UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FITZGERALD DENNISON, SR.,
Plaintiff, v. No. 24-cv-2301-ZMF MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff Fitzgerald Dennison, Sr., filed for Supplemental Security
Income Benefits (“SSI”). See Admin. R. (“AR”) 151, ECF No. 5.1 An Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) denied his request. See AR 14. Plaintiff now challenges that decision, claiming that the
ALJ incorrectly found that he was not disabled because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his
allegations of pain and dysfunction, and the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial
evidence. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 2, ECF No. 8.
After considering the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record, the undersigned
recommends that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANT
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance.
1 The Administrative Record contains over fifty exhibits. See ECF No. 5. For ease of reference, the citations to the Administrative Record will cite to the consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page.
1 I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
The Social Security Act provides benefits to individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a)(1). To claim SSI, a plaintiff must prove that they are “disabled.” Id. An individual is
disabled if they are “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must
render them unable to return to previous work or “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step evaluation process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a). The burden of proof rests with the claimant for the first four steps, then shifts to the
SSA for the last step. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). At step one, the
claimant must prove they are not currently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must show that they have a “severe impairment” or a
“combination of impairments” that “significantly limits [their] physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities.” Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(5)(c). At step three, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s impairment(s) meets or is equal to one of the criteria listed in
Appendix 1. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the ALJ finds that the claimant meets the requirements,
then they are disabled. See id. If not, then the ALJ proceeds to step four. See id. At step four, the
ALJ must decide if the claimant has the “residual functional capacity” (RFC) to perform the
requirements of their “past relevant work.” Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). Put another way,
the ALJ must determine “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” Id.
2 § 416.945(a)(1) (defining RFC). If the ALJ finds that the claimant has the RFC to return to their
previous work, then they are not disabled. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If a claimant cannot return
to their previous work, then the ALJ proceeds to step five. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). There, the
ALJ must determine, based on the claimant’s RFC, “age, education, and work experience,”
whether the claimant can find any other work in the national economy. Id. If the claimant cannot
adjust to other work, then they are disabled. See id.
B. Factual Background
1. Medical Evidence
In September 2021, Plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of his diabetes. See AR 266.
The need for hospitalization likely resulted from his noncompliance with medication and poor diet.
See AR 266. The hospital discharged him following a brief stay with instructions to continue his
diabetes treatment plan. See AR 268. Between September 2020 and February 2023, Plaintiff saw
Dr. Jason Yoon for his primary care appointments. See AR 323–85. During several of these visits,
Plaintiff reported poor compliance with his diabetes treatment plan but did not report any active
diabetes symptoms. See AR 360, 369. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff’s test results showed
elevated blood sugar levels, indicating uncontrolled diabetes. See AR 358, 367, 375, 383. Plaintiff
did not report any back pain during these visits. See AR 324–84. Repeated examinations between
2020 and 2022 of his lumbosacral spine also revealed no abnormal findings. See AR 326–79.
In August 2022, Plaintiff saw NP Vashtina Ellison-Ruddock for a consultative
examination. See AR 311–18. Plaintiff reported experiencing “on and off mild achy lower back
pain,” with the pain worsening to a 3 to 4 out of 10. AR 311. The pain was “aggravat[ed] by only
prolonged sitting” AR 311. He also reported prior, but not current, use of pain medication for his
back pain. See AR 311. Additionally, Plaintiff reported “diabetes without complications since
3 2018” and stated that he took diabetes medicine twice daily. AR 311. Regarding his history of
seizures, Plaintiff denied having any seizures since 2020. See AR 311. He stated that he did not
need help with his daily activities, which included cooking, light cleaning, laundry, and shopping.
