TROTT, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Collazo was arrested for murder and advised of his Miranda rights. He declined to waive them, asking instead to talk to a lawyer. The police responded to his request by telling Collazo it “might be worse” for him if he talked to an attorney, and that it was in his interest to talk to them without one. Three hours later, he “changed his mind,” was readvised of his rights, and talked to the police. What he told them was used to convict him and send him to prison. We are called on in this appeal to examine the conduct of the police leading up to Collazo’s confession, and to decide in light of that conduct whether Collazo was denied due process when his confession was introduced in evidence. We conclude that Collazo’s confession was involuntary, and that its use to convict him violated his Constitutional rights. We reverse the district court.
I
On September 27, 1982, Dennis Collazo, an occasional informant and undercover operative for the Drug Enforcement Administration, was arrested for the murder of Douglas Metzger. Metzger often sold cocaine to Collazo’s niece, who owed Metzger a considerable debt arising from her purchases. When Collazo’s niece expressed a desire to free herself from her drug debt, Collazo and Tony Young, one of Collazo’s confederates, attempted an armed robbery of Metzger. The robbery turned into a brawl, and Young shot Metzger. After the murder, Collazo went to Mexico (apparently on DEA business), and was arrested on his return.1
After the arrest, Collazo was escorted to an interview room in the San Jose Police Station where Officer Rolen fully advised [414]*414him of his Miranda rights. In response, he asked to talk to his wife. The police denied this request. After some discussion about where he was on the day of the murder and another rejected request to talk to his wife, Collazo requested to talk to a lawyer. Instead of respecting his request, however, Officer Destro (Officer Ro-len’s partner) attempted to pressure him into dispensing with counsel and talking to them about the homicide.2 A transcript of the conversation follows:
Collazo: Oh, you know, ah, can I, you know, talk to a lawyer?
Destro: It's up to you. This is your last chance to talk to us, though.
Collazo: I understand that.
Destro: Once you get a lawyer, he’s gonna say forget it. You know, don’t talk to the police. Then it might be worse for you.
Collazo: Pardon me?
Destro: Then it might be worse for you. Collazo: Why?
Destro: Because, ah, you know, there’s other people involved in this thing, and we would like to get everybody. If you don’t want to talk about it, uh—
Rolen: Well, he’s asked for a lawyer, so why don’t we, I guess we’ll end our interview right there.
Collazo: If, ah, if ah, this gonna be stupid for you, you know, for me it means a lot, you know.
Destro: If you’re arrested for murder, it does mean a lot.
The police then departed, leaving Collazo in the interview room to ponder Officer Destro’s inappropriate admonition and to consider whether he could afford to exercise his Constitutional rights.
Collazo was then permitted to call and to see his wife, a legal secretary. She came to the police station and had a lengthy discussion with him, the substance of which is unknown. Some three hours after the officers’ departure, Collazo contacted a sergeant and asked, “Where are the investigators?” The sergeant correctly construed this as a request to talk to them, and they were so notified and returned to the station. Collazo was again advised of his Miranda rights, and indicated he had changed his mind and was now willing to talk. He then essentially confessed to his nonshoot-ing role in the crimes for which he had been charged and arrested.
In state court, Collazo unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his incriminating statements on the ground that they were the product of impermissible coercion and thus a violation of his Constitutional rights. He argued that the formal waiver of his Miranda rights was nothing more than the involuntary product of previous threats. At trial, his taped statement, the truthfulness of which he partially repudiated, was admitted in evidence over his objection. Collazo was convicted by a jury of felony murder, burglary, and conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, and theft. For these crimes he was sentenced to state prison for a term of 26 years to life.
Collazo pursued his case on appeal through the state courts in California, attacking his confession as the direct product of a violation of his federal Constitutional rights. He was not successful and after exhausting all state remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. His petition was denied, but a certificate of probable cause was issued.
