2025 IL App (1st) 241291-U
THIRD DIVISION August 20, 2025
No. 1-24-1291
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CHARLES B. DENNIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) 2023 CH 02885 ) ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE and ILLINOIS ) CONCEALED CARRY LICENSING REVIEW BOARD, ) Honorable ) Sophia H. Hall, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the Board’s decision to deny plaintiff’s application for a concealed carry license where the concealed carry statute is constitutional on its face and plaintiff forfeited any as- applied claim, and plaintiff was not denied due process during the administrative proceedings.
¶2 Plaintiff Charles B. Dennis appeals the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Illinois
Concealed Carry Licensing Board’s (Board) denial of his application for a concealed carry license
(CCL). On appeal, plaintiff contends that (1) the concealed carry statute is unconstitutional on its
face where there is no historical analog supporting the regulation, (2) he was denied due process No. 1-24-1291
in the administrative proceedings where the Board did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, and (3)
the circuit court erred when it refused to remand the matter for further evidence. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Plaintiff is an Illinois resident, and he possesses a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID)
card. On May 24, 2022, plaintiff applied for a CCL because the neighborhood where he resided
was “changing,” and he wanted to protect himself and his family. The Illinois Department of State
Police (ISP) received an objection to plaintiff’s application pursuant to section 15(a) of the Firearm
Concealed Carry Act (Act) (430 ILCS 66/15(a) (West 2022)). The objection was made by Officer
Anthony Famiglietti on behalf of Superintendent David O. Brown of the Chicago Police
Department (CPD). In support of the objection, the CPD submitted two police reports.
¶5 The first report indicated that on November 9, 2009, plaintiff was arrested for domestic
battery. On that day, officers responded to a call regarding a person with a knife. The victim, who
was plaintiff’s girlfriend at the time, stated that they had a verbal altercation and plaintiff “pulled
her by her hair towards the ground and began kicking her about the body with his foot.” The victim
stated that she suffered minor bruising and swelling to her left forearm. The responding officers
observed no visible injuries on the victim, and she refused medical treatment. Plaintiff was taken
into custody, but the case was later stricken from the docket “with leave to reinstate.”
¶6 The second report indicated that plaintiff was arrested on May 13, 2017, for domestic
battery. Blue Island police officers responded to a “domestic battery in progress, with a male
subject armed with a knife.” The male subject, identified as plaintiff, informed the dispatcher that
he had placed the knives in the sink. The report summarized plaintiff’s statement to police. He
stated that he and his wife “were fighting over money, and that the house is going into foreclosure.”
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He told police that his wife’s family threatened him over the phone, causing the argument “to
escalate.” His wife “bumped his chest into hers” and “he bumped her back.” At some point, he
held two kitchen knives in his hands, but he never threatened his wife with them.
¶7 The report also summarized the statement given by plaintiff’s wife, Stacy. She stated that
plaintiff was “bi-polar” and “was having a bad day today, yelling and threatening her.” During
their argument, plaintiff pushed her into the bedroom closet door. He told her, “If you mess with
me I’ll split your face.” Plaintiff “got two kitchen knives, which he held in one hand, and was on
his cell phone with the other.” He told Stacy, “I love you, but it’s going to be war.” Plaintiff then
“placed the two knives in the sink, at which point the police arrived.”
¶8 Stacy signed a complaint based on plaintiff “pushing her into the closet, but not for the
knives.” She stated that she never felt threatened by the knives. Stacy refused medical treatment,
and plaintiff was taken into custody. The case was subsequently stricken from the docket “with
leave to reinstate.”
¶9 The CPD also included plaintiff’s criminal history report. That report showed plaintiff’s
two domestic battery arrests, as well as arrests in 2005 for driving on a revoked license and for a
child restraint violation. For the latter charges, plaintiff was found guilty and served a sentence of
one year of supervision. Plaintiff also had an arrest in 1997 for criminal trespass to vehicles, which
was stricken from the docket with leave to reinstate. In 1994, plaintiff was arrested for theft. He
pleaded guilty and completed a one-year term of supervision.
¶ 10 The objection and reports were submitted to the Board pursuant to section 15(a) of the Act.
On August 15, 2022, the Board sent a letter informing plaintiff of the objection and that a “majority
of the Board determined that the objection filed against you appears sustainable.” The letter
recounted the information contained in the domestic battery arrest reports and stated that
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“Pursuant to 20 Ill. Admin. Code 2900.140(e)(1), you now have 15 days from the date of
receipt of this notice to submit any relevant evidence, including any documentation
supporting any factual assertions you may make, to the Board for its consideration before
a final administrative decision is rendered regarding your application. Information and
supporting documentation can be uploaded to your application via the CCL website.”
