Dennis Scott v. City of Daytona Beach, Florida

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 24-12964
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 1 of 49

FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12662 ____________________

DENNIS SCOTT, CHAD DRIGGERS, DOUGLAS WILLIS, GEORGE ROWLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-02192-WWB-RMN ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 2 of 49

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12662 ____________________ No. 24-12964 ____________________

DENNIS SCOTT, CHAD DRIGGERS, DOUGLAS WILLIS, GEORGE ROWLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-02192-WWB-RMN ____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: Panhandling is divisive. For some, it’s a way of life—perhaps even a matter of life and death. To others, though, panhandling is a nuisance—they say it compromises safety and sanitation, unset- tles residents, and generally degrades the social order. Having con- cluded that panhandling’s costs outweigh its benefits, Daytona Beach adopted an ordinance broadly restricting it within city limits. Four men who regularly panhandle in Daytona Beach chal- lenged most of the ordinance’s provisions, claiming that they USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 3 of 49

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violate the First Amendment. Agreeing, the district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, enjoined enforcement of the challenged provisions, and awarded damages. For the most part, we too agree—the ordinance imposes content-based restrictions on the plaintiffs’ speech, and those re- strictions fail strict scrutiny. We part ways with the district court, though, on two jurisdictional issues. On the front end of the case, so to speak, we hold that the plaintiffs have failed to establish stand- ing to attack some of the ordinance’s provisions. And on the back end, we hold that the district court overstepped its authority when it issued what was, in effect, a universal injunction. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the district court’s order. 1 I A In 2019, Daytona Beach confronted a problem. Local police had received numerous complaints about panhandling, and city leaders feared that panhandlers’ conduct was undermining safety, aesthetics, and residents’ and visitors’ general experience. The city was particularly alarmed by the rise of what it called “aggressive panhandling”—beggars using profanity or touching or intimidating others as a means of inducing donations. In an effort to address the

1 We also affirm the district court’s damages award, as the parties stipulated

that the plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount if we deem any provision of the ordinance unconstitutional. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 4 of 49

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issues it perceived, Daytona Beach enacted Ordinance No. 19-27, which substantially restricted panhandling in the city. The specifics of the ordinance are key to evaluating its con- stitutionality, so we’ll take some time to describe them here. We’ll begin with four key definitions and then move on to the ordi- nance’s operative provisions. First, and most importantly, the or- dinance provides a detailed (if a little clunky) definition of “panhan- dle”: Panhandle means to beg or make any demand or re- quest made in person for an immediate donation of money or some other article of value from another person for the use of one’s self or others, including but not limited to for a charitable or sponsor purpose or that will benefit a charitable organization or spon- sor. As used in this article, the word “solicit” and its forms are included in this definition. Panhandling is considered as having taken place regardless of whether the person making the solicitation received any contribution. Any purchase of an item for an amount far exceeding its value, under circumstances where a reasonable person would understand that the purchase is in substance a donation, constitutes a do- nation as contemplated in this definition. Begging is included in this definition of Panhandling. Soliciting is includ[ed] in this definition of Panhandling.

Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 66-1(b)(3) (MuniCode Supp. 2019). Second and third, we need to define the words “beg” and “solicit,” to which the ordinance’s definition of “panhandle” USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 5 of 49

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repeatedly refers. Because the ordinance itself doesn’t define those constituent terms, we ask how an ordinary person would under- stand them—that is, “how a reasonable person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the[m] in context.” United States v. Pate, 84 F.4th 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (quoting John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2392–93 (2003)). While not dispositive, diction- ary definitions can be indicative of words’ ordinary understanding. One prominent descriptive dictionary defines the term “beg” as “to ask for as a charity esp[ecially] habitually or from house to house,” and “to ask for alms or charity.” Beg, Webster’s Third New Inter- national Dictionary (1961); accord, e.g., Beg, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“[t]o ask for charity, esp[ecially] habitually or pitia- bly”). The same volume defines the word “solicit” as “to approach with a request or plea (as in selling or begging),” and “to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading.” Solicit, Webster’s Third New In- ternational Dictionary, supra; accord, e.g., Solicitation, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (“the act or an instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something,” or “an attempt or effort to gain business”); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 72 (2022) (adopting the Black’s definition of “solicitation”). For our purposes, “beg” is easy. The ordinary understand- ing of that term fits comfortably within the ordinance’s definition of “panhandle.” “Solicit” is trickier. According to the dictionary, at least, it covers any request to obtain anything—not just money or an article of value. Importantly, though, the ordinance expressly limits panhandling to requests for “donation[s].” Daytona Beach, USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 6 of 49

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Fla., Code § 66-1(b)(3); see also Br. of Appellant at 26 (acknowledg- ing that the ordinance doesn’t apply to commercial solicitations). Because the ordinance expressly characterizes “[s]olicit[ation]” as a subset of donation-focused “panhandl[ing],” it would be nonsensi- cal—at least for present purposes—for “solicit” to carry its broader meaning.2 So we’re left to infer from context the sense of the term “solicit” as it is used in the ordinance. At times the ordinance ap- pears to use “panhandle” and “solicit” interchangeably—the defini- tion section, for example, provides that “[p]anhandling is consid- ered as having taken place regardless of whether the person making the solicitation received any contribution.” Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 66-1(b)(3). The ordinance makes clear, though, that “[s]oliciting is included in th[e] definition of panhandling.” Id. (em- phasis added). The term “solicit” is thus best read to refer to pretty much everything covered by the term “panhandle,” but no more. Finally, “aggressive panhandling.” The ordinance explains that term by reference to five particular means of seeking dona- tions. (Warning: This is tedious, but while we’re defining terms, we think it better to quote than to paraphrase.) To “aggressive[ly] panhandl[e],” the ordinance says, is (1) “[t]o approach or speak to a person and demand, request or beg for money or a donation of

2 It’s true that in ordinary parlance, panhandling might be a subset of solicita-

tion—after all, making a “demand or request . . . in person for an immediate donation of money or some other article of value,” id., is one means of “re- questing or seeking to obtain something,” Solicitation, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. But under the ordinance—whose definitions we must respect—the re- verse is true. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 7 of 49

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valuable property in such a manner as would cause a reasonable person to believe that the person is being threatened with immi- nent bodily injury or the commission of a criminal act upon the person approached or another person in the solicited person’s com- pany, or upon property in the person’s immediate possession”; (2) “[t]o maintain contact with a solicited person and continue de- manding, requesting or begging for money or a donation of valua- ble property after the solicited person has made a negative response to an initial demand or request”; (3) “[t]o obstruct, block or im- pede . . . the passage or free movement of a solicited person or a person in the company of a solicited person”; (4) “[t]o touch or cause physical contact to a solicited person or a person in the com- pany of a solicited person, or to touch any vehicle occupied by a solicited person or by a person in the company of the solicited per- son, without the person’s express consent”; or (5) “[t]o engage in conduct that would reasonably be construed as intended to intimi- date, compel or force a solicited person to accede to demands.” Id. § 66-1(b)(2)(a)–(e). The definitional work done, we proceed to the ordinance’s operative provisions. The substantive restrictions can be divided into three categories. First, and most straightforwardly, the ordi- nance bans aggressive panhandling citywide, including in all “pub- lic or semi-public area[s].” Id. § 66-1(c)(1). Second, the ordinance prohibits garden-variety panhandling in locations throughout the city. Among them: at or near “com- mercially zoned property,” id. § 66-1(c)(3)(a), “bus [and] trolley USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 8 of 49

