Department of Corrections v. Brown

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Department of Corrections v. Brown

403 S.E.2d 452, 198 Ga. App. 862, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 317

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 22, 1991

DocketA90A1572

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 403 S.E.2d 452 (Department of Corrections v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Department of Corrections v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 452, 198 Ga. App. 862, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

J. Farrell Brown, Curtis Nuckolls, Cleo B. Jenkins, Leslie Dodson, Wirt W. Garmany III, Terry H. Jones, Sylvia Hill and Janet Landers (plaintiffs) filed a declaratory judgment action against the Georgia Department of Corrections (defendant) and alleged that they are employed by defendant as probation officers in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit and alleged facts showing that a conflict exists between the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit and defendant as to whether the counties should be allowed to supplement plaintiffs’ salaries. Plaintiffs prayed for “an interlocutory order . . . allowing [them] to receive and use any supplements paid by the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit [and a declaration of their] right and status ... to receive pay supplements from the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit.” Defendant challenged plaintiffs’ complaint, but the trial court subsequently entered an order and declared that plaintiffs “are legally entitled to and should receive the pay supplements in question from the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit. . . .” Defendant appeals. Held:

“[A]n action for declaratory judgment will lie only when necessary to protect plaintiffs against the risk of undirected future action which would jeopardize their interests. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487 (117 SE2d 336) (1960), later appeal, 217 Ga. 562 (123 SE2d 770) (1962).” Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 (339 SE2d 226). In the case sub judice, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were in need of direction with respect to undirected future conduct on their part which might jeopardize their interests. Consequently, “ ‘ “the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter [a declaratory] judgment. This being so, the judgment must be set aside as nugatory.” (Cit.) . . .’ Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Dennis, 185 Ga. App. 177, 178 (363 SE2d 614) (1987).” Logan Paving Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 196 Ga. App. 42, 43 (395 SE2d 287).

Judgment vacated.

Sognier, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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McMurray, Presiding Judge.

J. Farrell Brown, Curtis Nuckolls, Cleo B. Jenkins, Leslie Dodson, Wirt W. Garmany III, Terry H. Jones, Sylvia Hill and Janet Landers (plaintiffs) filed a declaratory judgment action against the Georgia Department of Corrections (defendant) and alleged that they are employed by defendant as probation officers in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit and alleged facts showing that a conflict exists between the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit and defendant as to whether the counties should be allowed to supplement plaintiffs’ salaries. Plaintiffs prayed for “an interlocutory order . . . allowing [them] to receive and use any supplements paid by the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit [and a declaration of their] right and status ... to receive pay supplements from the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit.” Defendant challenged plaintiffs’ complaint, but the trial court subsequently entered an order and declared that plaintiffs “are legally entitled to and should receive the pay supplements in question from the counties of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit. . . .” Defendant appeals. Held:

“[A]n action for declaratory judgment will lie only when necessary to protect plaintiffs against the risk of undirected future action which would jeopardize their interests. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487 (117 SE2d 336) (1960), later appeal, 217 Ga. 562 (123 SE2d 770) (1962).” Moss v. Central State Hosp., 255 Ga. 403, 404 (339 SE2d 226). In the case sub judice, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were in need of direction with respect to undirected future conduct on their part which might jeopardize their interests. Consequently, “ ‘ “the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter [a declaratory] judgment. This being so, the judgment must be set aside as nugatory.” (Cit.) . . .’ Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Dennis, 185 Ga. App. 177, 178 (363 SE2d 614) (1987).” Logan Paving Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 196 Ga. App. 42, 43 (395 SE2d 287).

Judgment vacated.

Sognier, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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403 S.E.2d 452, 198 Ga. App. 862, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/department-of-corrections-v-brown-gactapp-1991.

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