Plaintiff did not submit any statements or documents in response.
¶ 11 On March 3, 2023, the Board informed Officer Famiglietti that after reviewing the evidence
received from the applicant and law enforcement, it determined that the evidence established by a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff either posed a danger to himself or to others, or that
he posed a threat to public safety. That same day, the ISP sent plaintiff a letter stating that his
concealed carry application had been denied. The ISP informed plaintiff that the Board had
“affirmed the objection of law enforcement and notified the Illinois State Police that you are
ineligible for a license.”
¶ 12 Plaintiff sought administrative review of the Board’s determination. In his first amended
complaint, plaintiff argued that the Board’s decision was not supported by the facts. He noted that
Stacy never felt threatened by the knives, and he was never convicted of any domestic battery
offense. Plaintiff also alleged that he “is not a threat to himself or to others.” In support, he attached
an evaluation conducted by licensed clinical psychologist Mark Brenzinger in March 2022.
Plaintiff was identified as having “low risk potential” for violence toward himself and others.
¶ 13 Plaintiff also alleged that he had a constitutional right under the second amendment to carry
a concealed firearm and that the Act violated this right. He contended that in order to deprive
citizens of this right, the Act must require a higher standard of proof for dangerousness than the
standard articulated in the Act. Instead, the Act improperly placed an undue burden on applicants
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to prove that they are not dangerous, which caused him to incur substantial costs to obtain a
psychological evaluation. Plaintiff also alleged that his due process rights were violated. He argued
that the Act was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.
¶ 14 Defendants responded that the Board’s decision was supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. They argued that plaintiff forfeited his constitutional challenges because he failed to
raise the issues before the Board. On the merits, defendants argued that plaintiff received due
process in the administrative proceeding where he received proper notice and had an opportunity
to respond to the objection. Plaintiff, however, did not offer any evidence in response. Defendants
also argued that plaintiff failed to establish that his constitutional rights were violated.
¶ 15 After a hearing, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. It found that the decision
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court also found that it could not consider
plaintiff’s contention challenging the Act’s procedures or his constitutional arguments because
they were not first raised before the Board. Nonetheless, the court considered the substance of his
constitutional arguments and found them to be without merit.
¶ 16 Plaintiff filed this appeal.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 It is well-established that on administrative review, this court reviews the decision of the
administrative agency, not the circuit court’s judgment. Our review of the Board’s determination
is governed by Administrative Review Law. American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577 (2005). Our
standard of review depends on whether the issue involves a question of law, a question of fact, or
a mixed question of law and fact. Id.
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¶ 19 We first consider plaintiff’s claim that, pursuant to New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Act violates his second amendment right to carry
a firearm for self-defense outside his home. This contention presents a question of law that we
review de novo. People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463, 466 (2011).
¶ 20 Defendants argue that plaintiff forfeited review of this claim because he failed to raise the
issue before the Board. Generally, issues not raised before the administrative agency are deemed
forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on administrative review. Texaco-Cities Service
Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278 (1998). This rule applies to constitutional issues, even
where the administrative agency lacks the authority to decide such questions. Arvia v. Madigan,
209 Ill. 2d 520, 526 (2004).
¶ 21 However, plaintiff challenges the Act’s entire “statutory scheme,” arguing that it operates
to deprive citizens of their second amendment right when they are denied a license to carry a
concealed firearm. Specifically, plaintiff argues that there is no historical analog for the Board’s
authority to deny a CCL, and that the reasonable suspicion standard used for objecting to
applications under the Act is unconstitutionally speculative. Plaintiff’s constitutional claim is a
facial one. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36 (describing a facial constitutional
challenge as a claim that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts). Courts may consider
a facial challenge to the validity of a statute, even if the issue was not first raised before the Board,
if it presents “an entirely legal question that does not require fact-finding by the agency or
application of the agency’s particular expertise.” Id. at 528.
¶ 22 Regardless of forfeiture, our supreme court recently held that the concealed carry licensing
regime, as set forth in the Act, is facially constitutional in light of Bruen. In People v. Thompson,
2025 IL 129965, the supreme court considered the constitutionality of the Act’s licensing regime.
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The defendant in Thompson was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW)
because, although he had a FOID card, he did not have a CCL and he possessed an uncased, loaded
handgun in a vehicle while traveling on a highway. Id. ¶ 7. Therefore, the defendant’s possession
of the handgun constituted unlicensed concealed carriage punishable under the AUUW statute. Id.
