Dennis Keith Yeager v. Iowa District Court for Polk County

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-0911

Filed August 19, 2026

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Dennis Keith Yeager,

Plaintiff,

v.

Iowa District Court for Polk County, Defendant.

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Certiorari from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Ashley Stewart, Judge.

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WRIT ANNULLED

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Audra F. Saunders of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for plaintiff.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, attorney for defendant.

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Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.

Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Dennis Yeager appeals the district court’s finding that he willfully violated two no-contact orders (NCO). Yeager was found in contempt and sentenced to 300 days in jail. On appeal, he asserts there was not substantial evidence to support the contempt finding. He also alleges that he was denied due process because he was punished for contempt absent an order for rule to show cause. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

In December 2024, Yeager was charged with a simple misdemeanor assault in “Case A.” An NCO was issued by the district court, naming M.W. as the protected party. Yeager was charged in January 2025 with assault causing bodily injury, a serious misdemeanor, in “Case B.” A second NCO was entered as part of Case B, naming T.W. as the protected party. T.W. is the mother of M.W.

A complaint was filed in Case B, alleging Yeager violated both NCOs.

The allegations stem from Yeager’s assaults on both M.W. and T.W. The complaint alleged Yeager grabbed T.W. by the throat, M.W. intervened, and Yeager grabbed M.W. by the neck and punched him in the head twice. As a result of this incident, a third case—“Case C”—was opened in March 2025, charging Yeager with assault causing bodily injury or mental illness and violation of an NCO.1 In Case B, an application for rule to show cause was

1 Case A is SMAC416959, which is alleged to list M.W. as the protected party. The case file for SMAC416959 is not part of our appellate record. Case B is SRCR388319 and lists T.W. as the protected party. Case C is SRCR390157 and lists both T.W. and M.W. as the protected parties.

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filed on March 30, 2025. In Case C, an application for rule to show cause was filed on May 5, 2025, a date after the contempt hearing was held.

Following a contempt hearing, the district court found Yeager violated the NCOs. The court sentenced Yeager to 120 days for violating the NCO with T.W. and 180 days for violating the NCO with M.W. The jail terms were ordered to run consecutively. After the contempt hearing, the district court informed the State that Case B only listed T.W. as the protected party. The State attempted to remedy the issue by filing an application to initiate contempt in Case C, even though the application in that case was filed after Yeager’s contempt finding. There was no contempt application filed in Case A. Yeager sought certiorari review to challenge the contempt findings. Our supreme court granted the writ and transferred the case to this court.

II. Analysis

Yeager first asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s contempt findings. He argues that the testimony of M.W. should not have been afforded weight because of his dishonesty during the investigation and because “his version of events is simply illogical.” Yeager contends that M.W.’s story that he was lifted off the ground by his neck by Yeager, a fifty- five-year-old man, “is highly improbable.”

We review certiorari actions “for correction of errors at law.” K.C. v.

Iowa Dist. Ct., 6 N.W.3d 297, 301 (Iowa 2024). “However, to the extent a constitutional issue is involved, our review is de novo.” Id. Writs of certiorari are “appropriate when a lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” Id. (cleaned up). “When the court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or when the court has not applied the law properly, an illegality exists.” Id. (citation omitted). “[S]ubstantial

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evidence to support such a finding is such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Den Hartog v. City of Waterloo, 926 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 2019) (cleaned up).

“Illegal resistance to any order” is an action that constitutes contempt.

Iowa Code § 665.2(3) (2025). The resistance must be willful. Reis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 787 N.W.2d 61, 68 (Iowa 2010). To find willful resistance, the district court must find “conduct that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Yeager was prohibited by court orders from having contact with or being in the presence of M.W. and T.W. On the day of the incident in question, both protected parties were in the presence of Yeager. Both M.W. and T.W. testified that Yeager grabbed T.W. by the throat, M.W. stepped in to stop the physical contact, then Yeager lifted M.W. off the ground by his throat and punched M.W. twice in the head. M.W. ran to a nearby business to call law enforcement, who responded and observed injuries to M.W. Law enforcement was able to confirm the existence of the NCOs.

Yeager contends that M.W.’s testimony is improbable, partly because M.W. lied to law enforcement about his initial presence in Yeager’s residence. M.W. initially reported that he heard T.W. being attacked while he was in a different trailer, then arrived to aid his mother. M.W. felt he would get into trouble because of the NCO if law enforcement knew he was already present in the same trailer as Yeager. M.W. eventually provided law enforcement with “an honest answer,” and M.W. admitted in his testimony that he had initially fabricated part of the story. Yeager also asserts that due to his age and the

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weight of M.W., it would be improbable that he was able to lift M.W. off the ground for an extended period.

