Dennis Palaza v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance.
This text of Dennis Palaza v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance. (Dennis Palaza v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-58
DENNIS PALAZA
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This appeal stems from Dennis Palaza's efforts to obtain
pandemic unemployment assistance (PUA) under the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act of 2020 (the CARES Act).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 9021-9034. 1 The department of unemployment
assistance (department) denied Palaza's application for
benefits. The department's board of review (board) affirmed,
and Palaza appealed to the District Court, which granted
judgment to the board. We affirm.
1The PUA provided financial benefits to people who were not eligible for regular unemployment compensation, including those who were "unemployed, partially unemployed, or unable or unavailable to work" in 2020 for certain COVID-19 related reasons. 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I). This included someone who "was scheduled to commence employment and does not have a job or is unable to reach the job as a direct result of the COVID-19 public health emergency." 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)(gg). Background. After Palaza's March 29, 2020 application for
PUA was denied, he appealed. At an evidentiary hearing, Palaza
testified that after an interview on March 4, 2020, Hub
Construction hired him to start work on March 16, 2020. The
company informed him "at that time, that they were not able to
hire anybody because of the pandemic." Palaza submitted a
written affidavit providing the same information. He also
submitted an affidavit signed by Vincent P. Gratta, vice
president of Hub Construction, which stated, "Mr. Palaza applied
for employment at Hub Construction in Hull, MA around early
March 2020. However, after the shut down we were not taking on
new employees." He offered to answer questions and provided a
telephone number.
The review examiner affirmed the denial of benefits. She
found that the Gratta letter stated only that Palaza had applied
for a job, but the company was not taking on new employees.
Gratta did not say that the company had offered Palaza a
position or that an offer was withdrawn due to the COVID-19
health emergency. Neither affidavit contained any detail as to
pay, hours, or job responsibilities. She also noted that the
affidavits were not notarized.
Palaza sought review from the board, which was allowed. He
provided a copy of his affidavit, which by this time had been
notarized. He also provided a notarized affidavit from a friend
2 stating that the friend had driven Palaza to the construction
company on March 4, 2020, so he could apply for a job. The
board affirmed the department's decision and Palaza appealed to
the District Court pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 42. 2 A judge
affirmed the decision of the board and entered a judgment on the
pleadings. This appeal followed.
Discussion. Palaza argues on appeal that the department
exceeded its authority and violated Federal law when it engaged
in fact-finding, rather than rely on his self-certification of
eligibility for PUA. He cites in support United States
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration,
Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 16-20, Change 6
(September 3, 2021) (letter). That letter provides, in relevant
part, that, "[b]ecause eligibility is based on self-
certification, no further fact-finding is involved."
Our review of the department's determination that a
claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits is "highly
deferential to the agency" (citation omitted), Lincoln Pharmacy
of Milford, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment
Assistance, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 431 (2009), and limited to
deciding "whether the decision contains sufficient findings to
2 At the hearing before the judge, counsel for the board candidly explained how the PUA program worked. Counsel also explained, and we agree, that lack of notarization of affidavits should not be held against Palaza.
3 demonstrate that the correct legal principles were applied, and
whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence."
Norfolk County Retirement Sys. v. Director of the Dep't of Labor
& Workforce Dev., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 764 (2006).
Here, the department determined that Palaza was not
eligible for PUA because he did not offer any credible testimony
or documentation that he had received an offer of employment in
2020. It is not reasonable to read the Department of Labor
letter as prohibiting the department from investigating the
veracity of an applicant's self-certification, both because the
statute requires "documentation to substantiate employment," 15
U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(iii), and because the letter itself says
that "states are required to take reasonable and customary
precautions to deter and detect fraud" and "[i]t is critical
that states implement processes that ensure payments are being
made only to eligible individuals and that states have
aggressive strategies and tools in place to prevent, detect, and
recover fraudulent payments." Cf. Simmons v. Arizona Dep't of
Economic Sec., 254 Ariz. 109, 113 (2022) ("The ALJ made no
finding that [the PUA applicant's] testimony was not credible").
On this record, we see no error in the department's
conclusion that Palaza was not offered employment in 2020, and
that he was thus not qualified to receive PUA. As the State
agency responsible for administering PUA, the department is
4 required to find whether an individual is eligible for
unemployment entitlements. See 20 C.F.R. § 625.9(a)(1). The
statutory framework required Palaza to provide "documentation to
substantiate employment or self-employment or the planned
commencement of employment" in a qualifying time frame. 15
U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(iii). The Gratta letter did not state
that Palaza had been offered a job or had an offer rescinded.
The department was not required to credit evidence by Palaza
that, if believed, might support a different conclusion. See
Boston v. Downing, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 83 (2008) (court will
not displace agency's choice between two conflicting views of
evidence). See also Fisch v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Dennis Palaza v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennis-palaza-v-director-of-the-department-of-unemployment-assistance-massappct-2024.