Deonta D. Anderson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 26, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CR-405
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 26 2019, 8:23 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Paul J. Podlejski Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Anderson, Indiana Attorney General Michael Vo Sherman Certified Legal Intern Evan Matthew Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Deonta D. Anderson, August 26, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-405 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff David A. Happe, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C04-1706-F6-1570

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-405 | August 26, 2019 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Deonta D. Anderson appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony resisting law

enforcement, arguing that the evidence is insufficient. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Around 7 p.m. on June 10, 2017, Anderson Police Department Officer Ryan

Prado was on patrol when he was dispatched to Cooper’s Sport Bowl on a

report of a man and a woman “fighting” in the parking lot. Tr. p. 133. When

Officer Prado arrived on the scene, he saw a man, later identified as Anderson,

and a woman “loud[ly]” “arguing” and “yelling.” Id. at 134, 135. The arguing

and yelling was loud enough that Officer Prado could hear it from his patrol car

about twenty-five feet away. Officer Prado didn’t know what had happened

before his arrival, so he approached the woman to investigate. The woman

yelled at Officer Prado to “get” Anderson. Id. at 144. Officer Prado then

ordered Anderson to “[s]top, come here,” but Anderson responded, “[N]o, I

don’t have to.” Id. at 135. Officer Prado told Anderson to stop “at least five”

times, but Anderson never did. Id. at 138. Eventually, Anderson got into his

car. When Officer Prado ordered Anderson to get out, he locked the door and

“drove away.” Id. Officer Prado did not pursue Anderson, but he was

eventually able to identify him.

[3] The State charged Anderson with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement for

fleeing by car. A jury trial was held. During closing argument, defense counsel

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-405 | August 26, 2019 Page 2 of 5 argued that Officer Prado did not have a reasonable basis for ordering

Anderson to stop and that therefore Anderson was not required to obey Officer

Prado’s orders. Id. at 171. The jury found Anderson guilty, and the trial court

sentenced him to 880 days executed in the Department of Correction.

[4] Anderson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] Anderson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

As relevant here, the resisting statute provides that a person who knowingly or

intentionally flees in a car after being ordered to stop by a law-enforcement

officer commits Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-

3-1(a)(3), (c)(1)(A). Anderson does not dispute that Officer Prado ordered him

to stop or that he fled by car. Instead, his appeal is based on our Supreme

Court’s holding that this part of the resisting statute must be read to require that

the police officer’s order to stop be based on probable cause or reasonable

suspicion, that is, specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to

reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d

1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014); Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014).

Absent proof that the officer’s order to stop meets this requirement, the

evidence is insufficient to establish the offense of resisting law enforcement.

Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255. Anderson argues that Officer Prado’s order to stop

was not based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-405 | August 26, 2019 Page 3 of 5 [6] Anderson claims that the facts of this case “are almost perfectly in line with

those in Gaddie,” where our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction

for resisting law enforcement. Appellant’s Br. pp. 7-8. In Gaddie, around 10

p.m. police were dispatched to a house in Indianapolis on a report of a

“disturbance.” 10 N.E.3d at 1252. When police arrived, there were eight

people on the front porch and in the front yard “screaming and yelling.” Id.

There were several other people, including the defendant, walking along a side

yard toward the back of the house. An officer told the group to return to the

front yard, and everyone did so except the defendant. The officer followed the

defendant and ordered him to stop twice. The defendant looked back but did

not stop. At trial, the officer testified that he had not seen the defendant or

anyone else commit a crime before ordering the defendant to stop. On appeal,

our Supreme Court found that the officer’s order to stop was not based on

reasonable suspicion:

[The officer] testified that he had responded to “just a disturbance” and that he had not seen the defendant or anyone else commit a crime prior to ordering the defendant to stop. Our legislature has not defined a “disturbance” as a crime, and thus a report of a disturbance, without more, is not a sufficient basis upon which to conduct an investigatory stop.

Id. at 1255.

[7] As the State points out, here there is more. That is, Officer Prado was

dispatched to the parking lot of Cooper’s Sport Bowl on a report of a man and a

woman “fighting.” When Officer Prado arrived on the scene, he didn’t know

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-405 | August 26, 2019 Page 4 of 5 what had been going on but saw that Anderson and the woman were arguing

and yelling loudly. In fact, according to Officer Prado, the yelling was loud

enough to be classified as disorderly conduct. Tr. p. 147; see Ind. Code § 35-45-

1-3(a). When Officer Prado approached the woman to investigate, she told

him to “get” Anderson. Based on these facts, we conclude that Officer Prado

had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and therefore could

freeze the situation to investigate. We therefore affirm Anderson’s conviction

for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.1

[8] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

1 During the preliminary-instructions and final-instructions conferences, defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury that Officer Prado’s order to stop must have been based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, but the trial court declined to do so. See Tr. pp. 111-16, 159-60. On appeal, Anderson does not argue that the trial court erred by not giving such an instruction.

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