Deonte Dwight Williams v. State of Iowa
This text of Deonte Dwight Williams v. State of Iowa (Deonte Dwight Williams v. State of Iowa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0502 Filed April 10, 2024
DEONTE DWIGHT WILLIAMS, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
Deonte Williams appeals the order granting summary dismissal of his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Cathleen J. Siebricht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Deonte Williams appeals the order granting summary dismissal of his
application for postconviction relief (PCR) after finding it was time-barred. He filed
his PCR application in February 2022, challenging the sentences imposed after he
pled guilty to two counts of second-degree robbery in December 2017. The PCR
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the application because it was not filed
within three years of the date his conviction became final, as required by Iowa
Code section 822.3 (2022). On appeal, Williams contends the PCR court erred by
dismissing his application without allowing him the opportunity to fully develop the
record and challenges the constitutionality of section 822.3. For the reasons
below, we affirm.
We review the summary dismissal of a PCR application for correction of
errors at law. Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). Applying our
summary judgment standards to summary disposition of PCR applications,
summary disposition is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show . . .
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa R. Civ.
P. 1.981(3)). The State, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving there
are no genuine issues of material fact, and we review the record in the light most
favorable to Williams. See id.
Applying these standards, we agree that the State proved no issue of
material fact is in dispute. The PCR application states that Williams’s convictions
were final in December 2017. Under section 822.3, Williams had until 3
December 2020 to apply for PCR from those convictions. His PCR application
was filed more than one year after the limitation period expired. Because his
application was untimely on its face, summary dismissal was appropriate.
Williams complains that he was not allowed an opportunity to prove his PCR
application falls under the exception in section 822.3 for grounds of fact or law that
could not have been raised within the three-year limitation period. But despite the
PCR court twice extending the deadline to amend his application, Williams never
argued that he could not raise his claim earlier. Nor did he make that argument at
the hearing on the State’s motion. Considering Williams’s silence on the issue, the
PCR court properly granted summary dismissal.1
Finally, Williams challenges the constitutionality of section 822.3. The issue
was neither presented to nor ruled on by the PCR court. Because error was not
preserved for our review, we do not address this claim on appeal. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).
We affirm the summary dismissal of Williams’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
1 Williams also claims the PCR court failed to provide notice under section 822.6(2)
(“The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal.”). But section 822.6(2) applies only to dismissals made on the court’s initiative. See Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002).
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