¶ 17. The issue before the court involved “the constitutionality of the AUUW statute’s enforcement
of the CCL licensing regime, which incorporates FOID card licensure.” Id. To answer this
question, the court considered whether the licensing regimes used to obtain a FOID card and a
CCL “comport with the second amendment.” Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 23 Relevant to this appeal, the supreme court found that the concealed carry licensing system
was a “shall-issue” regime where it contained “narrow, objective, and definite standards” for
granting licenses. Id. ¶ 42. As such, “the State must issue a CCL if the applicant meets the
requirements of both the FOID Card Act and the Concealed Carry Act.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 20. The court found that Bruen expressly held that “shall-issue firearm licensing regimes, like
the one enacted in Illinois, comport with the second amendment” because they do not involve the
“unchanneled discretion” of officials to deny licenses, nor do they contain a special-needs
requirement. Id. ¶ 42. The supreme court acknowledged that under Bruen, if the firearm regulation
covers presumptively protected conduct, the State must justify the regulation by showing that “it
is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. ¶ 43. It found,
however, that Bruen’s “express endorsement of shall-issue licensure obviate[d] the need for this
court to apply the historical-tradition component of the Bruen analysis” to the case. Id. Although
the defendant’s facial challenge was without merit, the court noted that “[t]he processing of any
given application in Illinois might give rise to an as-applied challenge ***.” Id. ¶ 50.
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¶ 24 Following Thompson, we find that Illinois’ statutory concealed carry licensing regime is
constitutional on its face. We do not ascertain from plaintiff’s brief that he raised an as-applied
constitutional challenge. However, to the extent that his arguments may be viewed as such, we
find that plaintiff has forfeited administrative review of claims that the CCL statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him. An as-applied constitutional claim “ ‘depends almost wholly
upon a determination of factual matters in which the specialized agency is thought to be more
proficient.’ ” Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 530-31, quoting Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill. 2d 493,
495 (1958). When litigants assert an as-applied challenge, courts prefer that the issue is first raised
before the administrative agency, “notwithstanding the agency’s inability to rule on the matter[,]”
so that opposing parties have a full opportunity to refute the challenge. Id. at 527-28. “Such an
evidentiary record is indispensable because administrative review is confined to the record created
before the agency.” Id. This is especially true here, where plaintiff on administrative review
discredits the evidence presented to the Board. We therefore decline to consider claims that the
Act is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff, where he did not raise that issue before the Board.
¶ 25 Plaintiff next contends that he was denied due process where he did not receive an
evidentiary hearing before the Board. Since this contention raises a purely legal issue, our standard
of review is de novo. Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271
(2004).
¶ 26 While administrative proceedings are subject to due process requirements, “due process is
a flexible concept and requires only such procedural protections as fundamental principles of
justice and the particular situation demand.” Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 92 (1992). Our supreme court has determined that to comply with due
process, “[a]n administrative proceeding need not involve an evidentiary hearing in the nature of
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a judicial proceeding.” Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation,
2014 IL 116023, ¶ 40. Rather, the salient issue is whether the administrative proceedings provided
the affected party with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Perez v. Illinois Concealed
Carry Licensing Review Board, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 27.
¶ 27 In Perez, the plaintiff claimed, as does plaintiff here, that he was denied due process
because the Board failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the objections to his CCL application.
Id. ¶ 26. This court found his argument unpersuasive. We noted that under the administrative rules,
the Board was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. ¶ 27. The Board had also notified
the plaintiff of law enforcement’s objections and gave him an opportunity to respond, which he
did. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not request a hearing upon being notified of the objections,
nor did he challenge the administrative process in the underlying proceedings. Id. ¶ 28. As such,
he consented to the procedure and forfeited review of the issue on appeal. Id.
¶ 28 Similarly, plaintiff in this case was notified by letter of the objections and informed that he
had 15 days “to submit any relevant evidence, including any documentation supporting any factual
assertions you may make, to the Board for its consideration before a final administrative decision
is rendered” on his application. Although he had an opportunity to be heard, he did not submit any
evidence. Moreover, like the plaintiff in Perez, plaintiff here did not request a hearing below, nor
did he raise his due process claim before the Board. The forfeiture rule “applies equally to issues
involving constitutional due process rights.” Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202
Ill. App. 3d 279, 287 (1990). For these reasons, plaintiff’s due process argument fails.
¶ 29 Plaintiff’s final contention is that the circuit court erred when it did not remand the matter
to the Board “for further evidence.” Whether to remand a case to the administrative agency for the
purpose of presenting new evidence is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the circuit
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court. Baker v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2014 IL App (1st) 123669, ¶ 23. This
contention also raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Western
Illinois University v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 32.
