DENNIS M. CLOHERTY v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & Others.
This text of DENNIS M. CLOHERTY v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & Others. (DENNIS M. CLOHERTY v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & Others.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1129
DENNIS M. CLOHERTY
vs.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & others.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Dennis M. Cloherty, filed a pro se complaint
in the Superior Court against the defendants. On August 5,
2024, a judge dismissed the complaint, as twice amended. A
final judgment entered that same date. The motion judge
subsequently denied Cloherty's motion for reconsideration. We
affirm.
To begin, we note that the plaintiff's brief does not
address the complaint's deficiencies at all. Failure to address
the issue in the principal brief constitutes waiver. See Smith
v. Bell Atl., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 725 n. 8 (2005) ("argument
1 Town of Wakefield and CCF Quannapowitt Property Company, LLC. that is not raised in a party's principal brief may be deemed
waived"); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481
Mass. 1628 (2019) ("appellate court need not pass upon questions
or issues not argued in the brief").
Even if the plaintiff offered an argument for the viability
of the complaint, we discern no error that merits relief. At
issue here is the plaintiff's second amended complaint filed on
February 9, 2024. He asserted two counts that he titled
"Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act" and "Frontage on a
Way." Neither of these counts as titled, nor the substance of
the text within these counts articulate cognizable causes of
action against the defendants. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1),
365 Mass. 749 (1974) (pleading must set forth "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974)
("averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct").
"Pleadings must stand or fall on their own." Mmoe v.
Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985). Indeed, "nothing in
the rules of civil procedure authorizes a judge to recast a
complaint in a form that corresponds to the judge's view of what
claims the plaintiff intended but failed adequately to set
forth." Id. Here, the motion judge concluded that the
complaint failed to comport with these fundamental pleading
2 requirements under our procedural rules. We discern no abuse of
discretion in this determination. See id. at 621.
Aside from its dispositive procedural deficiency, the
complaint also failed in substance to set forth a cause of
action that suggested the plaintiff was entitled to relief. See
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008);
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974) (authorizing
dismissal of complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted"). "What is required at the pleading
stage are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely
consistent with)' an entitlement to relief . . . ."
Iannacchino, supra, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007). Upon de novo review, we must determine
"whether the factual allegations in the complaint are
sufficient, as a matter of law, to state a recognized cause of
action or claim, and whether such allegations plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief" (citation omitted). Dunn v. Genzyme
Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 717 (2021). Here, in exacting detail
starting in 1893, the complaint chronicles the history of land
in the vicinity of Lake Quannapowitt in Wakefield, but the
complaint is silent as to the liability of the defendants that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief. While "the complaint
need not recite [a] specific cause of action so long as the
3 factual allegations are sufficient to support such a claim,"
Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37,
47 (2022), the complaint here lacks both any specific cause of
action or any factual allegation supporting an entitlement to
relief.
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for reconsideration affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Grant & Hodgens, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: March 11, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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