See AR 312. Plaintiff’s physical examination revealed no abnormal findings. See AR 312–14. X-
rays of his lumbosacral spine showed moderate and severe degenerative disc disease, as well as
mild vertebrae displacement. See AR 314. NP Ellison-Ruddock concluded that Plaintiff “ha[d] no
physical limitations.” AR 314. In August 2022, State agency medical consultant Dr. Eduardo Haim
reviewed the record and found that Plaintiff’s physical impairments restricted him to work at the
“medium” exertional level with the need to “avoid even moderate exposure” to environmental
hazards. AR 48–52. Dr. Haim relied on Plaintiff’s lumbar spine x-ray, which revealed moderate
to severe degenerative disc disease and mild vertebrae displacement, as well as his history of
seizures. See AR 51.
2. Social Security Administration Review
On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed for SSI. See AR 151. He claimed that his disability
began on July 15, 2020. See AR 43. On February 10, 2022, the State agency denied Plaintiff’s
application, and later on reconsideration. See AR 45, 52. On August 9, 2023, the ALJ held a
hearing. See AR 30. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about his pain and symptoms. See AR 34–
38. Plaintiff stated that he had lower back pain that prevented him from “walk[ing] far.” AR 34–
35, 37. He described being able to stand for only “five to ten minutes” before needing to sit down
to take a break. AR 38. He further stated that he took medication for his back pain twice a day but
had not sought treatment since approximately a year before the hearing. See AR 35. Additionally,
he stated that he took medicine for his diabetes. See AR 37. He claimed that he sat on his couch
and watched television during the day. See AR 36–37. He also claimed that his adult children
4 helped with groceries, meal preparation, and laundry. See AR 36. Additionally, he reported that he
used medical transportation to pick up his prescriptions and used the elevator in his apartment to
retrieve delivered medication. See AR 36. After Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ asked the
Vocational Expert (“VE”) about a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age and education, and
who had the ability to perform a reduced range of light work. See AR 39–40. The VE explained
that such an individual could find employment, such as: a final inspector, an assembler of electrical
accessories, and an information clerk. See AR 40.
On November 1, 2023, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. See AR 14. At step one, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in a substantial gainful activity since January 3, 2022. See AR
19. At step two, the ALJ concluded that his “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, diabetes
[], and obesity” were severe impairments. AR 19.
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria in
Appendix 1. See AR 20. The ALJ dismissed his claim for his back impairment because “there
[was] no evidence of listing level signs, symptoms, and objective findings on imaging or in
operative reports and impairment related limitations of musculoskeletal functioning with a
documented medical need for an assistive device or a related . . . gross movements.” AR 20. The
ALJ also dismissed his claim for his diabetes because “there [was] no evidence that his diabetes
as [sic] caused signs or symptoms that [met] the requirements of a listing for another body system.”
AR 20. Additionally, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s obesity was “considered in conjunction with
[his] other impairments” but that “there [was] no evidence that his weight ha[d] increased the
5 severity of his co-existing conditions to the extent that the combination of impairments medically
equal[ed] a listing in any body system.” AR 20.
At step four, the ALJ used a two-part process to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. See AR 20.
First, the ALJ found that his impairments reasonably could produce his symptoms. See AR 22.
Second, the ALJ found that the record did not support the alleged “intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of [his] symptoms.” AR 22. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform light
work, except that:
[I]n an eight hour workday, he can sit for six hours while alternating to a standing position for ten minutes during every hour of sitting while remaining on task; and can stand and/or walk for six hours with the ability to alternate to sitting for five minutes during every hour of standing and/or walking while remaining on task. He can lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. In addition, he can occasionally stoop, crouch, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally operate a motor vehicle.
AR 20. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ relied on the opinions of medical professionals who
examined Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s own statements, and Plaintiff’s medical records. See AR 21–24. The
ALJ also determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. See AR 24.
At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could find another job in the national economy.
See AR 24–25. The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff was unable to “perform the full range of light
work” due to “additional limitations” in the RFC. AR 24–25. The ALJ referred to the VE’s
testimony regarding a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, who could work as a final inspector, electrical accessories assembler, and information clerk.