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stop[s]” and other “public transportation facilit[ies],” id. § 66- 1(c)(3)(b), ATMs, id. § 66-1(c)(3)(c), “parking lot[s]” and other park- ing facilities, id. § 66-1(c)(3)(d), “public restroom[s],” id. § 66-1(c)(3)(e), “daycare[s] [and] school[s],” id. § 66-1(c)(3)(f), and certain “signalized intersection[s],” id. § 66-1(c)(3)(g), as well as on the Daytona Beach Boardwalk, a beachfront promenade, id. § 66-1(c)(3)(h). Third, the ordinance restricts certain methods of panhan- dling, many of which overlap with the practices covered by the prohibition on aggressive panhandling and the location-based pro- visions. So, for instance, the ordinance prohibits approaching any- one in a car “in an aggressive manner,” id. § 66-1(c)(4)(a), panhan- dling at “outdoor dining area[s,] . . . seating area[s], playground[s,] [and] . . . merchandise area[s], id. § 66-1(c)(4)(b), panhandling at “transit stop[s],” id. § 66-1(c)(4)(c), and panhandling from people “in line waiting to be admitted to a commercial establishment,” id. § 66-1(c)(4)(d). The ordinance also prohibits “touching [a solicited person] without that person’s consent,” id. § 66-1(c)(4)(e), using “profane or abusive” language during a panhandling interaction, id. § 66-1(c)(4)(f), and employing threatening “gesture[s] or act[s]” to induce donations, id. § 66-1(c)(4)(g), as well as panhandling “under the influence of alcohol” or illegal drugs, id. § 66-1(c)(4)(h), and panhandling “[a]fter [d]ark,” id. § 66-1(c)(4)(i). B Shortly after the ordinance’s enactment, the city set about enforcing it, including against the four plaintiffs here. Dennis Scott, USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 9 of 49

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Douglas Willis, Chad Driggers, and George Rowland all panhandle in Daytona Beach. Each is, or has been, homeless, and all subsist on the money and goods that they obtain panhandling. The men panhandle throughout the city: Scott panhandles around the Day- tona International Speedway and asks for donations as cars leave the area’s shopping centers. He has also panhandled at the I-95 offramp to the west of the racetrack. Willis spends most of his time near the Boardwalk, and he requests donations from passersby on or around public sidewalks near the beach. He has panhandled both on sidewalks and along public roadways in the area. Driggers and Rowland seem to cover the same basic territories; they spend most of their time near Ridgewood and Mason Avenues, which in- tersect in northern Daytona Beach. Daytona Beach police have threatened to arrest each of the plaintiffs—and, in the case of Driggers, actually arrested him—for violating the ordinance. Perhaps not surprisingly, each of the plain- tiffs has limited his panhandling because of the crackdown. C In 2022, Scott, Driggers, Willis, and Rowland sued Daytona Beach in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 18 of the ordinance’s 19 restrictions violate their First Amendment free- USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 10 of 49

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speech rights, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. 3 They brought both facial and as-applied challenges. Following discovery, the plaintiffs moved for partial sum- mary judgment, which the district court granted. The court issued a declaratory judgment holding that the challenged provisions vio- late the First Amendment. It first concluded that the challenged provisions were content-based speech restrictions because they ap- plied only to a subset of solicitation—namely, requests “for chari- table donations.” The court next held that each of the provisions failed strict scrutiny because it was either under- or over-inclusive. After holding the challenged provisions unconstitutional, the court permanently enjoined their enforcement and scheduled a bench trial on the issue of damages. Daytona Beach appealed. Seeking to avoid trial, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding damages and jointly moved for judgment. Pursuant to the stipulation, the plaintiffs are entitled to $80,000 if, but only if, this Court declares any provision of the ordinance unconstitu- tional. Consistent with the parties’ joint motion, the district court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The city appealed. The damages appeal was consolidated with the summary judg- ment appeal. * * *

3 The one provision the plaintiffs didn’t challenge is § 66-1(c)(2), which prohib-

its aggressive panhandling on the private property of someone who has pro- hibited panhandling or posted a sign to that effect. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 11 of 49

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Our opinion proceeds in three parts. First, we address (as we must) the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge each of the ordi- nance’s provisions. We hold that one or more of the plaintiffs has standing to attack some, but not all, of those provisions. Second, we take up the merits. We hold that seven of the ordinance’s pro- visions—those that at least one plaintiff has standing to challenge— violate the First Amendment. We decline to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the other 11 provisions. And finally, we consider the propriety of the district court’s remedies. We hold that the court’s declaratory judgment and injunction were over- broad. II First up, standing. 4 Because standing “is a threshold jurisdic- tional question,” we must assure ourselves “not only of [our] own jurisdiction, but also of that of the [district] court[].” AT&T Mobil- ity, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2007). That’s true regardless of whether, or how thoroughly, the parties have briefed the standing issue. Id. at 1360. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show three things: (1) that he has suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) that his injury was caused by the defendant’s conduct, and (3) that a favorable decision would likely redress his injury. Henry v. Att’y Gen., 45 F.4th 1272, 1287

4 We review de novo whether a plaintiff has standing. Henry v. Att’y Gen., 45 F.4th 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2022). We also review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 12 of 49

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(11th Cir. 2022). Here, the latter two requirements—causation and redressability—are clearly satisfied. As the district court observed, the city’s police officers made the arrests and threats that allegedly chilled the plaintiffs’ speech. And a declaration that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional, as well as an injunction against their enforcement, would permit the plaintiffs to panhandle with- out fear of arrest and prosecution. So too, damages would com- pensate the plaintiffs for their past injuries. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ standing depends on the first ele- ment: injury in fact. And the analysis of that element turns out to be significantly more complicated than the district court and the parties seem to have recognized. Bottom line: We hold that some of the plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated such an injury re- sulting from certain provisions of the ordinance. But not all the plaintiffs have shown an injury in fact stemming from each of the challenged provisions. Our evaluation of the standing issues in the case proceeds in four parts. First, we’ll explain the injury-in-fact requirement’s ap- plication in free-speech cases. Second, we’ll describe the interac- tion between standing doctrine and the traditional summary judg- ment standard. Third, we’ll unpack the requirement that each plaintiff have standing to challenge each of the ordinance’s provi- sions. And finally, we’ll apply all that law to the plaintiffs’ chal- lenges here. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 13 of 49

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A To constitute a cognizable Article III injury, “an invasion of a legally protected interest” must be both “(a) concrete and partic- ularized[] and (b) actual or imminent.” Henry, 45 F.4th at 1287. In free-speech cases, sub-element (a) is easy—free-speech violations are “concrete and particularized.” Id. at 1288; see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016)) (holding that “abridgment of free speech” is a “concrete” injury). Sub-element (b) is where the action is. Whether a plaintiff’s injury is “actual or imminent” typically turns on the form of relief he requests. See Mack v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2021). To seek retrospective re- lief—i.e., damages—the plaintiff must show a completed injury. See id. To seek prospective relief—i.e., an injunction or a declaratory judgment—the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of future harm. Id. at 1357. In the free-speech context, a plaintiff can do so by showing that “the operation or enforcement of the government policy would cause a reasonable would-be speaker to self-cen- sor”—or, in other words, would “‘objectively chill[]’ protected ex- pression.” Henry, 45 F.4th at 1288. Helpfully, when a plaintiff alleges an ongoing chill to his speech, the past- and future-injury inquiries largely converge. Be- cause “an actual injury can exist when the plaintiff is chilled from exercising her right to free expression or forgoes expression in or- der to avoid enforcement consequences,” Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wilson v. State Bar of Ga., 132 USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 14 of 49