On appeal, Collazo argues (1) his confession was involuntary, (2) the alleged waiver he articulated before confessing was nothing more than the unlawful product of coercive tactics, and (3) the use of his statement against him was not harmless error.
II
We confront a state court record containing factual findings on the relevant issues. California argues that these findings, insofar as they pertain to the validity of the alleged waiver, are entitled to the presump[415]*415tion of correctness mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).3 Therefore, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review that controls our analysis.
We review de novo the voluntariness of Collazo’s confession. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), calls on us to determine “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution ...,” and to do so by subjecting the issue to “plenary federal review.” A federal court reviewing the admissibility of a confession is not bound by a state court finding of voluntariness and has a “duty to make an independent evaluation of the record.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). More specifically, we are not bound by state court findings that the conduct of the interrogating officers was not coercive. As Chief Judge Wallace recently stated in Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir.1990), “we are obligated to conduct an independent review of the ‘constitutional acceptability’ of the ... interrogation_” We take a fresh look at whether the police used “objectively unacceptable methods to coerce [the defendant] into waiving his right to silence_” United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 976 n. 16 (9th Cir.1987). In this regard, “the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant’s will was in fact overborne.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 452 (emphasis in original).
Historical or subsidiary facts are treated differently, even though they may be dis-positive of a Constitutional claim. Id. at 113, 106 S.Ct. at 451. Such findings as whether the police in fact made the alleged threats are reviewed for clear error if made by a district court, and are presumed correct under section 2254(d) if made by a state court. “To be sure, subsidiary factual questions, such as ... whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant ... are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption [of correctness].” Id. at 112, 106 S.Ct. at 450 (citations omitted).
The standard of review does not change when the inquiry shifts from the voluntariness of the confession to the voluntariness of an asserted Miranda waiver.4 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), makes it clear that “the inquiry whether a waiver is coerced ‘has two distinct dimensions’
“First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (emphasis added)).
We review the voluntariness prong de novo:
We agree with the Third Circuit and reaffirm Grooms’ [Grooms v. Keeney, 826 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1987)] adoption of a plenary standard of review because we find that the voluntariness of a waiver is a mixed question of law and [416]*416fact that requires de novo review. A mixed question of law and fact warrants de novo review when “the application of law to fact will require the consideration of legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles.”
Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984)). See also Derrick, 924 F.2d at 822. Thus, as with the voluntariness of a confession, the vol-untariness of a Miranda waiver is decided by first examining objectively the methods the police used to produce the waiver.
But the calculus shifts when we focus on the awareness prong. In this dimension, “we review the question of whether the defendant’s mind was overborne—i.e., was his waiver knowing and intelligent—for clear error.” Derrick, 924 F.2d at 823. In the context of collateral review, “a state trial court’s determination that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to section 2254(d).” Id.
Ill
We now examine Officer Destro’s response to Collazo’s initial assertion of his Miranda rights. We must determine, as a threshold matter, whether Officer Destro’s attempt to discourage Collazo from speaking to a lawyer is compatible with a system of justice that does not permit police coercion. We conclude it is not, and we so conclude for a multitude of reasons.5
First, applying the traditional Fifth Amendment voluntariness test, Officer Destro’s nine terse sentences, understood plainly, were coercive. His words were calculated to pressure Collazo into changing his mind about remaining silent, and into talking without counsel to his interrogators. Destro’s warning that it “might be worse” for Collazo if he did not cooperate with the police can only be seen as menacing. During the suppression hearing, the prosecutor himself characterized Officer Destro’s tone and presentation as “insistent.” The tape of the interview confirms this description.
The use of coercive tactics by state law enforcement officers to pressure an arres-tee into talking has been prohibited since 1936. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (use of a defendant’s coerced confession in a state criminal trial denies due process).6 As the Supreme Court stated in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961):
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? ... The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession.
