Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Argeros

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Argeros

313 So. 2d 55, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14859

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 23, 1975

DocketNo. 74-403

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 313 So. 2d 55 (Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Argeros) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 So. 2d 55, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14859 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).

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PER CURIAM.

Appellee, Steven James Argeros, had his driving privilege suspended by appellant, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, State of Florida, for a period of one year for the accumulation of twenty-four points within thirty-six months as authorized by Section 322.27(2) (c), Florida Statutes 1973. Argeros filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Orange County Circuit Court to review the order of suspension. The circuit court, in its order granting the petition for a writ of certiora-ri and remanding the cause to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for further proceedings, determined that the procedure followed by the Department in suspending Argeros’ driver’s license without notice and opportunity to be heard prior to suspension constituted a deprivation of due process. It is from this order that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles takes the instant appeal.

The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles here contends that the holding of the circuit court was erroneous. We must agree. The Florida Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the failure of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to provide the individual who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant suspension of his driver’s license under § 322.27 with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual’s license does not deprive the individual of procedural due process. Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So.2d 513 (Fla.1962) ; Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla.1953).

Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order denying appellee’s petition for a writ of certio-rari.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

OWEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur. MAGER, J., concurs specially.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellee, Steven James Argeros, had his driving privilege suspended by appellant, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, State of Florida, for a period of one year for the accumulation of twenty-four points within thirty-six months as authorized by Section 322.27(2) (c), Florida Statutes 1973. Argeros filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Orange County Circuit Court to review the order of suspension. The circuit court, in its order granting the petition for a writ of certiora-ri and remanding the cause to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for further proceedings, determined that the procedure followed by the Department in suspending Argeros’ driver’s license without notice and opportunity to be heard prior to suspension constituted a deprivation of due process. It is from this order that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles takes the instant appeal.

The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles here contends that the holding of the circuit court was erroneous. We must agree. The Florida Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the failure of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to provide the individual who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant suspension of his driver’s license under § 322.27 with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual’s license does not deprive the individual of procedural due process. Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So.2d 513 (Fla.1962) ; Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla.1953).

Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order denying appellee’s petition for a writ of certio-rari.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

OWEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur. MAGER, J., concurs specially.

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313 So. 2d 55, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14859, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-highway-safety-motor-vehicles-v-argeros-fladistctapp-1975.

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