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F.3d 1422, 1428 (11th Cir. 1998)), an ongoing chill constitutes both imminent harm for prospective-relief purposes, see Henry, 45 F.4th at 1288, and actual, completed injury for retrospective-relief pur- poses, see Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 293 (2021) (hold- ing that a plaintiff can seek nominal damages for a violation of his free-speech rights); Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that a plaintiff who has suffered compensable injury as a result of a free-speech violation can sue for money dam- ages). Accordingly, in this case, if a plaintiff can show that a provi- sion of Daytona Beach’s ordinance objectively chills his protected expression, he has demonstrated standing to seek both prospective and retrospective relief. B Next up, the interaction between standing and summary judgment. Each standing requirement “must be sup- ported . . . with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Henry, 45 F.4th at 1287 (citation modified). Because this is an appeal from an order granting the plaintiffs summary judgment, the familiar summary judgment standard governs the plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the movant is entitled to judg- ment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving par- ties—here, the plaintiffs—bear the initial burden to show the lack of a genuine dispute. Dawkins v. Fulton Cnty., 733 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2013). “[O]nce that burden is met the burden shifts to USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 15 of 49

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the nonmoving party”—here, Daytona Beach—“to bring the court’s attention to evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.” Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2014). To do so, the city must present “more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 1122. C We next address the rule that a plaintiff must establish stand- ing to attack each ordinance provision that he challenges. “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431. Rather, “plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.” Id. Accord- ingly, our precedent requires a plaintiff challenging multiple provi- sions of a law to demonstrate standing as to each one. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2010). To do so, we held in CAMP, a plaintiff must show “that every chal- lenged provision affects [him]” personally. 451 F.3d at 1274 (cita- tion modified). Here, the district court never conducted the necessary pro- vision-by-provision analysis of the plaintiffs’ standing. Instead, based on the way the plaintiffs had framed their complaint, the court grouped the 18 challenged provisions into four categories, which it labeled the “Location-Based Provisions,” the “After-Dark Provisions,” the “Traffic Provisions,” and the “Conduct-Related Provisions.” The court then evaluated whether each category of provisions, considered as a whole, chilled the plaintiffs’ speech and USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 16 of 49

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concluded that a plaintiff who had been injured by any provision in a particular category had standing to challenge every provision in that category. But in CAMP, we rejected that sort of approach when we held that the plaintiff there didn’t have standing to chal- lenge an entire ordinance simply because it had been injured by one of its provisions. Instead—to repeat—we held that a plaintiff has to establish “that every challenged provision affects [him]” per- sonally. 451 F.3d at 1274 (citation modified). In the next section, we’ll conduct a CAMP-compliant stand- ing analysis, evaluating the plaintiffs’ standing on a provision-by- provision basis. Settle in. 5 D To reset the stage briefly: When challenging multiple pro- visions of a law, a plaintiff must establish standing as to each one. A free-speech plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact—and, in this case, has therefore demonstrated standing—if the challenged law objectively chills protected expression. And for summary

5 At oral argument, the plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that, under CAMP, we have

to conduct a provision-by-provision standing analysis. See Tr. of Oral Argu- ment at 16:28. She contended, though, that the district court’s categorical ap- proach comported with CAMP because the ordinance’s provisions overlap with one another. See id. at 16:44. True, some provisions do overlap, but it doesn’t follow that a court is relieved of its obligation to verify each plaintiff’s standing to challenge each provision. And as our analysis will show, the dis- trict court’s method often led it to find standing where there was none. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 17 of 49

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judgment to be proper, there mustn’t be a genuine issue of material fact as to standing. With that recap, let’s assess the plaintiffs’ standing to chal- lenge each of the 18 provisions that they contend violate their First Amendment rights. i First up is § 66-1(c)(1), which prohibits “aggressive panhan- dling.” Each plaintiff has said that, in the future, he may solicit do- nations in ways that are criminalized by (c)(1). That includes, for example, requesting a donation from someone when standing within two feet of him, which all plaintiffs have said they might do. The plaintiffs have been arrested, threatened with arrest, or both for violating the ordinance, and Willis has seen others get arrested while panhandling. In light of this enforcement history, a reasona- ble person would refrain from soliciting in any way defined as “ag- gressive panhandling” despite an inclination to do so. Paragraph (c)(1) therefore objectively chills the plaintiffs’ speech, and they have satisfied their initial burden to show that there is no genuine dispute as to their standing to challenge that provision. The city responds that, during discovery, the plaintiffs de- nied having previously panhandled aggressively. But that conces- sion doesn’t negate the fact that the plaintiffs may want to engage in “aggressive panhandling” but are deterred from doing so by par- agraph (c)(1). We conclude that, based on the available evidence, there is no genuine dispute that the plaintiffs have standing to chal- lenge (c)(1). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 18 of 49

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ii The plaintiffs also challenge eight separate provisions of § 66-1(c)(3), which prohibit panhandling in certain locations. To establish their standing as to these provisions, the plaintiffs argue that the location-based prohibitions cover areas where they pan- handle. To determine whether the plaintiffs have shown the ab- sence of a genuine factual dispute regarding their standing, we con- sider whether the particular urban features designated in the law are sufficiently prevalent in the areas where they panhandle that there can be no meaningful doubt that the provisions at issue ob- jectively chill their speech. Subparagraph (c)(3)(a) prohibits panhandling within 20 feet of the entry to or exit from any commercially zoned property. Wil- lis, Driggers, and Rowland have shown that there is no genuine dispute that this provision chills their speech. According to maps in the record, 6 there’s a substantial amount of commercial property on the beach side of Daytona Beach and near the Boardwalk—both areas where Willis panhandles. Because of the threat of arrest, Wil- lis has stopped holding a sign and has reduced his panhandling. That self-censorship is objectively reasonable in the face of possible prosecution, and the city has pointed to no record evidence that undermines Willis’s standing. The maps also show that there is commercial property on the southern corners of Mason and Ridge- wood Avenues, where Driggers and Rowland panhandle. Both

6 The maps identify panhandling exclusion zones based on urban features like

business entrances and exits, ATMs, parking areas, etc. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 19 of 49

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have had to move to the northern side of Ridgewood because of threatened enforcement, which indicates objective chill. And as with Willis, the city hasn’t identified any record evidence that un- dermines Driggers and Rowland’s standing. Scott, by contrast, hasn’t shown the absence of a material fact as to his standing to attack subparagraph (c)(3)(a). There are shopping centers along In- ternational Speedway, but only a few commercial entrances and exits along the road. Because depending on exactly where Scott panhandles, (c)(3)(a) may or may not objectively chill his speech, he hasn’t clearly established his standing to challenge the provision. Subparagraph (c)(3)(b) prohibits panhandling within 20 feet of any bus or trolley stop or any public-transportation facility. All plaintiffs have conclusively shown standing to challenge this provi- sion. As to Willis, the maps show a number of bus stops near the Boardwalk. As to Driggers and Rowland, the maps identify a bus stop very near the southern corner of Mason and Ridgewood. And as to Scott, there are numerous bus stops up and down Interna- tional Speedway. Because exclusion zones around transit stops cover the areas where each plaintiff panhandles, enforcement of (c)(3)(b) objectively chills their speech. Subparagraph (c)(3)(c) prohibits panhandling within 20 feet of ATMs and other cash-dispensing machines. No plaintiff has shown that this provision indisputably chills his speech. As to Wil- lis, the maps show some ATMs in the area where he panhandles, but they aren’t so pervasive, or so particularized to specific loca- tions where he operates, that the provision would clearly cause a USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 20 of 49