(emphasis added). Twenty-eight years later, and eighteen years before the investigation in this case, the privilege against self-incrimination was held applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Interrogation tactics need not be violent or physical in nature to be deemed coercive. Psychological coercion is equally likely to result in involuntary statements, and thus is also forbidden. Mincey, 437 [417]*417U.S. at 401, 98 S.Ct. at 2418, provides us with guidance:
There were not present in this case some of the gross abuses that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beatings ... or “truth serums”.... But the “blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” ... Determination of whether a statement is involuntary “requires more than a mere color-matching of cases.” It requires careful evaluation of all the circumstances of the interrogation.
(citations' omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Spano, 360 U.S. at 321, 79 S.Ct. at 1206 (“[A]s law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease.”).
Second, Officer Destro not only resorted generally to coercive tactics, but in doing so he effectively told Collazo he would be penalized if he exercised rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution of the United States. Notwithstanding Miranda’s attempt to “assure that the exercise of the [Fifth Amendment right to silence] will be scrupulously honored ...,” 384 U.S. 436 at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) Officer Destro attempted to impose a penalty on its invocation. The Supreme Court has held “while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Doyle went on to hold “the use for impeachment purposes of [an arrestee’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 (footnote omitted). It follows as night the day that Officer Destro’s attempt in the police station to impose a penalty on Collazo’s choice to remain silent amounts to a serious infringement of Colla-zo’s Fifth Amendment right. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (“[I]n Miranda ... the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was seen as the principal protection for a person facing police interrogation.”).
Third, Miranda expresses concern about the compelling pressures that weigh upon a person in custody, pressures that can break a person’s free will and cause that person to talk involuntarily. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Here, Officer Destro took unfair advantage of these pressures. At a point where the law required him to back off, he did not “scrupulously honor” Collazo’s right to cut off questioning; he stepped on it. Any minimally trained police officer should have known such pressure was improper and likely to produce involuntary statements. Thus, Officer Destro engaged in prohibited interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), points out “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (footnote omitted).7 In-nis explicitly outlawed techniques likely to “ ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.” Id. at 299,100 S.Ct. at 1688 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1618-19); see also Shedelbower v. Estelle, 859 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1988), United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.1991).
In this regard, Officer Destro’s immediate interrogation of Collazo in direct response to his request for a lawyer is a textbook violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 [418]*418(1981). Edwards made it clear beyond doubt that “an accused, such as [Collazo], having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added). At the point Officer Destro hectored Collazo, Collazo had not initiated further communication with the officers. In fact, he had terminated the exchange by asking for a lawyer. The goal of the Court in Edwards was “to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers ...,” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). What Officer Destro did can only be seen as badgering Collazo in the precise manner that concerned the Edwards Court.
Fourth, Officer Destro demeaned the pre-trial role of counsel articulated by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its progeny. He did so by dispensing a one-sided, unauthorized legal opinion regarding whether Collazo should remain silent and exercise his right to counsel.8 This advice adds yet another unacceptable dimension to Officer Destro’s methods. “[T]o a suspect who has indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2100, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). As if this were not enough, Officer Destro inappropriately led Collazo to believe he could reap some legal benefit by excluding defense attorneys from the pre-trial process. Such a tactic is inconsistent with Miranda’s stated purpose of making “the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system — that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. As it turned out, and with considerable irony, not only did matters not go better for Collazo by talking without an attorney rather than remaining silent, but his statements were used to send him to prison, possibly for life.
Thus, Officer Destro’s statements subjected Collazo to menacing custodial interrogation in violation of Brown v. Mississippi, Culombe, Miranda, Innis, and Edwards. Officer Destro’s words are an egregious violation of Miranda — the essence of improper law enforcement behavior in response to the rules established in that the landmark case. We join with Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent in characterizing this behavior as “improper and reprehensible.”
