Deotis Sanders-Gray v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 10-23-00252-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-23-00252-CR

DEOTIS SANDERS-GRAY, Appellant v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-1453-C2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The jury convicted Deotis Sanders-Gray of the offense of felon in possession of a

firearm. The State had provided Sanders-Gray with a notice of punishment

enhancement. The jury assessed punishment at confinement for 20 years. See TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 46.04; 12.42(a). Because the trial court did not commit error in the charge to the

jury on punishment, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. BACKGROUND

Sanders-Gray had previously been adjudicated delinquent and committed to the

Texas Juvenile Justice Department for the felony offense of burglary of a habitation. Prior

to trial for the offense of felon in possession of a firearm, the State provided Sanders-Gray

with a notice of intent to enhance his punishment from a third degree felony to a second

degree felony with the prior burglary adjudication. After his conviction, Sanders-Gray

pled true at the beginning of the punishment phase to the punishment enhancement

notice. During the punishment phase, the State also introduced a copy of the juvenile

court adjudication for burglary of a habitation. In the punishment charge, the trial court

instructed the jury as to the range of punishment pursuant to the enhancement. The jury

was informed of the enhancement offense, and because Sanders-Gray pled true to the

offense, the jury was also instructed to find the enhancement true. The court did not

inform the jury in the charge that the enhancement offense was a juvenile adjudication.

CHARGE ERROR

In one issue on appeal, Sanders-Gray complains that the trial court failed to

properly instruct the jury by failing to track the language of Texas Penal Code section

12.42(f) 1 in the charge regarding the punishment enhancement which, he contends,

egregiously harmed him.

Standard of Review

If a defendant timely objects to alleged jury-charge error, the record need only

1 This subsection pertains to when a juvenile adjudication may be considered a final, felony conviction for the purpose of punishment enhancement.

Sanders-Gray v. State Page 2 show some harm to obtain relief. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh'g). If there

was no timely objection, the record must show egregious harm. Id. Either way, to obtain

a reversal for jury charge error, the appellant must have suffered actual harm and not

merely theoretical harm. Reed v. State, 680 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

Sanders-Gray admits that he did not object to the court’s charge. Thus, if we find

the trial court erred, we must decide whether the record shows egregious harm.

However, if we do not find the trial court erred, our analysis ends.

Law

When a defendant is a repeat or habitual offender, the Texas Penal Code gives the

State the ability to request and prove an increased punishment range for that defendant.

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42. Prior convictions used as enhancements must be pled in

some form but need not be pled in the indictment. Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997).

As it applies to this case, if it is shown on the trial of a felony of the third degree

that the defendant had previously been finally convicted of a felony other than a state jail

felony, on conviction, the defendant shall be punished for a felony of the second degree.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42 (a). Generally, an adjudication by a juvenile court that a child

engaged in delinquent conduct constituting a felony offense for which the child was

committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department is considered a final felony

conviction for certain enhancement provisions including the enhancement provision

used by the State. Id. (f), (a).

Sanders-Gray v. State Page 3 The State has the burden to prove that any prior conviction used to enhance a

sentence was final under the law and that the defendant was the person previously

convicted of that offense. Wilson v. State, 671 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A

plea of "true," however, satisfies the State's burden of proof and permits the trial court to

charge the jury on punishment as though the primary offense carries the enhanced

punishment. Harvey v. State, 611 S.W.2d 108, 111-112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). When a

plea of true occurs, the trial court may instruct the jury to find the enhancement

paragraph to be true. See Chandler v. State, 21 S.W.3d 922, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Urbano v. State, 808 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1991, no pet.). Consequently, in that situation, there is no need to submit the validity of

the enhancement allegation for the jury's consideration. See Howell v. State, 563 S.W.2d

933, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

Application

In this case, Sanders-Gray pled true to the punishment enhancement notice

provided by the State. Thus, the State was not required to prove up the enhancement,

and the trial court could instruct the jury to find the enhancement to be true. Because

the trial court instructed the jury to find the enhancement to be true, there was nothing

for the jury to consider. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to track the

language of section 12.42(f) in the charge.

CONCLUSION

Having determined the trial court did not err, we overrule Sanders-Gray’s sole

Sanders-Gray v. State Page 4 issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

TOM GRAY Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Smith, and Justice Wright 2 Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed December 12, 2024 Do not publish [CRPM]

2 The Honorable Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Eleventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.

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