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reasonable person to modify his behavior. Similarly, as to Driggers and Rowland, there appears to be an ATM near the southeastern corner of Mason and Ridgewood, but the presence of that single ATM doesn’t definitively show an objective chill. And as to Scott, there don’t appear to be any ATMs along the road where he pan- handles. Subparagraph (c)(3)(d) prohibits panhandling within 20 feet of a city-owned parking lot, meter, or pay station. No plaintiff has conclusively established standing to challenge (c)(3)(d). Driggers, Rowland, and Scott haven’t alleged that they panhandle, or intend to panhandle, near these facilities, and the maps don’t show any near where they operate. Willis has presented some evidence that he panhandles near public parking facilities—there are clusters of parking meters near the Boardwalk—but he hasn’t shown that pub- lic parking is so pervasive, or so particularized to where he panhan- dles, that (c)(3)(d) indisputably chills his expression. Subparagraph (c)(3)(e) prohibits panhandling within 20 feet of any public restroom. No plaintiff has established standing to challenge this provision, because the maps don’t show public re- strooms near any of the areas where any of them operates. Subparagraph (c)(3)(f) prohibits panhandling within 100 feet of a daycare or school. No plaintiff has established standing to chal- lenge (c)(3)(f). There are schools near the areas where Willis, Drig- gers, and Rowland panhandle, but the exclusion zones around the schools don’t sweep so broadly as to permit the conclusion that USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 21 of 49

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their speech is objectively chilled. The maps don’t show any schools in the area where Scott panhandles. Subparagraph (c)(3)(g) prohibits panhandling within 150 feet of a signalized intersection on certain types of roads. All plaintiffs clearly have standing to challenge this provision. Driggers, Row- land, and Scott have all stated that they panhandle at intersections subject to (c)(3)(g)’s ban. And Willis has said that he has done so along public roadways, and intersection-based exclusion zones sub- stantially cover the area where he operates. Finally, subparagraph (c)(3)(h) prohibits panhandling on the Boardwalk. Willis has standing to challenge this provision because he has previously panhandled on the Boardwalk and has been threatened with enforcement of the ordinance. By contrast, Drig- gers, Rowland, and Scott lack standing because none has claimed to have panhandled on the Boardwalk or that he intends to do so iii Next up are nine ostensibly conduct-based provisions in par- agraph (c)(4).7 Subparagraph (c)(4)(a) prohibits approaching a vehicle to panhandle, solicit or beg, or to offer to perform a service related to the vehicle, or otherwise to solicit the sale of goods or services, if

7 We say “ostensibly” because we agree with the plaintiffs that some of these

look more like location-based provisions. We’ll call them conduct-based, however, because that’s how the ordinance labels them. The label is immate- rial to our analysis. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 22 of 49

22 Opinion of the Court 24-12662

done so in an aggressive manner. All the plaintiffs have standing to challenge this provision. As already explained, they all solicit along public roadways, and have indicated they may engage in so- called aggressive panhandling in the future. Subparagraph (c)(4)(b) prohibits panhandling, soliciting, and begging at any outdoor dining amphitheater, amphitheater seating area, playground, or outdoor merchandise area that is in use at the time. No plaintiff has definitively shown standing to challenge (c)(4)(b). Scott, Driggers, and Rowland haven’t claimed that they panhandle or intend to panhandle at the covered locations, and the maps don’t show a significant number of such locations in the areas where they operate. As to Willis, there are some outdoor dining areas on the Boardwalk, but he hasn’t stated that he panhandles at them, let alone that he does so while they’re in use. Subparagraph (c)(4)(c) prohibits panhandling, soliciting, and begging at transit stops and taxi stands, as well as in public-transit vehicles. Although all plaintiffs have established that they panhan- dle near public-transit stops, see supra at 19 (addressing the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge (c)(3)(b)), they haven’t shown beyond dispute that they panhandle at those locations. So the plaintiffs haven’t clearly established standing to challenge (c)(4)(c). Subparagraphs (c)(4)(d) through (h) prohibit panhandling that involves certain behavior. Subparagraph (c)(4)(d) prohibits panhandling, soliciting, and begging aimed at anyone standing in line at a commercial establishment. Subparagraph (c)(4)(e) prohib- its panhandling, soliciting, and begging that involves touching USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 23 of 49

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someone without his or her consent. Subparagraph (c)(4)(f) pro- hibits the use of any profane or abusive language in the course of panhandling, soliciting, or begging. In a similar way, subparagraph (c)(4)(g) prohibits the use of any gesture or act intended to instill fear in the person being solicited or to make her feel compelled to donate. And subparagraph (c)(4)(h) prohibits panhandling, solicit- ing, and begging while under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs. Because none of the plaintiffs claim that they have engaged in, or may engage in, any of the conduct described in subpara- graphs (c)(4)(d) through (h), they haven’t shown that these provi- sions objectively chill their speech. 8 Lastly, subparagraph (c)(4)(i) prohibits panhandling, solicit- ing, and begging after dark. Driggers, Rowland, and Willis have standing to challenge this provision because they stated that they sometimes panhandle at night. 9 Scott, by contrast, lacks standing

8 At oral argument, the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that there was no rec-

ord evidence that her clients have used or intend to use profanity when pan- handling. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 20:25. We similarly find no evidence that suggests the plaintiffs have panhandled or intend to panhandle in the ways restricted by (c)(4)(d), (e), (g), and (h). 9 The city’s lone response is that the plaintiffs first mentioned nighttime pan-

handling in their amended complaint and that their discovery responses re- ported only that they “sometimes” panhandle after sunset. But the fact that the plaintiffs didn’t allege that they panhandle after dark in their initial com- plaint doesn’t undermine their claim to standing—plaintiffs are free to assert new facts in an amended complaint. Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs only sometimes panhandle at night negate their standing. How frequently they en- gage in nighttime panhandling may bear on the degree of chill that they expe- rience, but not on whether they suffer any chill at all. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 24 of 49

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to challenge (c)(4)(i), because he hasn’t said that he has panhandled at night or that he might do so in the future. * * * To sum up, each plaintiff indisputably has standing to attack some, but not all, of the ordinance’s provisions: • Scott has standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(b), (c)(3)(g), and (c)(4)(a). He hasn’t established standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(3)(a), (c)(3)(c)–(f), (c)(3)(h), or (c)(4)(b)– (i). • Driggers and Rowland have standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i). They haven’t established standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(3)(c)–(f), (c)(3)(h), or (c)(4)(b)–(h). • Willis has standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i). He hasn’t established standing to challenge §§ 66-1(c)(3)(c)–(f) or (c)(4)(b)–(h). So, where does that leave us? With respect to the provisions that at least one plaintiff indisputably has standing to challenge, we proceed to the merits. Cf. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (“A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one plain- tiff establishes that she has standing to sue.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, in the next Part, we’ll consider whether §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) violate the First Amendment. Because no plaintiff has indisputably established standing to challenge §§ (c)(3)(c)–(f) or (c)(4)(b)–(h), we do not now USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 25 of 49

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consider their constitutionality. With respect to the claims that the plaintiffs haven’t indisputably established standing to pursue, we vacate the district court’s order granting summary judgment. On remand, the court should determine for each provision whether (1) each plaintiff lacks standing entirely, in which case his claim should be dismissed, or (2) there is a genuine dispute regarding standing, in which case the issue should be resolved at trial. III On then—at last—to the merits of the First Amendment is- sue. 10 Our analysis proceeds in three sequential steps. First, we must determine whether the plaintiffs’ panhandling is protected by the First Amendment. That much is easy—we have previously held that panhandling is speech within the First Amendment’s am- bit. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999). Second, in order to assign the appropriate standard of scru- tiny, we must decide whether the challenged provisions are “con- tent-based” or “content-neutral.” Although less straightforward than the coverage issue, we conclude, for reasons we’ll explain, that the provisions are content-based and therefore trigger strict (rather than intermediate) constitutional scrutiny. Finally, having concluded that strict scrutiny applies, we must conduct the narrow-

10 We review questions of constitutional law de novo. Food Not Bombs, 901 F.3d at 1239. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 26 of 49

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tailoring inquiry. We conclude, as is so often the case, that the city has failed to satisfy that exacting standard. 11 A 1 In free-speech cases, whether a law is content-based or con- tent-neutral is often dispositive. If a speech restriction is content- based, it’s presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scru- tiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). By con- trast, if the restriction is content-neutral, it faces the loosey-goosier intermediate scrutiny. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Because the doctrinal test for identifying content- based regulations has evolved over the years, we think it’ll be use- ful to begin by briefly sketching that history.