California freely admits on appeal that “[t]he police violated Collazo’s Miranda rights_” What California fails to appreciate is that a breach of these rules not only has Miranda implications, but traditional voluntariness implications as well. Although Miranda “rights” are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected,” Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 2364, when these measures are ignored, as they were in this case, a suspect’s Constitutional rights are directly affected. Destro’s failure to comply with Miranda aggravated his coercive tactics. See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 1339, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967) {Miranda transgressions are relevant on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession).
Returning to non-Miranda aspects of the traditional Fifth Amendment voluntariness test, we see that Officer Destro’s words and tactics share much in common with other psychological ploys that have been scrutinized and found wanting. The Su[419]*419preme Court noted in Spring, 479 U.S. at 576 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 858 n. 8:
In certain circumstances, the Court has found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922] (1963) (misrepresentation by police officers that a suspect would be deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child if she failed to cooperate with authorities rendered the subsequent confession involuntary); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 [79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265] (1959) (misrepresentation by the suspect’s friend that the friend would lose his job as a police officer if the suspect failed to cooperate rendered his statement involuntary).
Destro’s ploy also trespasses on our holding in United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.1981), which condemned warnings by interrogators “that a lengthy prison term could be imposed, that [the arrestee] had a lot at stake, that her cooperation would be communicated to the prosecutor, that her failure to cooperate would be similarly communicated, and that she might not see her two-year-old child for a while_” (footnotes omitted). Writing for the panel, Judge Reinhardt held that this litany, under the circumstances, constituted psychologically coercive tactics sufficient to render Tingle’s subsequent confession involuntary.
We are not unaware of the complex challenges faced by law enforcement officers as they discharge their important and difficult responsibilities in accord with Constitutional principles and the rules designed to protect them. Nevertheless, this is a nation where the rule of law prevails, where ends do not justify inappropriate means. Miranda has been part of our law since 1966. Most law enforcement officers abide faithfully by its requirements even though they find them on occasion to be frustrating. As long as Miranda is on the books, it must be respected. In this case, it was not honored. It was disobeyed.
The present case is not one where we examine interrogation practices not addressed by the courts as of the time of the interrogation. Officer Destro’s improper admonition flew directly in the face of previously published rules and rights on the books for some time before Collazo’s request. This disregard for established rules exacerbates the police conduct in question and it evokes Justice Brandéis’ timeless dissenting remarks in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928):
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
We repeat this statement not to berate Officer Destro, but to remind all law enforcement officers of the importance of their responsibilities.
Based on the foregoing, our plenary review of the tactics used by Officer Destro in an attempt to pressure Collazo into talking to his adversaries leads us to a two-part conclusion. First, Officer Destro’s tactics add up to a flagrant breach of the prophylactic rules established by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its progeny to protect a defendant’s Constitutional right against self-incrimination. Second, Officer Destro’s overreaching behavior violated not only Miranda, but also the general Constitutional prohibition against coercive interrogation practices likely to result in involuntary responses. Officer Destro’s gambit was inconsistent with Collazo’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as well as his right to consult an attorney. His inquisitorial stratagem was calculated to break Collazo’s will. As such, it offends [420]*420due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV
If Collazo had confessed to his interrogators in immediate response to Officer Des-tro’s pressure, his confession — for the reasons previously detailed — would have been manifestly inadmissible, and our inquiry would be over. But Collazo’s confession did not come until some three hours after Officer Destro’s impropriety, and it was preceded by certain events to which California points in support of an argument that boils down to this proposition: By the time Collazo decided to talk, the taint of any earlier misconduct had evaporated, leaving Collazo free to decide on his own whether to “[initiate] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885.
In making this argument and in attempting to bring this case within Edwards’s exception covering suspects who themselves initiate further discussion, California points to the following facts:
1. Collazo asked to talk to Officers Des-tro and Rolen; they did not make the contact, he did.
2. Collazo’s request to see them came some three hours after their initial departure.
3. In the interim, Collazo had been permitted to speak privately and at length with his wife, a legal secretary.
4. Before confessing, Collazo was read-vised of his Miranda rights and acknowledged to the police he had changed his mind and wanted to talk.