See AR 25. The ALJ found the VE’s testimony credible. See AR 25. Thus, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR 25.
On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court. See Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.
On October 27, 2024, Judge Friedrich, with the parties’ consent, referred this case to the
6 undersigned for all purposes. See Min. Order (Oct. 27, 2024). Pending before this court are
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and the Defendant Social Security Commissioner’s
Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. J. Affirm. & Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. J.
Reversal (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing the SSA’s disability determination, the district court acts in an appellate
role and must uphold the determination “if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not tainted
by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence
is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Butler 353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The standard is
highly deferential, requiring “more than a scintilla,” but is satisfied by “something less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
As such, the “reviewing court may neither reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the
Commissioner’s judgment ‘concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.’” Goodman v.
Colvin, 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1995)).
That said, the ALJ must establish a “logical bridge” between their conclusions and the
evidence so that a reviewing court “‘may assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and
afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.’” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67
(D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002)). “[T]he plaintiff bears
the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision was not based on substantial
7 evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin, 121 F. Supp. 3d 163,
169 (D.D.C 2015) (internal quotations marks and brackets omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two challenges to the ALJ’s decision. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2. First, he argues
that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his allegations of pain and dysfunction. See id. at 3. Second,
he claims that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 4.
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Pain and Dysfunction
An ALJ may find a claimant’s allegations of pain and dysfunction “inconsistent with the
overall evidence of record” when “the frequency or extent of the treatment sought by [the claimant]
is not comparable with the degree of the [claimant’s] subjective complaints, or if the [claimant]
fails to follow prescribed treatment.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,
at *9 (Oct. 25, 2017). In doing so, however, the ALJ must “consider[] possible reasons [the
claimant] may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the degree of [their]
complaints.” Id.; see Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 108 (finding that the ALJ correctly compared
the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain with her failure to follow prescribed treatments, after
considering reasonable explanations for her noncompliance, including lack of health insurance);
Tiana O. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2051, 2023 WL 5348747, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2023) (finding
that the ALJ incorrectly evaluated the claimant’s subjective complaints about her mental health
limitations, in part because the ALJ failed to consider reasons for her treatment noncompliance).
This inquiry is required only if the ALJ “conclude[s] that [the claimant] would be deemed disabled
8 and eligible for benefits but for [their] noncompliance with treatment.” Darlene M. v. Kijakazi,
No. 20-cv-1817, 2021 WL 6841641, at *23 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021).
1. Plaintiff’s Noncompliance with Treatment
Darlene M. clarifies when an inquiry into a claimant’s noncompliance with treatment is
warranted. 2021 WL 6841641, at *23. In Darlene M., the ALJ found at step three that the
claimant’s impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any listed impairments, largely
because medical testing, treatment notes regarding claimant’s physical condition, and claimant’s
own reports of her daily activities were inconsistent with her “statements as to the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms.” Id. at *6. The court found that the ALJ
properly discounted the claimant’s subjective testimony concerning the limiting effects of her
symptoms because “the ALJ noted [the claimant’s] noncompliance with treatment merely as a
factor” in their decision. Id. at *23. Critically, the ALJ did not make claimant’s noncompliance the
only thing barring relief. See id.
Similarly, the ALJ here appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s subjective testimony
concerning the limiting effects of his symptoms. See AR 20–23. As in Darlene M., the ALJ “noted
[Plaintiff’s] noncompliance with treatment merely as a factor” in reaching his conclusion. 2021
WL 6841641, at *23; see AR 21–23. The ALJ did not conclude that Plaintiff would have been
eligible “but for [his] noncompliance with treatment.” Darlene M., 2021 WL 6841641, at *23; see
AR 21–23. The ALJ found the objective medical evidence, including physical examinations and
medical opinions, as well as Plaintiff’s own prior statements about his daily activities inconsistent
9 with his “statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [his] symptoms.”
