Denton v. Abbitt

66 Va. Cir. 54, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 249
CourtAmherst County Circuit Court
DecidedSeptember 8, 2004
DocketCase No. CL5871
StatusPublished

This text of 66 Va. Cir. 54 (Denton v. Abbitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Amherst County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Denton v. Abbitt, 66 Va. Cir. 54, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 249 (Va. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

BY JUDGE J. MICHAEL GAMBLE

I am writing to furnish the written decision of the Court in this case. The rulings of the Court are as follows. The common boundary line between the adjacent properties of Mr. and Mrs. Charles W. Denton (“Denton”) and Patricia O’Dell Abbitt (“Abbitt”) is set forth on the plat of J. A. Michael Nichols, Land Surveyor, dated August 14, 2002, and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit # 4. Abbitt has title by adverse possession of that portion of the roadway located on Denton from Wright Shop Road to the point where the vertical plane of the front of the Abbitt garage (not carport) extends to the bottom of the bank along the driveway/roadway. This area extends northward from the Denton/Abbitt boundaiy on the Nichols plat to the bottom of the small bank (located on Denton) on the north side of the roadway. Next, Abbitt has established a right-of-way by prescription from the point where the roadway passes north of the Abbitt garage until it enters the real estate of Abbitt at approximately point H6 on the plat by Thomas C. Brooks, Sr., Land [55]*55Surveyor, dated June 24,2002, and admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit # 2. The Court’s reasons for these rulings are set forth below.

This proceeding began as a motion for judgment to establish boundary lines under Va. Code § 8.01-179. The defendant also seeks to establish a boundary line in her counterclaim. A party seeking to determine a boundary line must recover on the strength of his own title. Page v. Luhring, 208 Va. 643, 650, 159 S.E.2d 642 (1968); Griggs v. Brown, 126 Va. 556, 102 S.E. 212 (1920).

In order for a party to prevail in a boundary line case, the party must establish the boundary by a preponderance of the evidence by one of three methods. These methods are by (1) showing perfect legal title to the land by showing an unbroken chain of title either to the Commonwealth or to a common grantor; or (2) title by adverse possession; or (3) such state of facts as will warrant to the court in presuming a grant. Development Corp. v. Jackson, 201 Va. 95, 99, 109 S.E.2d 400 (1959). In the instant case, the Court finds that Denton has shown perfect legal title to the land by showing an unbroken chain to a common grantor. Both the Denton real estate and the Abbitt real estate came from a 110.43 acre tract of land shown on a plat of the B. W. Johnson Farm by S. S. Lynn dated April 1920 and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit # 6. This real estate was subdivided pursuant to a plat by H. G. Garland, C.E., dated April 16, 1928, and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit # 5. Lot number 4 on the Garland plat is currently the real estate of Denton. Lot number 3 on the Garland plat is currently the real estate of Abbitt. Subsequent to the Garland plat, a portion of both the Denton and Abbitt properties was taken by the Commonwealth of Virginia for the improvement of Wright Shop Road.

Additionally, at the trial of this case, each party had a surveyor testify as an expert witness. Both surveyors had difficulty reestablishing the common boundary line between the Denton and Abbitt properties due to defects in the H. G. Garland survey. The basic problem with the H. G. Garland survey is that it failed to close with respect to both the Denton and Abbitt properties. Most of these problems were caused due to the lack of accuracy of the compass and chain measuring devices used by surveyors of that era. Both expert surveyors made exhaustive efforts to reestablish the common boundary notwithstanding the errors in the Garland plat.

In this case, the key boundary line issue revolved around the location of a white oak tree located on the boundary between Lot 3 and Lot 4 on the Garland plat about 400 feet from Wright Shop Road. The Dentons maintain that this is the large white oak tree shown on Plaintiffs Exhibits 28, 29, 31, and 73A. Defendant maintains that this white oak tree is a smaller white oak [56]*56tree no longer in existence located on the northeastern side of the current roadway leading into the Abbitt real estate. The Court finds that the greater weight of the evidence establishes the white oak tree as the existing 24 inch white oak tree located southwest of the roadway into the Abbitt property and shown on Plaintiffs Exhibits set forth above. There are several reasons for this Court ruling. First, the existing white oak tree is over 100 years old. It has old fence sticking out of the tree. The radial inverse lines to the northwest comer of the property support the use of this tree rather than the smaller tree that was once six inches in diameter. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 72A. Last, Bill Abbitt, father of defendant, remembers the smaller tree to be about six inches in width. This means that it was much smaller in width at the time the surveyors used the tree. The Court finds that it is unlikely that the surveyors would have used such a small tree when there was a larger tree in close proximity.

Accordingly, the evidence by a greater weight establishes the boundary shown on the Nichols plat.

The next question involves adverse possession. Both Denton and Abbitt have made claims for adverse possession of the portion of the roadway leading from Wright Shop Road into the southeast portion of the Abbitt real estate. The Dentons basically claim adverse possession along the portion from the garage to the point where the roadway enters the Abbitt real estate. Abbitt claims adverse possession from Wright Shop Road the entire distance of the roadway until it enters the Abbitt real estate.

In order to establish adverse possession, a claimant must “prove actual, hostile, exclusive, visual, and continuous possession, under a claim of right for the statutory period of fifteen years.” Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61-62, 400 S.E.2d 168 (1991); Va. Code § 8.01-236. A claimant must prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 43, 431 S.E.2d 285 (1993). The term “hostile” does not mean angry or combative in the context of adverse possession. It is hostile if it is under “claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner.” Grappo, 241 Va. at 62. The phrase “claim of right” refers to the intent of a claimant to use land as the claimant’s own to the exclusion of all others. Kim v. Douval Corp., 259 Va. 752, 757, 529 S.E.2d 92 (2000). Claim ofright, however, does not depend on actual title or actual right to the properly. Marion Inv. Co. v. Virginia Lincoln Furniture Corp., 171 Va. 170, 182, 198 S.E. 508 (1938).

The evidence established beyond question that the roadway from Wright Shop Road to the existing garage has been used as a driveway, parking lot, and access road to the Abbitt real estate. Bill Abbitt, Pete Abbitt, Lawrence Tyree, Richard Wooldridge, Don Sirocco, Bobby Harris, Helen Furneyhough, [57]*57and Zane Harvey all confirmed and corroborated the adverse use of this section of the roadway. Further, Plaintiffs Exhibits 33,46,47, 70, 72A, and 24 established these facts. Likewise, Defendant’s Exhibits 10,11,13,14, and 18 established the parked vehicles on this roadway. These photographs date from the 1940s.

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Related

Martin v. Moore
561 S.E.2d 672 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2002)
Young Kee Kim v. Douval Corp.
529 S.E.2d 92 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2000)
Grappo v. Blanks
400 S.E.2d 168 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1991)
Bull Run Development Corp. v. Jackson
109 S.E.2d 400 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1959)
Ward v. Harper
360 S.E.2d 179 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1987)
Calhoun v. Woods
431 S.E.2d 285 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1993)
Causey v. Lanigan
159 S.E.2d 655 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1968)
Page v. Luhring
159 S.E.2d 642 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1968)
Griggs v. Brown
102 S.E. 212 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1920)
Marion Investment Co. v. Virginia Lincoln Furniture Corp.
198 S.E. 508 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1938)

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Bluebook (online)
66 Va. Cir. 54, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/denton-v-abbitt-vaccamherst-2004.