5. After he confessed, Collazo stated in response to questions from Destro that he was not acting because of any promises or threats made by the police.
California also points to various aspects of Collazo’s personal background:
1. He was a mature 29 year old adult.
2. He had worked with the Drug Enforcement Administration as a undercover operative and as an informant.
3. He was personally and intimately familiar with the criminal justice system, having been arrested on previous occasions.
4. He was aware of his rights before the day of his apprehension.
In sum, California argues that the totality of the relevant circumstances and the characteristics of the confessor demonstrate that when Collazo asked to see Officers Destro and Rolen he was acting voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, not because of any previous compulsion. Relying on Edwards and Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), which permits a suspect to answer some questions while refusing to answer others, California concludes that his Miran-dized confession was admissible in evidence.
In making this argument California assumes that following a Miranda violation the appropriate question is the same as it is if no such violation has previously occurred — that is, did Collazo initiate the communication that led to the incriminating statements? We need not decide whether the state’s view is correct, because even assuming for the sake of argument that it is, we find as explained below that Collazo’s initiation of the communication leading to the second interrogation was the product of the coercive statements made by the police during the first, illegal interrogation.
California’s argument fails to appreciate the evident linkage between the coercion and the confession, and it fails to accord appropriate weight to the rules that govern this inquiry. To determine whether the initial coercion tainted both Collazo’s request to see his interrogators as well as his alleged waiver, we apply the traditional test for deciding whether each was voluntary, asking whether each resulted from the exercise of Collazo’s free will.
Ordinarily, the burden of proof in this regard falls upon the state, and it must be carried by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 at 168, 107 S.Ct. 515 at 522, 93 L.Ed.2d [421]*421473 (1986). (“Whenever the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.”)
However, “[a]s Justice White has explained, ‘the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities’ insistence to make a statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.’ ” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. at 2098 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 at 110, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. at 321 at 329, n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result)). Thus, “if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. at 2097 (emphasis added). Because we conclude that Officer Destro induced Collazo’s purported waiver by initially insisting that Collazo cooperate, we believe Roberson’s warning is highly pertinent.
The factors that are relevant to determining the effect of previous police coercion have been spelled out in United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1987). They are whether (1) there was a break in the stream of events sufficient to insulate the statement from the effect of the prior coercion, (2) it can be inferred that the coercive practices had a continuing effect that touched the subsequent statement, (3) the passage of time, a change in the location of the interrogation, or a change in the identity of the interrogators interrupted the effect of the coercion, and (4) the conditions that would have precluded the use of a first statement had been removed.
The application of these factors to the facts of the case at hand is similar to the task mandated by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407 at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We must determine “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which ... objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), also provides considerable guidance:9
The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on ... a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant_ And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.
(citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Our plenary review of the record in light of the relevant tests and the factors to be applied leads us to conclude that Collazo’s alleged waiver and confession were not voluntary. Collazo testified he was scared, and that Officer Destro’s threats are what caused him to change his mind and talk without counsel. The record amply supports his contentions. The day, subject matter, place of the interrogation, and in[422]*422terrogation team remained the same. Under the circumstances, the passage of only three hours is insignificant, even when coupled with Collazo’s unreported discussion with his wife. California underscores Mrs. Collazo’s occupation as a legal secretary, implying that her vocation somehow dissipates any taint that might have resulted from Officer Destro’s warning. We find her occupation of no value in deciding this case. Collazo was entitled to the presence of an attorney, not a legal secretary. The trial judge remarked, “I am not going to assume that a legal secretary is in any position to give him any advice as to his legal rights,” an observation with which we agree. Collazo’s past experience working with law enforcement is at best a neutral factor; in fact, it may have made him unusually susceptible to Officer Destro’s exhortation to cooperate. Moreover, the police did nothing to erase their transgression.
