Dennis Lloyd Smith v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp, d/b/a MercyOne Des Moines Medical Center; Sariah Steed, RN; Stacey Lea Baker, RN; Patricia Ann Hunter, RN; Megan Rodgers, MSW; Dustin Uhlenhopp, D.O.; and Dale Grunewald, D.O.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-0679

Filed September 2, 2026

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Dennis Lloyd Smith, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp, d/b/a MercyOne Des Moines Medical Center; Sariah Steed, RN; Stacey Lea Baker, RN; Patricia Ann Hunter, RN; Megan Rodgers, MSW; Dustin Uhlenhopp, D.O.; and Dale Grunewald, D.O., Defendants–Appellees.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Patrick D. Smith, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Dennis Lloyd Smith, Des Moines, self-represented appellant.

Sarah E. Schleisman, Frederick T. Harris, and Ryan P. Tunink of Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, West Des Moines, attorneys for appellees Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp, d/b/a MercyOne Des Moines Medical Center; Sariah Steed, RN; Stacey Lea Baker, RN; Patricia Ann Hunter, RN;

Megan Rodgers, MSW; and Dustin Uhlenhopp, D.O.

Janice M. Thomas and John A. Maschman of Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, West Des Moines, attorneys for appellee Dale Grunewald, D.O.

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Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Buller, J., and Bower, S.J.

Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

This is the third in a series of lawsuits brought against various healthcare providers related to care provided to Dennis Smith’s wife from October to November 2019 after she fell and broke her ankle. The district court dismissed this action, and Smith appeals. We start with some background information.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2019, Smith took his wife to the hospital—Catholic Health Initiatives–Iowa Corp., d/b/a MercyOne Des Moines Medical Center (MercyOne)—for her broken ankle. His wife had required near constant supervision after a stroke in 2000 left her without short-term memory function. Smith alleges that a nurse at the hospital left negative notes about his wife in his wife’s medical files that prevented her from being accepted into a facility capable of meeting her recovery needs. Smith alleges he found another facility that would accept her, but that facility eventually refused to let her stay. Because no other facility would take her and she could not put weight on her ankle, Smith alleges that his wife was forced to remain at the hospital on “observation” status. While there, Smith alleges a doctor prescribed a medication intended to help his wife sleep that was explicitly contraindicated on her chart. Smith further alleges that the doctor got consent for the medication from his wife despite her mental deficiencies. He alleges his wife was eventually transferred to Granger Nursing and Rehab where her doctor, Dr. Dale Grunewald, doubled her dosage of the medication. The medication allegedly caused his wife to contract pneumonia, which prevented her from progressing in physical therapy. Smith alleges he took his wife to see her personal physician, who agreed that the medication she was prescribed was inappropriate and began weening her

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off it. Smith then brought his wife home from the facility and later initiated his first lawsuit.

In the first suit (Smith I), Smith named himself as a plaintiff both in his individual capacity and on his wife’s behalf as her conservator. Defendants included MercyOne; OPCO Granger, Iowa LLC, d/b/a Granger Nursing and Rehab (Granger); and employees of both entities. The court dismissed his wife’s claims ab initio because Smith could not represent her, as he was not licensed to practice law. The court later dismissed Smith’s individual claims with prejudice.

In the second suit (Smith II), Smith’s wife sued the same parties for the same conduct and resulting harm. The court dismissed her claims via summary judgment because two counts were based on statutes that did not provide for a private right of action and the remaining counts were barred by the statute of limitations.

Smith brought this action (Smith III) in his individual capacity against Dr. Grunewald, MercyOne, and several MercyOne employees, some of whom were not previously named as defendants in Smith I or Smith II. He asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied contract, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. All defendants filed motions to dismiss arguing the judgments in Smith I and II barred Smith’s claims based on the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted the motion. Smith appeals. He contends that claim preclusion does not apply, the court denied him due process by not allowing him to file additional briefing, and the court was biased against him as a self-represented party.1

1 Smith also filed an appellate motion to take judicial notice of filings made in his wife’s conservatorship court file, which is not part of our record. The defendants resist

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II. Standard of Review

We review rulings on pre-answer motions to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020). We affirm if there is no right of recovery under the facts stated in the petition. Id. We conduct de novo review of claims that an individual’s due process rights were violated. State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Iowa 2011).

III. Claim Preclusion

Smith argues the district court misapplied the elements of claim preclusion. He also contends the court’s ruling lacked the specificity required for analyzing claim preclusion.

As to the latter argument, we find that Smith failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise the issue, and the district court must rule on it. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). “[I]f the appellant claims as error on appeal that the district court failed to make sufficiently specific findings and conclusions, then the appellant must file a[n Iowa R]ule [of Civil Procedure] 1.904(2) motion to preserve that point.” Id. at 864 n.2. Here, Smith never filed a motion under rule 1.904(2) claiming the court’s ruling lacked the specificity the law requires, and the court did not rule on it. Therefore, he has not preserved error on this claim. Accordingly, we only consider his claim that the court misapplied the elements of claim preclusion. See id.

the motion. While judicial notice may be taken on appeal, it is generally “not proper for the court to consider or take judicial notice of the records of the same court in a different proceeding without an agreement of the parties.” State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). As there is no agreement here, we deny Smith’s motion and decline to take judicial notice of his wife’s conservatorship file.

