Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

1 Navajo Rptr. 95
CourtNavajo Nation Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 23, 1974
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Navajo Nation Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (navajo 1974).

Opinion

KIRK, Chief Justice

On April 8, 1974, this Court granted the request of Peter MacDonald and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, for a review of the [96]*96Trial Court's decision adverse to their interest in the above entitled matter dated March 1 f 1974, the same being docket number WR-RO-11-74, in and for the Judicial District of Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona),

The parties will be referred to as plaintiffs and defendants as they appeared in the Trial Court.

Oral arguments were presented on behalf of the parties in this Court on May 9, 1974.

The Court has determined the facts as follows:

1. The plaintiffs, Dennison family, are Navajo Indians residing on the Navajo Reservation near Tohatchi, Navajo Nation (New Mexico), within the exterior boundaries of Navajo Grazing District 14.
2. The plaintiffs have a permit to graze an undisclosed number of sheep in an undefined area of District 14, known as their "traditional use area."
3. The plaintiffs have a home and other improvements, including sheep corrals, as well as what is called an "intangible interest" (liveihood) in the above said area.
4. Sometime in 1973, the defendant, Peter MacDonald, on behalf of defendant, the Navajo Tribe of Indians, granted a right-of-way to defendant, Tucson Gas and Electric Company, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a power line for the transmission of electrical energy above, over and across Navajo Tribal Land, including some portion of the plaintiffs' "traditional use area."
5. The defendant, Jefco, Incorporated, is a Utah corporation engaged in the construction business and employed by defendant Tucson Gas and Electric Company to construct the above said power line.
6. Defendants Pittman, Lynch, and Plummer appear to be Navajo Indians employed by the Navajo Tribe of Indian Affairs in some capacity, and are alleged to be agents of the defendant Tucson Gas and Electric Company, and in fact, had some part in securing and obtaining plaintiffs' written consent to the passage of the power line over and [97]*97across their "traditional use area.11
7. The defendant Graham Holmes, is a non-Indian employed by the Navajo Tribe in the Office of the Navajo Land Administration in a supervisory or consulting capacity at Window Rock, and is alleged to have had an active part, and did have some part in securing obtaining the plaintiffs' written consent to the construction of the power line over and across their "traditional use area."
8. The plaintiffs in fact signed some type of consent for the construction of and the passage of the power line over and across their "traditional use area" and they accepted a check in the amount Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) from defendant Tucson Gas and Electric Company for reasons that appear unclear even to the parties.
9. When the defendant Tucson Gas and Electric Company made application to the Navajo Tribe for the right-of-way across Tribal lands, the defendant Peter MacDonald, acting on behalf of the defendant Navajo Tribe of Indians, did not require the applicant of the right-of-way to deposit with the Treasurer of the Navajo Tribe an amount of money equal to at least double the estimated damages made by the Department of Land Investigation |n accordance with Navajo Law, as set forth by the Navajo Tribal Council j_n 16¡ N,T.C. ¿ 553, for the protection of individual Navajo Indians, who may be dispossessed or partially dispossessed by the granting of just such a right-of-way.
10. When defendant Jelco, Incorporated started construction of the power line over and across plaintiffs' "traditional use area", changing the contour of the surface and removing surface vegetation, etc., the plaintiffs brought a proceeding in the Trial Court to cancel their consents for the construction and the passage of the power line over and across their "traditional use area" alleging that their consent was obtained by fraud, deceit and duress; and for an injunction against all of the defendants from further trespass to their property; and for damages for the actual trespass to their use land; and for punative damages for the insolent manner in which the trespass was accomplished. Plaintiffs offered to return the uncashed check for Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) to the defendant Tucson Gas and Electric Company.
11. The Trial Court dismissed the action for damages against the following defendants for lack of jurisdiction:
(1). Tucson Gas and Electric Company
(2). Jelco, Incorporated
(3). Holmes, Lynch, Plummer and Pittman
The Trial Court denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction against Peter MacDonald, the Navajo Tribe of Indians, and the other defendants. The Trial Court further directed that a date be set for the remaining issues, i.e. damages, and whether the plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to exhaust their administrative remedies.
12. The defendants Peter MacDonald and the Navajo Tribe of [98]*98Indians, maintain through their counsel, the Navajo Prosecutor, Mr. Perry Allen, that the Navajo Tribal Government is immune from suit by one of its members,, in any event, under the legal concept of sovereign immunity, and that Peter MacDonald, Chairman of the Tribal Council in negotiating the right-of-way grant to the Tucson Gas and Electric Company was acting within the scope of the authority vested in him by the Navajo Tribal Council and that therefore he too is immune from suit.

The Court has further determined that this case involves the nature, source, and the lawful exercise of the governmental power of Eminent Domain, a subject with which the parties hereto and their lawyers of record seem to be totally unfamiliar and for that reason we feel impelled to make the following comments and observations:

Eminent Domain is the power of any sovereign to take or to authorize the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for public use without the consent of the owner. It is an inherent power and authority which is essential to the existence of all governments.

Therefore, as in this case, the sovereign (the Navajo Tribal Government), has the power and the authority to take or to authorize the taking of the Dennison property, all or part of it, without their consent. Plaintiffs1 consent to the granting of the right-of-way is totally unnecessary.

But, before the government can exercise this power of taking private property without the owners consent, it must provide just compensation for the property taken and provide the owner thereof with due process of law.

[99]*99These two prohibitions or restrictions on the exercise of the nherent governmental power of Eminent Domain are derived from:

A.The Constitution of the United States - 5th Amendment.
(1) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
(2) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
B.Constitutional Rights of Indians, N.T.C. App., P.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Navajo Rptr. 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennison-v-tucson-gas-electric-co-navajo-1974.