11 One prefatory matter: The plaintiffs have brought both facial and as-applied

challenges. Under Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), we analyze their facial challenge using a two-step test. First, we “assess the . . . law[’s] scope,” asking “[w]hat activities, by what actors, do[es] the law[] prohibit or otherwise regulate?” Id. at 724. Second, we “decide which of the law[’s] ap- plications violate the First Amendment, and . . . measure them against the rest.” Id. at 725. Here, the city’s ordinance “prohibit[s] or otherwise regu- late[s]” just one “activit[y],” id. at 724—“panhandling,” see Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 66-1(c), which, for reasons already explained, see supra at 4–7, in- cludes “begging,” “soliciting,” and “aggressive panhandling.” Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ facial challenge turns on whether the challenged provisions’ “appli- cations” to panhandling “violate the First Amendment”—because, if they do, there are no constitutional applications to balance the scales. Moody, 603 U.S. at 725. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 27 of 49

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The distinction between content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions took shape—and became a central pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence—in the latter part of the 20th century. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 49, 51–53 (2000). From the very outset, the Supreme Court found the line between content-based and content-neutral laws difficult to draw. In particular, the Court’s decisions vacillated between com- peting understandings of what marked a restriction as content- based. See Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 234. On the one hand, the Court sometimes focused on the government’s apparent purpose, treating even facially content- based restrictions relatively leniently so long as they didn’t indicate a censorial motivation. The point, the Court said in those cases, was “that content discrimination raises the specter that the Gov- ernment may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (ci- tation modified). In other words, content discrimination was a problem principally because it suggested government malfeasance. By this logic, a speech restriction that drew lines based on content but didn’t otherwise evince bias against particular viewpoints or speakers wasn’t content-based in a constitutionally problematic sense. See Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 28 of 49

28 Opinion of the Court 24-12662

On the other hand, the Supreme Court sometimes empha- sized facial content discrimination, regardless of ostensible govern- ment motive. The Court’s decision in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), is illustrative. There, without inquiring into purpose or intent, the Court held that an election law was facially content- based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, because its applica- tion “depend[ed] entirely on whether [someone’s] speech is related to a political campaign.” Id. at 197–98. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court sought to clar- ify the doctrine. Employing what it called a “commonsense” un- derstanding of the phrase “content based,” the Court articulated a bright-line rule: A speech restriction is content-based if “on its face” it “draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” 576 U.S. at 163 (citation modified). And importantly, the Court held that such a law “is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech.” Id. at 165 (citation modified). Reed represented the triumph of the fa- cial over the purposive approach to the content-discrimination in- quiry. In the ensuing years, some lower courts read Reed quite (and as it turns out, too) expansively. They interpreted the decision to establish a strict “read the sign” rule, under which a law was con- tent-based if it required one to look at speech’s substance to deter- mine whether the law’s restriction applied. In Reagan National Ad- vertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020), USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 29 of 49

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rev’d, 596 U.S. 61 (2022), for instance, the Fifth Circuit considered a city ordinance that applied different rules to on-premises and off- premises signs advertising products or services. Id. at 699–700. The court held that the ordinance was content-based because, it said, “[t]o determine whether a sign is on-premises or off-premises, one must read the sign and ask: does it advertise a business, person, ac- tivity, goods, products, or services” located offsite? Id. at 704 (cita- tion modified). In other words, the court reasoned, because view- ing the sign’s content was a prerequisite to determining how the ordinance applied, the law was facially content-based within the meaning of Reed. See id. at 704–05. 12 On review, the Supreme Court retained the core of Reed’s analytical framework but rejected the Fifth Circuit’s absolutist ap- proach. The Court reiterated that a regulation is facially content- based if it “targets speech based on its communicative content.” City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022) (citation modified) (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163). And im- portantly, the Court reaffirmed Reed’s holding that a regulation whose terms distinguish among topics or subjects is content-based regardless of the government’s motivation. See id. at 71. The Court held, though, that the Fifth Circuit’s wooden read-the-sign rule was “too extreme an interpretation” of Reed. Id.

12 The Sixth Circuit applied Reed to a similar sign regulation and reached the

same conclusion, holding that the law was “plain[ly]” content based. Thomas v. Bright, 937 F.3d 721, 730 (6th Cir. 2019), abrogated by City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61 (2022). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 30 of 49

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at 69. A law is “agnostic as to content,” the Court clarified, if it “requires an examination of speech only in service of drawing neu- tral . . . lines” unrelated to expression. Id. at 69. The ordinance at issue qualified as content-neutral because a particular sign’s “sub- stantive message” was irrelevant to the law’s application; one had to consider its content only to determine whether the sign was on- or off-premises. Id. at 71. Because location—a non-speech consid- eration—determined how the city treated the sign, the ordinance didn’t discriminate based on content. See id. Importantly for present purposes, in support of its clarifica- tion the Court pointed to regulations of “solicitation,” which it de- fined as “speech ‘requesting or seeking to obtain something’ or ‘[a]n attempt or effort to gain business.’” Id. at 72 (quoting Solicita- tion, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra). Needless to say, one has to read or listen to speech to determine whether it “request[s] . . . something” or attempts to “gain business.” Id. But, the Court said, that fact alone doesn’t automatically render every solicitation re- striction content-based. Rather, the Court explained, a law that “applie[s] evenhandedly to all who wish[] . . . to solicit” regardless of their purpose, id. at 73 (citation modified) (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981))—put simply, a law that regulates “solicitation generally,” id. at 72 (quot- ing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–307 (1940))—will be deemed content-neutral. Accordingly, the government can gener- ally regulate “solicitation” as a category without triggering strict scrutiny, but drawing more granular content-based lines—i.e., sin- gling out particular kinds of solicitation—will do so. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 31 of 49

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For its analogy to solicitation regulations, the Austin Court drew on Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). There, organizers of a state fair restricted so- licitations to fixed locations to ensure the orderliness of the event, which attracted more than 100,000 daily visitors. See id. at 643–44, 650. Members of the Krishna faith challenged the rule, arguing that it unconstitutionally limited their ability to distribute literature and solicit donations. Id. at 645. The Court rejected the Krishnas’ con- tention. The rule, the Court said, was not “based upon either the content or subject matter of speech” because it “applie[d] even- handedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds.” Id. at 648–49. “No person or organization,” the Court emphasized, “whether commercial or charitable, is permit- ted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes.” Id. at 649. So again—and importantly for us—under Heffron and Austin, a rule that restricts “solicitation” may be content-neutral—but only if it regulates categorically and “evenhandedly.” Austin, 596 U.S. at 72–73 (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649). A rule that discriminates among subcategories of solicitation—say, by applying different rules to requests for commercial and charitable donations—loses its claim to content-neutrality. And with narrow exceptions, the rule’s content-based-ness renders it constitutionally suspect. 13

13 The exception most relevant to solicitation regulations is the commercial-

speech doctrine, which allows “the State [to] regulate some types of commer- cial advertising more freely than other forms of protected speech.” 44 USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 32 of 49

32 Opinion of the Court 24-12662

* * * Taking stock: It seems to us that, from Reed and Austin, three principles emerge that inform our analysis of the free-speech issues in this case: First, there’s the fairly obvious fact that the gov- ernment-motive test is dead; a rule that on its face “targets speech based on its communicative content” is content-based, however benign the government’s intent. Id. at 69 (citation modified) (quot- ing Reed, 576 U.S. at 163). Second, there’s the general rule that the mere fact that someone has to look at the content of speech to de- cide whether a rule applies doesn’t render the rule content-based. Third, there’s the more particular rule governing solicitations: A general regulation that applies “evenhandedly” to all forms of so- licitation is considered content-neutral, whereas a solicitation reg- ulation that further “discriminate[s] based on topic, subject matter, or viewpoint”—i.e., one that singles out particular types of solicita- tions—is content-based and presumptively unconstitutional. See id. at 72–73. 2 a The challenged provisions of Daytona Beach’s anti-panhan- dling ordinance are content-based because they target only one particular type of solicitation—namely, “demand[s] or request[s] made in person for an immediate donation of money or some other

Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.). The issues in this case don’t implicate the commercial-speech doctrine. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 33 of 49

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article of value.” Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 66-1(b)(3). 14 Two features of the ordinance, we think, make plain its content discrim- ination.

