress in its statute “To provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government” included Title 5, The General Bridge Act of 1946, to eliminate the necessity of a special act of Congress whenever a bridge was to be erected over navigable waters. The Act gave general consent for the erection of all bridges, the locations, plans and specifications of which should be approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. In section 507 of this statute, 60 Stat. 849, 33 U. S. C. 530, it was said that a part of one section of the 1899 Act, and all of the 1906 Act should not apply to bridges constructed pursuant to the 1946 Act. The permission to the plaintiff which is here involved was granted pursuant to the 1946 Act. Included, therefore, in the former provisions made inapplicable to such bridges were sections 494 and 495 of 33 U. S. C., which were sections of the 1906 Act. They contain authorization to the Secretary of War to require the removal or alteration of bridges which obstruct navigation, and provide penalties for the failure of the owner to obey such orders. [719]*719But the 1946 Act did not provide that section 502 of 33 U. S. C. which, as we have seen, was contained in the 1899 Act, should be inapplicable to bridges built pursuant to the Act of 1946.

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Related

Union Bridge Co. v. United States
204 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1907)
Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States
221 U.S. 194 (Supreme Court, 1911)

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Bluebook (online)
159 F. Supp. 341, 141 Ct. Cl. 715, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-highways-of-louisiana-v-united-states-cc-1958.