Dennis Freeman v. Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedDecember 29, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-06880
StatusUnknown

This text of Dennis Freeman v. Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc. (Dennis Freeman v. Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dennis Freeman v. Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc., (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------- x : DENNIS FREEMAN, : DECISION & ORDER : Plaintiff, : 24-CV-6880 (AMD)(PK) : -against- : : THOMAS DAVID FARR, JR. and PRINCE : EXPRESS, INC, : : Defendants. : -------------------------------------------------------------- x

Peggy Kuo, United States Magistrate Judge: In this personal injury action brought by Dennis Freeman (“Plaintiff”) against Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc (“Prince Express”) (collectively, “Defendants”), Defendants have moved to transfer venue to the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (“Motion,” Dkt. 18; see also Defendants’ Brief in Support (“Def. Mem.”), Dkt. 18-3; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Pl. Mem.”), Dkt. 19-1; Defendants’ Reply (“Def. Reply”), Dkt. 20.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is denied. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Complaint (Dkt. 2-2), the Notice of Removal (Dkt. 2), and the parties’ submissions in connection with the Motion. Plaintiff is a resident of Queens, New York. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendant Farr is a resident of East Ridge, Tennessee, and Defendant Prince Express is a corporation incorporated in Tennessee, with a principal place of business in Soddy Daisy, Tennessee. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4; Notice of Removal ¶ 5.) On January 9, 2024, a vehicle operated by Mr. Farr and owned by Prince Express collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle in Waynesville, North Carolina. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-21.) Plaintiff was taken to Haywood Regional Medical Center where he was treated and released the same day. (Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (“Pl. SOMF”) ¶ 9, Dkt. 19-2.) Plaintiff almost immediately returned to New York and began treating with physicians in New York. (Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 9-14.) Mr. Farr was issued a citation for failure to reduce speed in connection with the incident. (Pl.

SOMF ¶ 8; see also “Haywood District Court Case Summary,” Ex. B to Pl. SOMF, Dkt. 19-4.) He pled responsible to the incident and paid restitution of $241.00. (Pl. SOMF ¶ 8; Haywood District Court Case Summary at 3 (ECF pagination).) PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action was filed in the New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, and removed to this Court on September 30, 2024. Defendants filed the Motion on May 30, 2025. DISCUSSION “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The party requesting transfer “carries the ‘burden of making out a strong case for transfer,’” and courts have applied “the clear and convincing evidence standard in determining whether to exercise discretion to grant a transfer motion.” New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.,

599 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Filmline (Cros-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 521 (2d Cir.1989)). “District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case- by-case basis.” D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir 2006). To determine whether a motion to transfer venue should be granted, courts “must apply a two-pronged test: (A) whether the action could have been brought in the proposed forum; and (B) whether the transfer would promote the convenience of parties and witnesses and would be in the interests of justice.” Cameron v. Prosegur Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 23-CV-8789 (DLI)(TAM), 2024 WL 4145742, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2024). I. Whether This Action Might Have Been Brought in the Western District of North Carolina

“[F]or the purposes of section 1404(a), an action might have been brought in another forum if, at the time the action was originally filed, the transferee court would have had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and if venue would have been proper in the transferee court.” Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Coe, 724 F. Supp. 3d 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). Plaintiff does not argue that this action could not have been brought in the Western District of North Carolina. Thus, only the second prong is at issue. II. Convenience and Interests of Justice Factors

In considering convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice, the Court analyzes various factors, including “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, [and] (7) the relative means of the parties.” D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 106-07 (alteration in original). “There is no strict formula for the application of these factors, and no single factor is determinative.” Sarracco v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 220 F. Supp. 3d 346, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “Instead, these factors should be applied and weighed in the context of the individualized circumstances of the particular case.” Id. “In seeking to meet their burden that clear and convincing evidence calls for transfer, [Defendants] must establish that at least one of the factors weighs in favor of transfer, and that any factors weighing in favor of transfer outweigh any factors weighing against it. If all the factors are neutral, the transfer motion should be denied.” In re Peloton Interactive, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 21-CV-2369 (CBA)(PK), 2022 WL 1211516, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022).

Plaintiff’s choice of forum is given “great weight” and should not be disturbed unless other factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer. See D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 107; EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). That deference is “particularly strong”

where, as here, Plaintiff sues in his home state. See Buchanan v. Umhoefer, No. 10-CV-3175 (JS)(ETB), 2011 WL 3421502, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011). Defendants argue that “New York’s sole relationship to this lawsuit is that Plaintiff is a resident of New York,” and that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, Plaintiff’s place of residence is “no basis for venue.” (Def. Mem. at 4; Def. Reply at 2 (“New York was never a proper venue since the subject accident did not occur in New York and Defendants are not residents of New York.”).) Venue for removed cases, however, is governed by the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, not by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Dennis Freeman v. Thomas David Farr, Jr. and Prince Express, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennis-freeman-v-thomas-david-farr-jr-and-prince-express-inc-nyed-2025.