14 One important preliminary matter: Our decision in Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale doesn’t compel the conclusion that Daytona Beach’s ordinance is content-neutral. Smith involved a Fort Lauderdale rule that prohibited pan- handling along the city’s beaches. 177 F.3d at 955. After observing that the plaintiffs there didn’t dispute that the rule was content-neutral, the panel in Smith applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld it. Id. at 956–57. Under our precedent about precedent, a prior panel’s holding binds subsequent panels “unless and until the first panel’s holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Bazantes, 978 F.3d 1227, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2020). There is, though, an important ca- veat: “[T]he prior precedent rule applies only to the actual holdings of prior decisions on issues that were actually decided by the earlier panel.” Id. at 1244 (emphasis added). Smith didn’t “actually decide[]” the content-neutrality question within the meaning of the prior-panel-precedent rule. The panel’s entire discussion of the issue consisted of a single sentence noting that the plaintiffs there had conceded the ordinance’s content-neutrality. Smith, 177 F.3d at 956. The panel provided no independent analysis; instead, it simply accepted the parties’ stipulation and then focused its attention on whether the rule survived inter- mediate scrutiny. Because Smith doesn’t constitute an “actual[] deci[sion]” of the content-neutrality issue, it doesn’t control our determination here. This conclusion comports with longstanding Supreme Court prece- dent. The Court has clarified that “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the rec- ord, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). Because the parties in Smith didn’t contest whether the rule there was content-based or content-neutral, they didn’t “br[ing]” the question “to [our] attention” in any meaningful sense. Nor, for reasons USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 34 of 49

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First, and perhaps most obviously, the city candidly con- cedes that “the law does not regulate commercial solicitations.” Br. of Appellant at 26. That fact alone takes the ordinance outside Hef- fron’s protection and betrays its content-based-ness. Recall that the Supreme Court in Heffron deemed content-neutral rules that neu- trally prohibit all solicitations, regardless of the speaker’s “commer- cial or charitable” purpose. 452 U.S. at 649. By restricting pleas for immediate donations but not commercial entreaties, Daytona Beach’s ordinance discriminates based on content. Cf. Café Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty., 360 F.3d 1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that an ordinance that “allow[ed] commercial messages to be displayed more prominently than political messages” was con- tent-based). 15 Second, and even aside from the commercial-charitable dis- tinction generally, there is the ordinance’s actual, everyday opera- tion. Again, given its definition of “panhandling,” whether the law restricts a speaker’s expression turns entirely on whether he makes a request for an immediate donation. So, for example, an

already explained, did we “rule upon” that question on the merits. Rather, under Cooper and its predecessors, the content-neutrality issue was a nonprec- edential “lurk[er].” 15 Perhaps realizing that regulating requests for donations but not commercial

solicitations poses a content-neutrality problem, the city argues that it has a good reason not to include commercial solicitations within the ordinance: The city already regulates them in other parts of its municipal code. The city, however, cites no authority for the idea that a content-based law should be considered content-neutral simply because the type of speech not covered by the law is regulated elsewhere. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 35 of 49

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individual standing at an intersection with a sign reading “Hun- gry—Please Help Me” would violate the ordinance. But an indi- vidual standing in the same place with a sign imploring passersby to “Help Your Local Humane Society” wouldn’t. So too, an indi- vidual on the Boardwalk asking beachgoers to “spare some change” would break the law, but a Greenpeace volunteer urging pedestrians to sign a “Save The Whales” petition wouldn’t. It is content, therefore, that triggers the ordinance’s application. The ordinance thus fails the “evenhanded[ness]” principle articulated in Heffron and reaffirmed in Austin. Unlike in Heffron, some “person[s] or organizations[s]”—the Humane Society supporter, the Green- peace volunteer, etc.—“[are] permitted to engage in” solicitation. 452 U.S. at 649. Only one category of would-be solicitors is prohib- ited from speaking up to ask for support: those seeking immediate donations. b The city isn’t without responses, of course. We’ll consider the city’s contentions in turn. i Most forcefully, the city argues that immediacy, like the loca- tion criterion in Austin, is an external, non-speech referent that ren- ders its ordinance content-neutral. See Austin, 596 U.S. at 69. So, the city’s argument goes, the ordinance is “agnostic as to con- tent”—one needs to look at the content of the speech in question, it says, only to determine whether it constitutes a request for an immediate donation. Br. of Appellant at 25. We aren’t convinced. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 36 of 49

36 Opinion of the Court 24-12662

A location criterion of the sort at issue in Austin has no mean- ingful effect on the speaker’s message. Consider two signs for a barbeque restaurant. The on-premises sign reads, “Come inside for the world’s best ribs!” The off-premises sign, “Head to Archibald’s for the world’s best ribs!” The communicative content is essen- tially the same: Archibald’s has the best ribs, and folks should pat- ronize the restaurant to try them. The ordinance’s immediacy criterion, by contrast—at least as it pertains here—does relate to the speaker’s message. Indeed, whether an individual asks for a donation now or at some later time goes to the heart of that message. There is a meaningful substan- tive difference between a sign that reads “Hungry—Please Help Me” and one that says “Hungry—Please Help Me by Donating to the Food Bank.” The first sign communicates a message of urgent personal need, whereas the second conveys a message of more gen- eral distress. The first evokes acute hunger pangs; the second more vaguely references chronic food insecurity. To be sure, the two signs are similar—both indicate that the speaker is hungry, and both seek support. But the immediacy of the first sign’s request inflects the speech with a sense of exigency that the second sign lacks. And that sense of exigency is critical to the sign’s communi- cative content. And yet Daytona Beach’s ordinance prohibits it. We think the city tips its hand when it emphasizes that a “if [a] speaker requests a donation of money at some future time or place, she can do so without any restrictions at all.” Br. of Appel- lant at 28. That’s precisely the problem. If an individual addresses USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 37 of 49

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one topic—future donations—he can speak freely. But if the same person wants to address a different topic—immediate help—his op- tions are severely limited. That disparate treatment, it seems to us, is textbook content discrimination. ii The city makes two additional arguments why its ordinance is content-neutral, but neither persuades us. First, the city insists that the ordinance is content-neutral because it restricts “all re- quests for the immediate donation of money . . . regardless of con- tent, viewpoint or the identity of the speaker.” Br. of Appellant at 25. Put another way, the ordinance “clearly defines solicitations so that it reaches every conceivable instance where an immediate do- nation is made in response to a request.” Id. at 24–25. The city, it seems to us, might be saying either of two things, neither of which solves its content-discrimination problem. As an initial matter, the city might be contending that the ordinance’s content-neutrality is preserved simply because it doesn’t draw even more fine-grained content-based distinctions than it already does— say, between requests for charitable donations and requests for po- litical donations. If so, it’s wrong. For reasons already explained, by targeting requests for immediate donations, the ordinance al- ready discriminates on the basis of content. The mere fact that it doesn’t go even further is no salve. The absence of speaker-based, viewpoint-based, or more granular content-based lines, doesn’t cure the existing content discrimination. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 38 of 49