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“The general rule of claim preclusion holds that a valid and final judgment on a claim bars a second action on the adjudicated claim or any part thereof.” Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Iowa 2011). A party asserting a claim-preclusion defense must prove three elements: (1) “the parties in the first and second action are the same parties or parties in privity,” (2) “the claim in the second suit could have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the prior case (i.e., both suits involve the same cause of action),” and (3) “there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action.” Id. at 836. We address these elements in turn.

As to the first element, privity exists between parties in the separate suits when there is an agent-principal relationship such that liability of the principal rests on respondeat superior rather than independent torts like negligent supervision or training. Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57, 63 (Iowa 2005). There is no question that the plaintiffs in both Smith I and Smith III are the same—that being Smith. As to defendants, Dr. Grunewald and MercyOne were defendants in both cases. All other defendants Smith added in Smith III are employees of MercyOne and were alleged to be acting in their capacities as employees when they allegedly harmed Smith, and MercyOne’s liability in Smith I was based on its employees’ conduct. As such, the added defendants here are in privity with MercyOne in Smith I, and the first element of claim preclusion is met. See id.

As to the second element, the claims in this suit must have been fully and fairly adjudicated in the prior suit. See Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 836. Because all claims that can be brought together must be, “claim preclusion will apply not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action but to all relevant matters that could have been determined.” Id. at 835 (cleaned up). This includes “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the

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defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Villarreal v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 873 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, at 196 (A.L.I. 1982)). What constitutes a “transaction” or “series” for purposes of this analysis is “determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, all harm that Smith alleges he suffered resulted from the defendants’ care of his wife from October to November of 2019. Although some of his claims in this suit bear different labels, the facts he alleges to prove them substantially overlap with the facts he set out to prove his claim in Smith I. Smith “is not entitled to a ʻsecond bite’ simply by alleging a new theory of recovery for the same wrong.” See Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting Bennett v. MC #619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512, 516–17 (Iowa 1998)). The relevant inquiry includes asking “how far the witnesses or proofs in the second action would tend to overlap the witnesses or proofs relevant to the first.” Id. at 837 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b, at 199 (A.L.I. 1982)). In both Smith I and here, to be successful on his claims, Smith would need to prove his wife was provided inadequate care that damaged him. He would need to rely on the same evidence in both cases. Therefore, these claims constitute the same transaction or series of transactions for claim-preclusion purposes. See id. The second element of claim preclusion has been established.

As to the third element, there must be a final judgment on the merits.

Dismissals that are not voluntary and not based on want of jurisdiction or improper venue “operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify

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otherwise.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.946. In Smith I, the court dismissed Smith’s claims against Dr. Grunewald and MercyOne on the merits. Neither dismissal was voluntary nor based on jurisdiction or venue. And the dismissal orders did not specify that they were not on the merits. Accordingly, the dismissals in Smith I were final and on the merits. As such, the third element of claim preclusion is established.

Because all elements of claim preclusion have been established, the doctrine applies to all claims actually brought in Smith I and all claims that could have been brought in Smith I, which includes all claims before us in Smith III. See Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 835 (applying claim preclusion to “all relevant matters that could have been determined” (citation omitted)). The district court correctly dismissed this action on that basis.

IV. Due Process & Miscellaneous Claims

Smith also claims that the court denied him due process by not allowing additional briefing. We find no merit in this claim. Smith was given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court of competent jurisdiction, which satisfies his due process rights. See Johnson v. Mitchell, 489 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (“Ordinarily, all that due process requires in a civil case is proper notice and service of process and a court of competent jurisdiction; procedural irregularities during the course of a civil case, even serious ones, will not subject the judgment to collateral attack.”).

Along with his due process claim, Smith also contends that the district court was biased against him based on his self-represented status. He bases this claim on the fact that the district court asked him a question that it did not ask the other parties and gratuitously “admonished” him in the last paragraph of its ruling. We see no bias arising from the court’s questioning.

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And what Smith calls admonitions were simple, accurate statements of the law regarding the standard for self-represented litigants, namely that courts do not utilize different standards when persons choose to represent themselves, courts do not judge by one standard for lawyers and another for lay persons, and all parties—represented or not—are expected to act with equal competence. See Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Nothing in the court’s statements reflects bias against Smith as a self- represented party. Accordingly, we reject his claim that the district court was biased against him.

V. Conclusion

We have considered all of Smith’s arguments on appeal, whether expressly addressed in this opinion or not, and we affirm the district court’s ruling dismissing Smith’s action based on claim preclusion.

AFFIRMED.