Dent v. American International Life Assurance Co.

390 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28407, 2005 WL 1163207
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 16, 2005
Docket5:03CV175 (DF)
StatusPublished

This text of 390 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (Dent v. American International Life Assurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dent v. American International Life Assurance Co., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28407, 2005 WL 1163207 (M.D. Ga. 2005).

Opinion

ORDER

FITZPATRICK, District Judge.

Plaintiff initiated this action to recover life insurance benefits she asserts she is due as the beneficiary of her son’s life insurance policy. Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (tab 26) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (tab 29).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court has observed, “One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56, summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs son, the decedent, Derek Morgan, was an employee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”). As a part of his employment, Mr. Morgan was eligible to participate in the Associates Health and Welfare Plan (“the Plan”). One component of the Plan was Group Term Life Insurance Policy, number GL-10722-01, (“the Policy”) that was funded and administered by Defendant. Two types of coverage were provided for under the Policy: basic life insurance and optional life insurance. Basic life insurance has a benefit amount of one times the annual earnings up to a maximum of $50,000.00. Tab 33, Ex. 3 to Compl., Pg. 9. There is a guaranteed issue amount of $50,000.00 for basic life insurance. Guaranteed Issue Amount, for both types of insurance, is defined as:

the amount of insurance that will be issued to an insured person without Evidence of Insurability. The Guaranteed Issue Amount for an insured person’s life insurance is shown in the schedule. For amounts in excess of the Guaranteed Issue Amount, Evidence of Insura-bility satisfactory to the company must be provided at the insured’s expense.

Tab 33, Ex. 3 to Compl., Pg. 9. The second type of insurance offered was optional life insurance whereby employees could elect additional coverage and have the premium amount deducted from their paycheck. Mr. Morgan exercised the option for addi *1343 tional life insurance; he selected option two that had a benefit amount of $25,000.00. The optional life insurance had a Guaranteed Issue Amount of $25,000.00.

The Policy also provided for a thirty-one day conversion period during which time employees, who were no longer a member of the eligible class, could elect to convert coverage under the Policy to individual coverage. Tab 33, Ex. 3 to Compl., Pg. 21. The coverage that an employee could convert is “not [] more than the amount of Life insurance that is lost under this Policy.” Tab 33, Ex. 3 to Compl., Pg. 20. In addition, the Policy provides that should the insured die during the conversion period a death benefit “equal to the maximum amount the Insured could have otherwise converted” will be paid. Tab 33, Ex. 3 to Compl., Pg. 21.

Mr. Morgan left his employment with Wal-Mart on July 20, 2000, and died from smoke inhalation in a house fire on August 20, 2000. Mr. Morgan had not exercised his conversion privilege, but died on the thirty-first day of the conversion period. Plaintiff has received a total of $37,000.00 from Defendant, which represents basic life insurance coverage equal to Mr. Morgan’s $12,000.00 annual salary and the $25,000.00 optional life insurance Mr. Morgan carried. Asserting that she is due the Guaranteed Issue Amount of $50,000.00 plus interest, Plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia. Defendant removed the action, which is governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001, to this Court.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

By their motions for summary judgment the parties seek to have the Court review Defendant’s decision to pay Plaintiff life insurance benefits totaling $37,000.00.

A. Standard for Reviewing Decision

Even though “ERISA provides no standard for reviewing decisions of plan administrators or fiduciaries,” the Supreme Court has done so. Williams v. BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir.2004). In Firestone, the Supreme Court established three distinct standards of review applicable to the plan administrators’ decisions: “(1) de novo where the plan does not grant the administrator discretion!;] (2) arbitrary and capricious [where] the plan grants the administrator discretion; and (3) heightened arbitrary and capricious where there is a conflict of interest.” HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 993 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Buckley v. Metro. Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir.1997)). To determine the applicable standard of review in this case, the Court “is required to examine ‘all of the plan documents.’ ” Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir.1997)). If after examining all the plan documents the Court finds “that the documents grant the claims administrator discretion, then at a minimum, the court applies arbitrary and capricious review and possibly heightened arbitrary and capricious review.” HCA 240 F.3d at 993.

In considering the parties earlier discovery motions, which included similar arguments to those made by Plaintiff in her summary judgment brief, the Court previously applied the above reasoning to determine the standard of review. The Court held that “the ... applicable standard of review for this Court to employ is heightened arbitrary and capricious.” Order dated Oct. 7, 2004, Tab 19 Pg. 4.

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Bluebook (online)
390 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28407, 2005 WL 1163207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dent-v-american-international-life-assurance-co-gamd-2005.