Most importantly, however, a review of the tape and transcript of Collazo’s alleged waiver and confession provide unmistakable evidence that no break in the causal chain or stream of events had occurred. Officer Rolen, Officer Destro’s partner, opened the second exchange by referring explicitly to their earlier discussion. Then, in readvising Collazo of his Miranda rights, Officer Rolen asked Collazo if he remembered “all the rights we advised you of earlier,” evoking their earlier exchange. Officer Rolen then went through the rights using mostly the past tense, i.e., “you had the right to remain silent,” “anything you said could be and would be used against you,” “you had a right to have a lawyer present with you and if you couldn’t afford one, one would be hired for you by the County of Santa Clara.” (emphasis added). Then Officer Rolen said, “And then I asked you if you understood all those rights. Do you understand all that — Okay. Now understanding all those rights and after talking with your wife and so forth, have you changed your mind now and do you want to talk to us?” To this, Collazo said, “Yes.”
Thus, Officer Rolen in Officer Destro’s presence explicitly tied the two encounters together. Proof of this actual linkage in Collazo’s mind is found in his immediate response to Officer Rolen’s recapitulation. The exchange continued as follows:
Q. Ok, ah, why don’t you just go ahead and tell us what you want to tell us.
A. Ah, (sigh) I want to have a discussion with you guys, ah, ah, ah what is the — I’m going to tell you exactly what happened that day. Whatever, you know, I am going to tell you, ah, I know you know, my rights already. Ah, I’m going to tell at the same time, ah, I would like to know what is the (inaudible).
Q. What is going to happen to you?
A. Yes.
(emphasis added).
One can only conclude from this exchange, and especially from Collazo’s question about what would happen to him, that Officer Destro’s threats about things “going worse” for Collazo if he sought a lawyer and did not cooperate were a primary motivating factor in his about-face and decision to talk without counsel. When first advised of his rights, Collazo had no questions for the police about his fate. He wanted a lawyer, presumably to counsel him on that issue. But when told abruptly that negative things would happen to him if he secured the services of legal counsel, he responded — albeit three hours later— with an inquiry that gives every appearance of having been generated by Officer Destro’s pressure.
Officer Rolen then properly declined to make any promises to Collazo in response to his inquiry, but in so doing he pointed out that there are “two sides to every story,” strongly implying, as did Officer Destro in their earlier encounter, that if Collazo cooperated it might mitigate his predicament.
It is readily apparent from the historical facts that Collazo’s “change of mind” — including his alleged Miranda waiver — was the direct product of the primary illegality in this case. Officer Destro’s strategy was successful. Collazo caved in. There is nothing of substance to demonstrate other[423]*423wise. There was “no break in the stream of events ... sufficient to insulate the statement from the effect of all that went before.” Clems, 386 U.S. at 710, 87 S.Ct. at 1340. Under the circumstances, Officer Rolen’s readviee of rights and Collazo’s alleged waiver thereof was an empty ceremony. Our analysis of this case confirms the general observation of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990), that “suspects who assert the right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily in subsequent interrogations.”
This case is not an example of the situation envisioned in Edwards when the Court carved out an exception for those suspects who “initiate” further discussion. Although the words and even the actions that could normally be construed as “initiation” were present at the outset of the second encounter, an analysis of the substance of the entire transaction — rather than the isolated form of the second encounter — demonstrates that Collazo did not “initiate” further conversation as that term is used in Edwards, or in Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2834 (“initiation” of a conversation by a suspect may be found based on an unbadgered desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation). As demonstrated, Collazo’s words and actions in calling back the officers and in “waiving” his rights were nothing less than the delayed product of Officer Destro’s admonitory adventure three hours previously, and hence were “initiated” by the police, not by Collazo. “ ‘[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.’ ” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1043, 103 S.Ct. at 2833 (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85).
