Dennis v. Gordon

125 P. 1063, 163 Cal. 427
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 5, 1912
DocketL.A. No. 2937.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 125 P. 1063 (Dennis v. Gordon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dennis v. Gordon, 125 P. 1063, 163 Cal. 427 (Cal. 1912).

Opinion

SHAW, J.

Dennis and Gordon were partners doing business under the firm name of Dennis-Gordon Company. The partnership was formed in September, 1907, and was dissolved by mutual consent on January 31, 1910. Dennis thereupon demanded of Gordon an accounting of the partnership business, which was refused. This action was then begun to compel such accounting. An account was rendered *429 and after it was settled by the court, judgment was given declaring that certain property standing in the name of Gordon was partnership property and that Dennis was the owner of an undivided half thereof, and that certain other property in the name of Gordon or his wife was his individual property in which Dennis had no interest. Dennis appeals from that portion of the judgment which is in favor of Gordon. He also moved for a new trial and he appeals from an order denying the motion.

The property adjudged to belong to Gordon was, first, 17% shares of the Wellman Oil Company; second, seventy-five thousand shares of the Western Crude Oil Company and fifteen hundred shares of the 32 Oil Company; and third, one hundred thousand shares of the Hale-McLeod Company. The contention of Dennis is that, although the money paid by Gordon in the acquisition of this property was his own and not the money of the firm, yet because he did not inform Dennis fully of the facts concerning it, so that Dennis could take an equal share, and because a part o.f the consideration upon which Gordon acquired it was services performed and to be performed by Gordon in bettering the property, Gordon was not acting in good faith and holds the property as trustee for the firm and as firm assets. The findings on this point are in general terms, as to each of said parcels, that it. is not a part of the assets of the firm. There were special findings to the effect that Gordon paid one thousand dollars for the property which he exchanged for the shares in the Western Crude Oil Company and in the 32 Oil Company, and that before buying any of the shares he offered to take Dennis in with him on the deal, but that Dennis refused. It is claimed that these findings are not sustained by sufficient evidence.

There is no merit in the preliminary objection of Gordon that the evidence cannot be considered. The order denying a new trial recites that the motion for a new trial was " presented upon all the grounds stated in the notice of intention to move for a new trial herein, and upon the statement of the case heretofore settled.” A copy of the notice of intention is printed in the transcript, but it is not authenticated by a bill of exceptions. Hence, it cannot be considered as a part of the record on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 661, *430 951, 952.) But the record contains a hill of exceptions in which the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain these findings is specified. The order denying the new trial does not clearly state that the grounds upon which the motion was made were those specified in the settled statement, and the draftsman apparently failed to observe that the document referred to as a statement of the case, is denominated on its face as a bill of exceptions. But such orders are to be liberally construed and substance, rather than form, is the essential thing. A bill of exceptions setting forth the evidence and proceedings taken at the trial, such as the one in this record, is in no wise distinguishable from a statement of the case. Wherever it is necessary for the ends of justice to do so we will consider the expressions as synonymous. A recital in the order that the motion was presented- upon the statement of the case heretofore settled will be deemed sufficient evidence that the objections set forth in the statement were the grounds of the motion. The misnomer whereby the bill was referred to as a statement will be disregarded. Furthermore, upon this point it is to be observed that the record does not show that any notice of the entry of the judgment was ever served upon Gordon’s attorneys of record. The party wishing to take advantage of the fact that it was served, for the purpose of preventing a consideration of the evidence on appeal from the judgment taken more than sixty days after its entry, must show that such notice was served more than sixty days before the taking of such appeal. Otherwise the appeal will be considered as having been taken under sections 941a, 941b, and 941c of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case, by sections 941b and 941c, the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewable in the same manner as if the appeal had been taken within sixty days of the entry of the judgment under section 939.

The Dennis-Gordon Company was formed without capital. Its business was to be the buying and selling of oil, bonds, stocks, oil leases, and real estate, either for others on commission, or on its own behalf, and the promoting of oil companies and the improvement of oil lands. The principal part of its business, however, was the business of selling property for others on commission. It was successful and profitable, but the profits received in money were immediately divided *431 between them. Only a small amount of money was kept on hand, apparently for the purpose of paying current expenses. The agreement of partnership was oral. It contemplated the buying of lands by the firm as a part of the business, but as there was no capital and no agreement that either should contribute money to the business, it would follow, necessarily, that if any property was bought by or for the firm requiring any considerable sum of money, a new agreement concerning it would have to be made before either would be obliged to contribute of his individual funds for that investment. Such new agreement might be made informally, as, for example, if either bought property for the firm and the other, after knowledge thereof, acquiesced therein or made no objection thereto. In that case there would be an implied agreement by each to contribute such additional funds as might be required therefor.

It is conceded that Gordon did not use any partnership funds in acquiring the properties in question, and that the money he paid therefor was his individual property. The only grounds upon which it is claimed that the property belongs to the firm are, as before stated, that Gordon paid the consideration in part by the performance of services in and about the properties, that his attention thereto prevented him from giving due attention to the firm business, and that he obtained the consent of Dennis that it should not be bought on firm account, by concealing from Dennis the real character of the property or by failing to inform him thereof.

The shares in the 32 Oil Company, in the Western Crude Oil Company and in the Hale-McLeod Company were all obtained in exchange for interests in certain oil lands held by Gordon and transferred by him to those companies. The 32 Oil Company shares were procured by the transfer of a one-fourth interest in a part of section 32, those of the Western Crude by the transfer to it of a one-fourth interest in a part of section 4; and those in the Hale-McLeod Company by the transfer to it of an interest in lands in sections 28, 34, and 24. These lands were not all in the same township and range, but their particular location is not important. The fact of the exchanges of these lands for stocks is of no consequence. The material inquiry is with regard to the acquisition by Gordon of the interests in the lands.

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Bluebook (online)
125 P. 1063, 163 Cal. 427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennis-v-gordon-cal-1912.