Yeager relies on State v. Smith to argue that M.W.’s previous fabrication and his testimony concerning the assault may render the testimony “so impossible and absurd and self-contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by the court.” 508 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding a conviction based on inconsistent and “absurd” testimony from alleged sexual-abuse victims). But Smith has been recently overturned by State v. Lang, where we determined the Smith court misapplied appellate standards of review by inserting itself as the factfinder for credibility determinations. 30 N.W.3d 757, 764–66 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“We have never permitted appellate courts to masquerade as jurors . . . . And credibility questions are reserved for the factfinder, such that we do not reverse criminal convictions because of disagreements over whether testimony was believable.” (cleaned up)).2

The district court found that Yeager willfully violated the NCOs by being present with the protected parties. It also discredited Yeager’s argument that he was unable to assault M.W. in the manner to which M.W. testified. Further, the officer who testified at the hearing described M.W.’s injuries, including marks on his neck and bleeding from the mouth, which the district court found credible. “It is not our place to resolve conflicts in the

2 As stated by our court in Lang:

Smith has long overstayed its welcome as controlling precedent. It was wrong when it was decided, and it is wrong now. It has never been followed, and it is irreconcilable with our standards of review as a court for correction of errors at law. Despite this, its problematic holding has persisted in briefing, requiring us to distance ourselves from the decision again and again. We therefore expressly overrule Smith . . . . 30 N.W.3d at 766.

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evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh evidence; such matters are for the [factfinder].” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). We find the district court committed no error in finding substantial evidence that Yeager willfully violated the NCOs.

Yeager also asserts he was denied his constitutional right to due process because he was punished for contempt before an order to show cause was filed in case C, demonstrating a lack of notice.3 See Iowa Code § 665.7. The State argues that errors were not preserved on this issue because Yeager did not object on due process or notice grounds during the contempt hearing. Yeager contends he preserved error because the supreme court granted his petition for review. The State moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the case is moot because Yeager has served his contempt sentences. Yeager resisted the motion, asserting the procedural issue is a matter of public interest. We turn first to error preservation.

Yeager asserts that the procedural error he raises on appeal was preserved because his “[p]etition for [w]rit of [c]ertiorari was timely filed and subsequently granted.” We are not convinced. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.107(1)(e)(4), regarding certiorari petitions, states: “The petition must state whether the plaintiff raised the issue in the district court, identify the interest of the plaintiff in the challenged decision, and state the grounds that justify issuance of the writ.” And rule 6.107(4) states, after the petition is granted: “Further proceedings will be had pursuant to the rules of appellate procedure. The appellate rules applicable to appellants apply to plaintiffs and

3 We note the district court indicated when opening the record that the parties were there on both SRCR388319 (Case B) and SRCR390157 (Case C). But the contempt order was subsequently filed only in SRCR388319 (Case B).

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those applicable to appellees apply to defendants.” Lastly, rule 6.903 states: “Filing a notice of appeal does not preserve an issue for appeal, and citing to the notice does not satisfy [the preservation] requirement.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1).

Yeager’s petition for writ of certiorari failed to state if the proceduralerror issue was raised in the district court. And the record shows Yeager did not raise an objection concerning the issue and did not receive a ruling on it. See Huffer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 23-0885, 2024 WL 4039430, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2024) (“Certiorari actions are not an exception to the requirement that claims must be first raised in the district court before we address them.”); see also Sorci v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 671 N.W.2d 482, 489–90 (Iowa 2003). The only issue that properly followed the requirements of the rules was Yeager’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. Because of deficiencies in the petition regarding the procedural challenge and because “[f ]iling a notice of appeal does not preserve an issue for appeal,” we agree with the State that this issue is not preserved in this manner. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1).

Yeager also frames this procedural challenge as a constitutional issue.

This does not change our analysis regarding error preservation. “[T]he rules of error preservation apply with equal force to constitutional issues.” Flowers v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 25-0101, 2026 WL 892512, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026) (cleaned up); see also Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Iowa 1979) (refusing to address constitutional challenges to contempt statute because they were not raised in district court). Accordingly, framing this issue as a constitutional challenge does not evade error-preservation requirements.

Lastly, Yeager argues that “Iowa caselaw shows that sentencing challenges are often excepted from our error preservation requirement.”

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State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 84 (Iowa 2024). While it is correct that “illegal sentences may be challenged at any time,” Medhaug v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 09-1027, 2010 WL 2602170, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2010), our supreme court has determined that “[c]ontempt proceedings are quasicriminal , not criminal, in nature,” State v. Mott, 731 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Iowa 2007) (articulating the difference between “punished” and “sentenced” as per section 665.4). “For this reason, the exception to the error preservation doctrine for illegal criminal sentences does not apply.” Medhaug, 2010 WL 2602170, at *1 n.1.

For the reasons above, we find Yeager has not preserved error for his procedural-due-process claim. Gibb, 286 N.W.2d at 185. Accordingly, we do not address the State’s mootness argument or Yeager’s collateralconsequences arguments.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling finding sufficient evidence supported Yeager’s violation of the NCOs. And we conclude error was not preserved on Yeager’s procedural-due-process claim.

WRIT ANNULLED.