¶ 30 The Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that on administrative review, the circuit
court has the authority, “where a hearing has been held by the agency, to remand for the purpose
of taking additional evidence ***.” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(7) (West 2022). Pertinent here, the plain
language of the statute provides that the circuit court may remand the matter for additional
evidence in cases “where a hearing has been held by the agency ***.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
Plaintiff cites Sanderson v. DeKalb County Zoning Board of Appeals, 24 Ill. App. 3d 107 (1974),
as support. In that case, however, a hearing was held prior to the administrative agency’s final
determination. Id. at 109. The Board in this case did not hold an evidentiary hearing prior to
rendering its decision. Plaintiff has cited no support for his contention that he was entitled to a
hearing upon remand when the Board did not conduct an evidentiary hearing in the first instance.
¶ 31 Furthermore, plaintiff seeks a hearing in order to persuade the Board to change its mind
about his application. The Board, however, has “no inherent power for amending or changing a
decision it has made.” Caldwell v. Nolan, 167 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1065 (1988). Being a creature of
statute, the Board has only those powers specifically conferred upon it by the legislature. Id. To
ascertain whether the Board has the power to reconsider or amend its decision, we look to section
20 of the Code, the Board’s enabling statute. See Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085. ¶ 33 (finding
that “any action taken by an agency must be authorized by its enabling act”).
¶ 32 The Board was created to consider law enforcement objections to an applicant’s eligibility
to obtain a CCL. 430 ILCS 66/20(a) (West 2022). The statute provides that:
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“If the Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant poses a
danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety, then the Board shall
affirm the objection of the law enforcement agency or the Illinois State Police and shall
notify the Illinois State Police that the applicant is ineligible for a license. If the Board does
not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant poses a danger to
himself or herself or others, or is a threat to public safety, then the Board shall notify the
Illinois State Police that the applicant is eligible for a license. ” Id. § 20(g).
Significant here, there is no provision authorizing the Board to reconsider its determination after
finding an applicant ineligible for a license. Unless authorized by statute, an administrative agency
may not modify or alter its decisions. Beyer v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2019 IL
App (1st) 191152, ¶ 35.
¶ 33 Lastly, we address plaintiff’s bare claim that the Board’s determination that he was
dangerous was not supported by the facts. In his opening brief, he contested the “speculative
conclusion” that he was a danger to others or posed a threat to public safety, because it was based
on a police report. In his reply brief, plaintiff asserted that the Board “did not properly consider
the whole record” where it ignored the opinion of the psychologist who evaluated plaintiff and
instead gave weight to “a six-year-old record of arrest.”
¶ 34 Plaintiff did not expand on either argument with analysis, nor did he support his contention
with citation to authority. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides that
the appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with
citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** Points not argued are forfeited
and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” An issue
that is “merely listed or included in a vague allegation of error is not ‘argued’ and will not satisfy
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the requirements of the rule.” Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010). As such, plaintiff has
forfeited review of the Board’s finding.
¶ 35 Regardless of forfeiture, there is no basis in the record to reverse the Board’s determination.
The Board’s findings of fact are considered prima facie true, and we will not reverse those findings
unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Beggs v. Board of Education of
Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. A factual
determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210
(2008).
¶ 36 Here, the Board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff posed a danger
to himself or others, or was a threat to public safety. In making this determination, the Board
considered two reports detailing plaintiff’s arrests for domestic battery. Police reports are included
in the information the Board can consider when presented with an objection. Jankovich v. Illinois
State Police, 2017 IL App (1st) 160706, ¶ 57. The evidence before the Board consisted of two
police reports indicating that (1) during an altercation with his then-girlfriend, plaintiff pulled her
by her hair towards the ground and “began kicking her about the body with his foot,” and (2)
during an argument with his wife, plaintiff pushed her into the bedroom closet door and told her,
“If you mess with me I’ll split your face.” Plaintiff was holding two kitchen knives but placed
them in the sink before police arrived. While plaintiff challenges the contents of the reports and
refers to an evaluation conducted by a licensed clinical psychologist, he did not present this
evidence to the Board even though he had every opportunity to do so.
¶ 37 Based on the evidence before the Board, we cannot say that the opposite conclusion was
clearly evident or that the Board’s determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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See Perez, 2016 IL App (1st) 152087, ¶ 22 (affirming the Board’s finding that the plaintiff posed
a danger, based on police reports for domestic battery, where he failed to “offer a statement refuting
or explaining the evidence against him”).
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s determination that plaintiff posed a
danger under the Act and therefore was ineligible for a CCL.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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