Darlene M., 2021 WL 6841641, at *6; see AR 20–23.
First, the ALJ noted that physical examinations of Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine revealed
no abnormal findings. See AR 22. “While ‘an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective
complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of
pain . . . it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.’” Ragudo v. Saul, 411
F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.
2005)). Such medical evidence includes “physical examinations” of a claimant’s “lumbar spine.”
Id. at 1134–35 (finding that the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s relatively normal physical
examinations findings in his determination that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible).
Second, that Plaintiff did not attribute any functional limitations to his diabetes at his
consultative examination and stated he had no complications from diabetes. See AR 21–22, 311.
An ALJ can consider a claimant’s failure to “complain[] of any issues concerning his [health
condition]” during medical visits as a basis for discrediting the claimant’s “current claim of
ongoing, disabling symptoms.” Petty v. Colvin, 204 F. Supp. 3d 196, 210 (D.D.C. 2016).
Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s “noncompliance with his diabetes medication is irrelevant to his
ability to work according to his own testimony[,]” where he stated that “his diabetes did not prevent
him from working; only his back pain allegedly did.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. Plaintiff refutes
Defendant’s characterization of his testimony, arguing that “Plaintiff testified that in addition to
his back, he also had diabetes” and “reported that he was not able to work due to diabetes.” Pl.’s
Resp. Def.’s Mot. J. Affirm. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) 2, ECF No. 13. This line of argumentation is
10 unnecessary because the ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff’s diabetes to “contribute[] to limiting
[Plaintiff] to light exertional work.” AR 23.
Third, Plaintiff’s daily activities included going on frequent walks, choosing not to use the
elevator at home, and requiring no assistance with cleaning, cooking, shopping, or doing laundry.
See AR 311–12. “An ALJ may assess a claimant’s credibility by comparing [the claimant’s]
subjective complaints of pain with [their] statements regarding [their] daily activities.” Goodman,
233 F. Supp. 3d at 107–08. (finding that the ALJ appropriately considered the plaintiff’s ability to
“perform numerous regular tasks and household chores[,]” including cooking, cleaning, and
grocery shopping, as a basis for discounting her subjective complaints of pain); see, e.g., Ali v.
Colvin, 236 F. Supp. 3d 86, 96 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that the ALJ appropriately considered the
plaintiff’s daily activities of “preparing meals, house and yard work, shopping by mail and
computer, handling money, watching TV and reading” as a basis for discounting parts of her
testimony).
Tiana O. illustrates when an ALJ improperly relies on a claimant’s noncompliance with
treatment in determining disability benefits. 2023 WL 5348747. In Tiana O.,2 the ALJ found at
step three that the claimant’s noncompliance with medication and treatment suggested that his
“symptoms were [not] as severe as alleged” and there was “no evidence of financial restrictions,
side effects, or other issues that prevented the claimant from continuing treatment.” Id. at *12. The
court held that the ALJ erred in finding the claimant’s subjective complaints were inconsistent
with his failure to seek treatment because the ALJ “misstated the record as to [the claimant’s]
2 The court’s ruling in Tiana O. primarily addressed the ALJ’s findings regarding the claimant’s mental impairments and related inconsistent treatment and noncompliance. 2023 WL 5348747. But the underlying legal principle remains the same for physical impairments where inconsistent treatment and noncompliance may be a feature of the condition itself and contribute to worsening symptoms. See id. at *11 (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.00(G)(2)(b)).
11 noncompliance with treatment.” Id. The record demonstrated that the claimant had attended
several treatment appointments. See id. And the ALJ “failed to adequately consider the reasons
underlying [the claimant’s] noncompliance with treatment.” Id.