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Alternatively, the city might be contending that the ordi- nance finds safe harbor in Austin’s “solicitation” carveout. Again, we disagree. Recall that in Austin, the Supreme Court—adverting to its earlier decision in Heffron—defined solicitation broadly as any “speech ‘requesting or seeking to obtain something’ or ‘an attempt or effort to gain business.’” 596 U.S. at 72 (citation modified) (quot- ing Solicitation, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra). If the ordinance here truly restricted all solicitations, as that term is commonly un- derstood, then the city’s reliance on Austin might be well-founded. But it doesn’t, and so it’s not. As we’ve explained, the ordinance effectively redefines (or term-of-art-ifies) the word “solicitation” as a constituent of the term “panhandling.” See Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 66-1(b)(3) (“Soliciting is includ[ed] in this definition of pan- handling.”). So as used in the ordinance, a “solicitation” covers only a request for an immediate donation. Accordingly, the ordinance singles out a particular topic for differential treatment. And that, for reasons already covered, makes it facially content-based. Second, and separately, the city points to a handful of out- of-circuit decisions, which it says suggest that laws targeting re- quests for immediate donations aren’t content-based. Only one warrants above-the-line treatment, 16 and even it is readily

16 In Waggoner v. City of Dallas, No. 3:22-CV-2776-E-BK, 2023 WL 5516474

(N.D. Tex. July 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV- 02776-E-BK, 2023 WL 5517220 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2023), the court held that a city ordinance was facially content-neutral because it “prohibit[ed] all per- sons”—with a few narrow, non-speech-related exceptions—“from standing or walking on designated medians and clear zones.” Id. at *6. And in United USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 39 of 49

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distinguishable. In National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 109 F.4th 728 (5th Cir. 2024), the Fifth Circuit held that an ordinance restricting the placement of donation boxes (think clothes, toys, etc.) didn’t discriminate based on content be- cause the law “regulate[d] all donation boxes without reference to content.” Id. at 734. The court emphasized that the restriction

States v. Lee, No. 1:23-CR-00368, 2024 WL 4836401 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2024), va- cated, No. 24-3171, 2025 WL 415328 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 2025), the court held that the closure of much of the Capitol Grounds on January 6, 2021, was con- tent-neutral because the area “was walled off to all members of the public writ large.” Id. at *5. So, unlike Daytona Beach’s ordinance, the regulations in Waggoner and Lee didn’t even refer to speech, let alone single out speech about a specific topic. In Mazo v. New Jersey Secretary of State, 54 F.4th 124 (3d Cir. 2022), the court addressed a law requiring political candidates to obtain consent before naming a person or organization in a ballot slogan. Id. at 133. The court viewed the case as a straightforward application of Austin, because one had to look at the content of the slogan only to determine whether the consent re- quirement applied—whether a third party had consented to the use of its name had nothing to do with the slogan’s communicative content. Id. at 149. Not so here, where a request for an immediate donation is the communicative content. Lastly, in Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 125 F.4th 929 (9th Cir. 2025), the court held that an Oregon law prohibiting unannounced audio recording of conversations was content-neutral, even though it had carveouts for record- ings of felonies and law-enforcement interactions. See id. at 950–51. Those exceptions, the court held, turned on when or with whom a conversation oc- curred, not on what the conversation was about. See id. at 951–52. That’s not the case here. Daytona Beach’s panhandling ordinance applies only when someone requests an immediate donation—in other words, its application turns on what one’s speech is about. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 40 of 49

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didn’t single out requests for “charitable” donations—by which it meant donations to those genuinely in need—but, rather, applied to all donation boxes, regardless of purpose. Id. at 735. So, the court concluded, because the ordinance “encompass[ed] both char- itable and non-charitable solicitations,” id., it was “agnostic as to content,” id. (quoting Austin, 596 U.S. at 69). 17 Whatever the merits of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, it’s enough to point out that the ordinance here is different from the one the court confronted there. In particular, Daytona Beach’s or- dinance goes an important (and content-based) step farther. It doesn’t generically target donations in the way the ordinance at is- sue in National Federation did; rather, it targets only requests for im- mediate donations, treating them differently from future donations. So whereas “[t]he signage on the donation boxes [was] of no con- sequence” in National Federation, id. at 734, the substance of a re- quest for a donation—its “signage,” if you will—is dispositive un- der Daytona Beach’s ordinance. And for reasons already explained, the immediate-donation-versus-future-donation distinction imper- missibly discriminates on the basis of content. * * *

17 The city also briefly adverts to U’SAgain, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV

24-6210-CBM-BFMx, 2024 WL 4127273 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2024), which upheld a similar donation-bin restriction. Because the court there employed logic similar to the Fifth Circuit’s and cited National Federation in concluding that Los Angeles’s regulation was content-neutral, see id. at *3, our discussion of National Federation also addresses the city’s reliance on U’SAgain, as well. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 41 of 49

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Taking stock, once again: Even if with the best of intentions, Daytona Beach has singled out a category of speech—requests for immediate donations—for disfavored treatment based on its com- municative content. Under Reed and Austin, that renders the ordi- nance facially content-based. And unlike the location criterion in Austin, there is no non-speech referent that renders the ordinance content-neutral; immediacy can’t be disentangled from the dona- tion request’s message—it is part and parcel of it. Finally, because the ordinance targets only a specific subset of solicitations— namely, requests for immediate donations of the sort that consti- tute “panhandling”—Austin’s solicitation carveout doesn’t rectify the ordinance’s content-discrimination. B Because the challenged provisions of Daytona Beach’s ordi- nance are facially content-based, they are presumptively unconsti- tutional and subject to strict scrutiny. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. We hold that they fail that test. Strict scrutiny is an exacting standard, one that few speech restrictions survive. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015). To satisfy strict scrutiny, the city must demonstrate (1) that it is pursuing a compelling government interest (2) by the least speech-restrictive means available to it. See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). The city proffers two inter- ests, which we’ll examine in turn. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 42 of 49

42 Opinion of the Court 24-12662

1 The city first asserts that the ordinance is necessary to pro- tect the public health. Panhandling, the city claims, is linked to public urination and defecation, which, in turn, can spread diseases that cause serious illness and even death. Before the district court, several witnesses—law-enforcement officers, fire-department per- sonnel, public workers, and local merchants—testified to the con- nection between panhandling and public urination and defecation, and the city’s expert confirmed that exposure to public urination and defecation can cause sickness. The plaintiffs dispute that pan- handling spreads pathogens, but given the procedural posture, we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the city and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Accordingly, we think it’s ap- propriate to infer a connection between panhandling, public urina- tion and defecation, and the spread of disease. And we agree with the city that protecting the public from the spread of infectious dis- eases is a compelling government interest. See Roman Catholic Dio- cese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 18 (2020). The problem is that the city could advance that interest by less speech-restrictive means. Most obviously, it could simply en- force the laws already on its books. As the plaintiffs point out, Day- tona Beach’s disorderly-conduct ordinance criminalizes “de- foul[ing] or disturb[ing] public property or private property of an- other so as to create an unsafe, unhealthy or unsanitary condition.” Daytona Beach, Fla., Code § 62-37(a)(7). The city protests that ex- isting laws can’t fully address the disease risk that panhandling poses. For support, it cites the deposition of the deputy city USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 43 of 49