California does point to questions Collazo was asked after his confession and near the end of his encounter with the police regarding whether his statement was motivated by threats or promises. In context, his denial at the time that threats or promises had anything to do with his decision to talk can only be seen as itself the predictable harvest of Officer Destro’s strategy. Collazo was asked about this by the prosecutor during the motion to suppress, and he gave an explanation we find credible:
Q. And you stated to them that they had not threatened you and they had— nor had they promised you anything; isn’t that true?
A. Yes.
Q. And today, you are testifying that in fact, you did feel that they had threatened you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. So at the end of that interview then, when you — the officers asked you if they had threatened you and you said no, you were lying to the officers; isn’t that true?
A. I don’t know what that means, you know, to you, but when you are in that kind of a situation, you have to say yes.
This is an appropriate case for application of the exclusionary rule, the purpose of which is “ ‘to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 600, 95 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)). A more lenient approach would “simply invite the ingenious officer to invent new stratagems to produce color-able waivers of the right to counsel.” United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir.1978) (en banc) (Goodwin, J., concurring and dissenting).
V
Following submission of this case, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), holding that “harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions.” Id. 111 S.Ct. at 1257. In light of this development, we requested the parties [424]*424to the present case to file simultaneous briefs addressing the question of whether the use of Collazo’s confession against him at trial, assuming it is found to have been involuntary, constituted harmless error. We have received the parties’ briefs, and we now decide this issue.
The test for determining whether an error of Constitutional dimension was harmless comes from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The Chapman test for excusing such error is whether the state has proved “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. “To say that an error did not ‘contribute’ to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial.... To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” Yates v. Evatt, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991).
We approach the record in this case with an awareness of the impact of a confession in a criminal trial.
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, “the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.... [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.” [Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1629-30, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)]. While some statements by a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely on that evidence alone in reaching its decision.
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1257-58 (omission in original) (citations omitted). As Justice Kennedy observed, “the court conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished, for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that incriminates the defendant only when connected with other evidence.” Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1266 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
An examination of Collazo’s taped statement reveals that it is indeed a detailed confession to conspiracy to rob Douglas Metzger and to burglarize the Metzger home. At one point in the interrogation, when Collazo was pressed on his intent and his purpose in confronting Metzger, he acknowledged his purpose was to rob Metz-ger of his “dope” and his money. This acknowledgment amounts to a complete confession to burglary, theft and robbery, and conspiring to commit those offenses. But, as California points out, Collazo’s statement falls short of being a “confession” to murder. To constitute a confession, Collazo had to admit he was guilty of the crime of murder. California Jury Instructions Criminal (“CAUIC”) 2.70 (1989 Revision). He made no such admission. In fact, the clear purpose of his statement was to assert he was innocent of murder because he fled the scene before his accomplice fired the fatal shot. It is apparent from his statement, however, that he was not conversant with either the felony murder rule or the vicarious liability that attaches under California law to co-conspirators. In California, a criminal conspirator is liable for “the natural and probable consequences of any act of a co-conspirator to further the object of the conspiracy, even though such act was not intended as a part of the original plan and even though he was not present at the time of the commission of such act.” CAUIC 6.11 (1989 Revision).
Thus, Collazo’s statement was tantamount to a confession to murder even though he may not have realized it at the time. In any event, the precise label placed on Collazo’s statement vis-a-vis the murder [425]*425allegation is less important than what he said, and the probable impact of his statements on the jury.