In contrast, the ALJ here did not conclude that if Plaintiff’s “symptoms were as severe as
alleged[,]” he would have complied with his diabetes treatment plan. Id.; see AR 21. Rather, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s diabetes was a severe impairment in part because of Plaintiff’s
“chronic non-compliance with treatment.” AR 23. The ALJ also did not conclude that there was
nothing “that prevented [Plaintiff] from continuing treatment.” Tiana O., 2023 WL 5348747, at
*12; see AR 21–23. Furthermore, unlike Tiana O., the treatment records here did not suggest that
the ALJ “misstated the record as to [Plaintiff’s] noncompliance with treatment.” 2023 WL
5348747, at *12; see AR 21–23. The ALJ correctly cited medical records that demonstrated:
Plaintiff’s consistently poor compliance with his diabetes treatment plan, including self-reports;
elevated blood sugar readings; and a prior diabetic episode. See AR 23. The ALJ did not “rely
solely on [Plaintiff’s] treatment noncompliance” to conclude that Plaintiff’s diabetes failed to meet
the severity of a listed impairment. Tiana O., 2023 WL 5348747, at *11. It is true the ALJ did not
consider the reasons underlying Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment. See AR 21–23. But,
because the ALJ did not “rely solely” on noncompliance in denying disability benefits, the ALJ
was not required to “consider[] possible reasons [Plaintiff] may not comply with treatment.” SSR
16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *9; Tiana O., 2023 WL 5348747, at *11. Instead, the ALJ looked to
12 various sources of information to make his conclusion. See AR 21–25. This distinguishes the
present case from Tiana O. 2023 WL 5348747.
B. Plaintiff’s RFC
When formulating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must provide a comprehensive and detailed
narrative discussion that:
Contain[s] a thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical and other evidence, including the [claimant’s] complaints of pain and other symptoms and the [ALJ’s] personal observations, if appropriate; . . . a resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole; and . . . a logical explanation of the effects of the symptoms, including pain, on the [claimant’s] ability to work.
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ’s narrative discussion must cite
specific evidence in the record and “explain[] which evidence [the ALJ] found credible and why.”
Pinkney v. Astrue, 675 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2009); see id. In other words, an ALJ may not
“simply list[] all of the evidence without clearly explaining which particular pieces of evidence
led [them] to [their] conclusion.” Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (finding the narrative
discussion insufficient where the ALJ listed evidence without explaining its support for his
conclusion or reasons for discounting contrary evidence). Ultimately, a narrative discussion is
sufficient when it “strikes the proper balance between” conflicting evidence in the record, even if
the ALJ “could have been clearer in articulating the support for [the] precise limitation.” Roshelle
S. B. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2842, 2022 WL 4448924, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2022).
1. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Credibility
Pinkney provides a baseline for what an ALJ needs to do when explaining the rationale
behind their RFC determination. 675 F. Supp. 2d at 18. There, the ALJ found that the claimant had
the RFC to perform work at the medium exertional level, in part because “the objective medical
evidence” and “[the claimant’s] testimony at the hearing” were inconsistent with the claimant’s
13 alleged “degree of difficulty performing . . . activities of daily living.” Id. at 17. The ALJ supported
this finding by citing specific medical evidence, including test results and professional opinions,
that indicated the claimant’s impairments were “only moderately limiting.” Id. at 16–17.
Like in Pinkney, the ALJ here “did more than merely list the evidence.” Id. at 17–18; see
AR 20–24. Specifically, the ALJ here “explained which evidence he found credible and why” in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Pinkney, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18; see AR 20–24. In his narrative
discussion, the ALJ addressed how Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his functional limitations
conflicted with both the medical examinations and his prior statements about his daily activities.
See AR 22. For instance, the ALJ noted that during Plaintiff’s consultative examination, Plaintiff
reported mild lower back pain worsened by prolonged sitting, while Plaintiff also stated that he
regularly took walks and managed chores like cooking and cleaning independently. See AR 21–
22. But Plaintiff’s testimony presented a contrary picture: Plaintiff stated that he watched
television all day and relied on his adult children to grocery shop and cook for him. See AR 36.