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manager, who testified that the city hadn’t attempted to prosecute people for public defecation, in part because it couldn’t muster the resources to “prosecute a crime that the system regards as minor or insignificant.” But the city can’t claim that less speech-restrictive means are inadequate when it hasn’t even tried to employ them or dedicated enough money or manpower to make them effective. Cf. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816, 823 (concluding that the government hadn’t shown that the low take-up rate of an opt-in adult-content blocking feature rendered it ineffective because the government failed to promote the technology to consumers). Because the city hasn’t seriously attempted to use existing, on-point laws to miti- gate the spread of disease connected to public urination and defe- cation, it may not address the problem indirectly by prohibiting speech that’s only arguably associated with those issues. 2 The city separately contends that the ordinance promotes traffic safety. Panhandlers approaching cars at busy intersections, the city says, expose both themselves and drivers to serious risk. For support, the city cites several instances in which panhandlers were hit by cars, as well as one in which a panhandler distracted a driver, who crashed into two other vehicles. So, according to the city, the ordinance is an appropriate way to ameliorate risks to both pedestrians and drivers. Even on the assumption the city’s particular traffic-related interests are compelling, but cf. Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a blanket rule that USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 44 of 49

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“traffic safety” is a compelling government interest), the challenged provisions fail strict scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring requirement. That is so for two reasons. First, as with its interest in public health, the city may well be able to address the traffic-safety issues it identifies by enforcing its existing laws against disorderly conduct, trespass, and obstruction of traffic. Cf. Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding that a state’s “legitimate interest in road safety ‘can be better served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation’” (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980))), voluntarily dis- missed, No. 20-14285-V (11th Cir. Sep. 1, 2021). But yet again, the city hasn’t tried those options or explained why they wouldn’t work. Second, the ordinance is fatally underinclusive. Underinclu- siveness “raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a par- ticular speaker or viewpoint.” Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011). 18 In Brown, for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a California law that restricted the sale of violent video games to minors, in part on the ground that it didn’t limit access to other media that comparably increased children’s feelings of ag- gression. Id. at 801–02. Here, the city asserts that people who

18 The city insists that underinclusivity is solely a tool for determining whether

or not a law is content-based, and that it’s irrelevant to the narrow-tailoring inquiry. That is incorrect. It’s well established that, while not dispositive, un- derinclusivity is relevant to whether a law advances a compelling interest. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 448–49. USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 45 of 49

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repeatedly approach cars at busy intersections face a substantial risk of serious injury. But even if that’s true, the ordinance regulates only those individuals who approach cars at busy intersections to communicate a particular message. So, as in Brown, the ordinance in- explicably targets only one speech-related problem—the risk posed by individuals requesting immediate donations—while leaving un- burdened similar threats to pedestrian safety—for example, the risk posed by those soliciting signatures for petitions.19 * * * In sum, the city has failed to demonstrate that its ordinance is the least speech-restrictive means to prevent the spread of disease and to reduce the risk of injury-causing traffic accidents. The chal- lenged provisions at issue therefore fail strict scrutiny and violate the First Amendment. IV Having held that a number of the challenged provisions vi- olate the First Amendment, we turn to the question of remedy. In

19 The city responds that the record shows that people soliciting immediate

donations are at a higher risk of being struck by cars than other solicitors. But for support, the city musters only scattered anecdotes that show, at most, that panhandlers face some risk—not that they face a higher risk. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 40 (citing a police officer’s deposition describing one incident in which a panhandler was killed in a traffic accident); Reply Br. of Appellant at 19 (citing a police officer’s affidavit referencing two instances in which pan- handlers were hit by cars). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 46 of 49

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its summary judgment order, the district court declared all 18 chal- lenged provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the city from enforcing them—against anyone. Subsequently, in its or- der entering final judgment, the court awarded the plaintiffs $80,000 in damages, consistent with the parties’ stipulation. For the sake of clarity, we’ll address the district court’s declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages award in turn. A The district court’s declaratory judgment was too broad: It held unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance that no plaintiff had clearly established standing to challenge—namely, §§ (c)(3)(c)– (f) and (c)(4)(b)–(h). Because genuine issues of fact regarding stand- ing preclude summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor, the district court should have refrained from granting the plaintiffs declaratory relief until their standing was properly adjudicated at trial. Accord- ingly, we vacate the court’s declaration that these provisions are unconstitutional. Because at least one plaintiff established standing to challenge the remaining provisions, and because we agree with the district court’s merits analysis, we affirm its declaration that §§ (c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) violate the First Amendment. B The district court’s injunction was likewise overbroad, for two related reasons. First, in light of the Supreme Court’s inter- vening decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), the in- junction impermissibly operates “universally.” In CASA, the Court USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 47 of 49

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held that universal injunctions—in which district courts “prohibit enforcement of a law or policy against anyone”—likely exceed fed- eral courts’ congressionally granted equitable powers. Id. at 837. 20 But that’s precisely the form and scope of relief the district court granted here; nothing in its order limited the injunction’s operation to the parties. Accordingly, in compliance with CASA, we vacate the injunction insofar as it prevents enforcement of the challenged provisions against nonparties. Second, and relatedly, the injunction is overbroad because it applies to provisions that the plaintiffs haven’t clearly established standing to challenge. Equitable remedies are party-specific. CASA, 606 U.S. at 844. It follows that if a particular plaintiff hasn’t shown standing to challenge a particular provision, a court can’t enjoin its enforcement against him. Importantly, this is true even if another plaintiff has standing to attack the provision generally. So while (as we’ve explained) the question when assessing the mer- its is whether any plaintiff is a proper party, see supra at 24, the ques- tion for equitable-relief purposes is whether a specific plaintiff is the proper party. Cf. id. (“It is an elementary principle that a court can- not adjudicate directly upon a person’s right without having him either actually or constructively before it.” (quoting Gregory v. Stet- son, 133 U.S. 579, 586 (1890))); cf. also William Baude & Samuel L.

20 CASA addressed a universal injunction against the federal government, but

the decision’s logic applies with equal force to any blanket, non-party-specific injunction. See Nussbaumer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 150 F.4th 1371, 1381 n.5 (11th Cir. 2025) (applying CASA’s prohibition on universal relief to a suit against a state agency). USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 48 of 49

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Bray, Proper Parties, Proper Relief, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 171 (2023) (“[I]f one party has standing, the Court will need to resolve that party’s rights. But figuring out whether all, most, or merely one of the parties has standing will be exceptionally important for deter- mining what relief a court should ultimately issue.”). Here, the district court should have enjoined enforcement of a particular provision against a plaintiff only if that plaintiff had standing to challenge that provision. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court’s order enjoining the city from enforc- ing §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(b), (c)(3)(g), and (c)(4)(a) against Scott; §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) against Driggers and Rowland; and §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) against Willis. We vacate the injunction in- sofar as it barred enforcement of other provisions against the plain- tiffs. C Lastly, we consider the district court’s $80,000 damages award. As already explained, in their joint motion for the entry of judgment, the parties agreed that if any provision of the ordinance was deemed unconstitutional on appeal, the plaintiffs would be en- titled to the full damages amount. We have held that seven of the ordinance’s provisions—§§ (c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i)—violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the damages award. * * * USCA11 Case: 24-12662 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2026 Page: 49 of 49

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To summarize: We AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the district court’s summary judgment order. We AFFIRM the court’s declaration that that §§ (c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) violate the First Amendment, but VACATE its declaration that §§ (c)(3)(c)–(f) and (c)(4)(b)–(h) do so. We AFFIRM the portion of the district court’s order enjoining the city from enforcing §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(b), (c)(3)(g), and (c)(4)(a) against Scott; §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) against Driggers and Rowland; and §§ 66-1(c)(1), (c)(3)(a)–(b), (c)(3)(g)–(h), (c)(4)(a), and (c)(4)(i) against Willis, but VACATE the injunction in all other respects. And we AFFIRM the $80,000 dam- ages award. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.