California, in its supplemental brief, addresses the harmless error issue as follows:
Appellant’s defense [that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy before the killing] was inherently incredible and defies the application of logic. Appellant purportedly abandoned the conspiracy but yet continued to associate with the coconspirators only hours later. Furthermore, he went to the Metzger residence either personally armed or with knowledge that his newly-found cocon-spirator was armed with a firearm. If his true intent was merely to speak with the victim, Young’s involvement and the display of a firearm conflicts with this purpose. The critical evidence used to establish appellant’s culpability was not the challenged statement to the police. It was, instead, the prosecution’s independent evidence of the conspiracy, the eyewitness testimony relating to appellant’s actions at the Metzger residence, and the coconspirators’ statement to appellant’s wife that appellant went to the Metzger home to commit a robbery. Therefore, the admission of appellant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
California may be correct that Collazo’s defense was “incredible,” but we cannot agree that the “critical evidence used to establish appellant’s culpability was not the challenged statement to the police.” The prosecutor repeatedly punctuated his cross-examination of Collazo with references to the statement, and he pummeled Collazo with excerpts from it that were inconsistent with his statements at trial. The prosecutor relied extensively on the taped interview in attacking Collazo’s testimony that he had abandoned all criminal intent before appearing at Douglas Metzger’s house on the evening that Metzger was killed. Col-lazo testified that it was during an earlier visit to the house with Ricky Laureano that he began to change his mind. One passage from the cross-examination of Collazo suffices to illustrate this point:
Q When you talked to the police, I think you testified on direct that you lied to them in several areas; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you were interviewed by the police at the end of the interview, you swore to them that everything you said to them was true, didn’t you?
A Yes, more or less was the truth. The only thing that I was holding was the involvement of Ricky. They have information on Ricky.
Q Well, at the end of your interview, did you tell Sergeants Rolen and Destro, “I swear to God this is more or less the truth?”
A No, sir.
Q You told them it was the truth, didn’t you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at the beginning of that interview, you told them, “I am going to tell you exactly what happened,” isn’t that correct?
A I think so, yes.
Q And at the time you told them this, you knew that they had arrested you for murder, did you not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you didn’t tell them that you and Ricky had been there earlier, did you?
A No, sir.
Q And they asked you about whether or not you were there earlier, didn’t they?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you testified here in court that the reason that you did not tell them about Ricky and you being there earlier was to protect Ricky?
A Yes.
Q At the same time on that tape, didn’t —strike that, at the same time during that interview, didn’t you tell the police officers that you had been with Ricky earlier that day?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you gave them Ricky’s name?
A Yes, sir.
Moreover, the prosecutor relied heavily in closing argument on Collazo’s taped [426]*426statement. He did so in three respects. First, he used it to cement his own case: “I would submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that there is more than sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.... You can base it [among other things] upon the statements to the police on the tape.” Second, the prosecutor used the statement to attack Collazo’s credibility as a witness: “And remember, remember Mr. Collazo’s testimony from the witness stand and how that differs from the taped statement. In the tape, there is nothing about the door being opened and Doug Metzger lunging over him to get to the black man.” Third, he used the statement to impugn directly Col-lazo’s defense of abandonment: “The only way you could follow [defense counsel’s] line of argument is if you wipe out all the circumstances behind this crime, if you wipe out this taped statement and you go strictly and purely upon his testimony on the stand....” The record is replete with similar examples of the effective use of the taped statement during both cross-examination and closing argument.
It is impossible to conclude from the foregoing as well as from the rest of the evidentiary record that Collazo’s coerced statement did not contribute to his conviction. The taped statement as it was used by the prosecutor was clearly not “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue.” Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.Ct. 1884. Thus, California has failed to sustain its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission in evidence of Collazo’s statement and its use during the trial was harmless error.
VI
Neither Collazo’s request to talk to his interrogators, nor his alleged Miranda waiver, nor his custodial confession were voluntary, as that term applies either to the conduct of the police, or to Collazo’s subjective reaction to police overreaching. To the extent that the state trial court’s conclusions on these issues are inconsistent with this evaluation, we respectfully reject them as being without foundation in the record. Furthermore, we conclude the error in question was not harmless.
We reverse the district court’s denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The case is remanded to the district court to issue the writ and to determine a reasonable time in which the State of California shall retry the petitioner without using his taped statement, or release him.
REVERSED and REMANDED.