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements at the consultative examination more credible, in part,
because Plaintiff’s testimony was “inconsistent with the treatment record[,] which regularly
document[ed] unremarkable physical examination results[,]” and “the objective [medical] findings
at the . . . consultative examination during which. . . [Plaintiff] had no significant findings.” AR
22. Such “[c]redibility determinations are ‘solely within the realm of the ALJ.’” Moore v.
Berryhill, 313 F. Supp. 3d 275, 283 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Callaway v. Berryhill, 292 F. Supp.
3d 289, 297 (D.D.C. 2018)).
Furthermore, the ALJ relied on the opinions from NP Ellison-Ruddock and Dr. Haim. See
AR 21, 23. The ALJ is not beholden to these medical opinions when “assessing and determining
[Plaintiff’s] RFC” but is “nonetheless required to consider and evaluate any such [medical
14 opinions] as opinion evidence.” Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (finding that the ALJ properly
afforded great weight to the State agency medical consultant’s RFC assessment). Both medical
professionals concluded that Plaintiff had no significant physical limitations and could perform
work at the medium exertional level. See AR 21, 23. The ALJ credited this opinion evidence. See
AR 23. In fact, this was the only credible opinion evidence in the record. See AR 23–24. Plaintiff
“point[ed] to no specific evidence beyond [his] own testimony that would contradict the ALJ’s
finding.” Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 111; see Pl.’s Mot. at 4–7; Pl.’s Resp. at 3–4. Thus, the
ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Goodman, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 111.
Despite these findings, the ALJ still acknowledged the physical limitations imposed by
Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease. See AR 23–24. “[W]hen analyzing the narrative discussion,
courts in this Circuit have considered an ALJ’s imposition of limitations that are more restrictive
than opined by consultative examiners as a factor that can weigh in the Commissioner’s favor.”
Katrina M. v. O’Malley, 752 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing Said S. v. O’Malley, No. 22-
cv-362, 2024 WL 2152737, at *10 (D.D.C. May 14, 2024)). Here, the ALJ viewed the overall
evidence and concluded that a reduction to a range of light exertional work with several postural
limitations was more reasonable than the less restrictive limitations put forth by the medical
experts. See AR 23–24. This more restrictive limitation “weigh[s] in the Commissioner’s favor.”
Katrina M., 752 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
2. The ALJ’s Sit-stand Restriction
Roshelle S. B. demonstrates the level of explanation and evidence that courts have deemed
adequate to support a sit-stand restriction in the RFC. 2022 WL 4448924. In Roshelle S. B., the
ALJ found that the claimant had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with the need to sit for about
5 minutes after every 15 to 20 minutes of standing or walking. See id. at *2. The court rejected the
15 claimant’s argument that the ALJ failed to adequately explain the basis for this sit-stand option.
See id. at *3. The court noted that the ALJ “could have been clearer in articulating the support for
[his] precise limitation”; however, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings “str[uck] the proper
balance between [the claimant’s] hearing testimony” regarding her inability to walk and “[the
claimant’s] documented history of improved mobility.” Id. at *4. The RFC assessment also
reflected the claimant’s own statements about being able to walk without the use of a cane. See id.
Finally, the ALJ “cited repeatedly to records summarizing [the claimant’s] ankle and lower leg
limitations” as well as “medical evaluations and imaging that justified the limitations.” Id.
Similarly, the ALJ’s RFC assessment here “str[uck] the proper balance between
[Plaintiff’s] hearing testimony” regarding his difficulty walking or performing household chores
like cooking and cleaning independently, and “[Plaintiff’s] documented history” of normal
physical examination findings, lack of treatment, and few complaints about active symptoms. Id.;
see AR 20–24. The ALJ’s RFC assessment reflected Plaintiff’s prior statements about not needing
assistance with his daily activities. See AR 21. Furthermore, the ALJ “cited repeatedly to records
summarizing [Plaintiff’s postural] limitations” as well as “medical evaluations and imaging that
justified the limitations [in the RFC].” Roshelle S. B., 2022 WL 4448924, at *4; see AR 20–24.
