Dennis Pierce v. Cecil Nye

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 24, 2025
Docket368883
StatusUnpublished

This text of Dennis Pierce v. Cecil Nye (Dennis Pierce v. Cecil Nye) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dennis Pierce v. Cecil Nye, (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DENNIS PIERCE, SUZANNE PIERCE, DOUG UNPUBLISHED ALLMAN, and ELAINE ALLMAN, June 24, 2025 2:23 PM Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 368883 Grand Traverse Circuit Court CECIL NYE and NYE’S TRAP RANGE, LC No. 2021-035809-CH

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and RICK and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this private zoning enforcement matter, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order: (1) denying their claim of nuisance per se and request for injunctive relief, and (2) ruling that the sport shooting activity on the east side of defendants’ property was a lawful nonconforming use. We affirm.

I. FACTS

This case arises from plaintiffs’ concerns of increased shooting activity at Nye’s Trap Range, which is a sport shooting range located in Paradise Township. The range encompasses 40 acres on a long and narrow parcel of land, and it is zoned in an agricultural district. The property was purchased by Delbert Nye in 1965, and the range opened in 1973 or 1974.1

The range quickly began operating as a prior nonconforming use when zoning in Paradise Township began. An interim zoning ordinance was instituted in 1975, but a new zoning ordinance was adopted in 1979, which repealed the interim zoning ordinance. The 1979 ordinance did not

1 Delbert died in January 2017, but Cecil Nye, Delbert’s grandson, has owned and operated the range since it was conveyed to him in 2016.

-1- permit shooting ranges in agricultural districts by right or by special use permit. 2 See 1979 Ordinance, §§ 15.10 and 15.11. The 1979 ordinance governed nonconforming uses as follows: “At the discretion of the owner, the lawful use of any building, structure, land or premises existing prior to the effective date of this Ordinance, may be continued, but no such building or structure or land use shall be enlarged or extended, except as provided herein.” 1979 Ordinance, § 9.12. In 2008, the township adopted the current zoning ordinance, which permitted shooting ranges in agricultural districts by a special land use permit, see 2008 Ordinance, § 6.04; however, there is no dispute that defendants never applied for such permit.

When the range first opened, it was primarily used for trap shooting3 on the west side of the property, but by 1975, about 10% of the shooting activity took place on the east side of the property. In Spring 2021, the sporting clays4 course on the east side of the property was “upgraded” for “safety reasons.” After the upgrades to the eastern part of the property were made, several adjacent property owners noticed more frequent and louder shooting activity; some of the property owners decided to contact the township’s zoning administrator about their concerns. The township’s zoning administrator began an investigation, but the township supervisor quickly instructed him to end it because the township board previously determined that the range was considered a lawful nonconforming use, and the township did not want to waste any more resources on the matter.5

In June 2021, plaintiffs filed suit, arguing that that the upgrades made to the east side of the range constituted an expansion of the prior nonconforming use in violation of the zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs requested that the trial court “enter an order enjoining Defendant from continuing to develop, install, and operate shooting stations in the area complained of, and declare

2 We acknowledge that the trial court incorrectly stated that the 1979 ordinance “allowed gun ranges in the agricultural district” when it clearly did not. See 1979 Ordinance, §§ 15.10 and 15.11. Nevertheless, the trial court very clearly stated that there was “sufficient evidence to find a history of sport shooting on the eastern portion of the property from the mid[-]1970’s through the present.” Therefore, the trial court’s factual findings, in conjunction with the plain language of the 1979 ordinance, display that the nonconforming use was established before the 1979 ordinance. 3 Trap shooting involves five shooters who shoot at clay pigeons, or targets, launched from trap houses. Each shooter takes five shots in each position, for a total of 25 shots each. 4 Sporting clays shooting is a “fairly new” form of shooting similar to “a hunting scenario.” It varies from trap shooting in that: (1) the shooting angles are different; (2) each round of shooting involves 50 shots over the course of 10 shooting stations; and (3) trap ranges are “set in concrete,” but sporting clays courses have “portable” machines. 5 In 2001, and again in 2005, one of the adjacent property owners complained about increased shooting activity on the west side of the range. The township responded to both complaints, finding that the range was considered a lawful nonconforming use and was therefore not in violation of the zoning ordinance. Notably, later in 2021, the township board discussed two complaint letters related to the range, and the board’s consensus “was to take no action.”

-2- that the addition of trap shooting stations as carried out by Defendant constitutes a public nuisance per se . . . .”6 After a bench trial, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendants’ actions amounted to nuisance per se; therefore, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek equitable relief. The trial court held “that the sport shooting on the eastern portion of Defendants’ property is a legal, prior nonconforming use, which does not violate the Ordinance or the [Sport Shooting Ranges Act (SSRA)].” The trial court reasoned as follows:

The Court finds that, based on the testimony introduced at trial, there is sufficient evidence to find a history of sport shooting on the eastern portion of the property from the mid[-]1970’s through the present. The Court further finds that, when the SSRA was enacted on July 5, 1994, almost the entire 40 acres of Defendants’ property were used for sport shooting, either as trap fields in the west or for hunting practice in the east. The “preexisting geographical boundaries” or “area” of the Range must then include both the western and eastern portions of the property. Arguably, the construction and installation of the sporting clays stations on the eastern portion is merely a continuation of a legal, prior nonconforming use. Alternatively, Defendants are permitted to expand or increase membership or opportunities for public participation and expand or increased events and activities within the preexisting geographical boundaries, even if not in compliance with the Ordinance pursuant to the SSRA. Ultimately, the Court finds that expansion of the sport shooting in the east, via use or facilities, is permitted by the statute.

Plaintiffs now appeal as of right.

II. NONCONFORMING USE

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the recent use of the east side of the range was not an unlawful expansion of defendants’ prior nonconforming use. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The circuit court’s findings of fact, if any, following a bench trial are reviewed for clear error, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Ladd v Motor City Plastics Co, 303 Mich App 83, 92; 842 NW2d 388 (2013). “A finding is clearly erroneous if there is no evidentiary support for it or if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Chelsea Investment Group, LLC v City of Chelsea, 288 Mich App 239, 251; 792 NW2d 781 (2010). “The trial court’s findings are given great deference because it is in a better position to examine the facts.” Id.

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Bluebook (online)
Dennis Pierce v. Cecil Nye, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennis-pierce-v-cecil-nye-michctapp-2025.