For example, the ALJ’s RFC “partially incorporated” NP Ellison-Ruddock’s and Dr. Haim’s
opinions that Plaintiff had no physical limitations and could perform work at the medium
exertional level. Thomas v. Astrue, 677 F. Supp. 2d 300, 308 (D.D.C. 2010); see AR 22–23. This
does not mean that the ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s “subjective pains complained of” or his x-rays
showing moderate to severe degenerative disc disease. Thomas, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 308; see AR
23. Instead, the ALJ gave Plaintiff “the benefit of the doubt by limiting [him] to light work[,]”
despite the absence of abnormal findings in Plaintiff’s physical examinations. Thomas, 677 F.
16 Supp. 2d at 308; see AR 22–23. The sit-stand option in the ALJ’s RFC also provided Plaintiff with
an “accommodation for [his] aggravated [back] pain caused by [prolonged sitting].” Thomas, 677
F. Supp. 2d at 308; see AR 23. Additionally, the ALJ noted the VE’s testimony that “an individual
with . . . [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and [RFC]” could work as a final inspector,
electrical accessories assembler, and information clerk. AR 25. These jobs account for the sit-stand
option in the RFC by allowing Plaintiff to perform them “sitting or standing at-will.” AR 25.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to explain his basis for his precise sit/stand option” in
the RFC by not citing any medical opinion that supported his finding. Pl.’s Mot. at 5–6. Plaintiff
is incorrect. “While the ALJ did not cite a medical opinion that laid out the exact RFC at which he
arrived, ‘sufficient information has been provided for the Court to understand [his] reasoning.’”
Callaway, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (quoting Grant v. Astrue, 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154 (D.D.C.
2012)); see AR 23–24. The ALJ here noted the contradictory evidence in the record that tended to
undermine Plaintiff’s testimony about “need[ing] to sit down to take a break” after “five to ten
minutes” of standing. AR 38. Specifically, the ALJ pointed to “the mostly normal medical
evidence in the record, and gave weight to the views of experts whose findings were consistent
with that objective medical evidence—all of which counsels for a more optimistic RFC than those
estimated by” Plaintiff’s testimony. Callaway, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 296; see AR 23. Thus, in the
absence of objective medical evidence corroborating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, the
ALJ’s inclusion of a sit-stand option accommodating Plaintiff’s reported limitations is more than
adequate. See Callaway, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 296.
Ultimately, the ALJ provided a “thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical
and other evidence.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7; see AR 20–24. His opinion provided “a
resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole” and “a logical explanation of the
17 effects of the symptoms . . . on [Plaintiff’s] ability to work.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7;
see AR 20–24. The ALJ also “explained which evidence he found credible and why[,]” rather than
merely listing the record evidence and stating the RFC in a conclusory manner. Pinkney, 675 F.
Supp. 2d at 18; see SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7; AR 20–24. In doing so, the ALJ’s RFC
finding “str[uck] the proper balance between” conflicting evidence in the record. Roshelle S. B.,
2022 WL 4448924, at *4; see AR 20–24. The ALJ established a “logical bridge” between his
conclusions and the evidence. Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67. That is to say, the ALJ’s RFC
“more than adequately accounts for . . . [Plaintiff’s] diabetes and lumbar spine impairment.” AR
23.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of
Reversal and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. Digitally signed by Zia
Date: August 26, 2025 Zia M.Faruqui M.Faruqui Date: 2025.08.26 15:26:01 -04'00' ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Plaintiff, v. No. 24-cv-2301-ZMF MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security
ORDER
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment of Affirmance is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal is
DENIED.
Zia Digitally signed by Zia M.Faruqui
M.Faruqui Date: 2025.08.26 15:25:42 -04'00' ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE