Denning v. Smith

3 Johns. Ch. 332, 1818 N.Y. LEXIS 188, 1818 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedMarch 9, 1818
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 3 Johns. Ch. 332 (Denning v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Denning v. Smith, 3 Johns. Ch. 332, 1818 N.Y. LEXIS 188, 1818 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5 (N.Y. 1818).

Opinion

The case stood over for consideration to this day, when the following opinion was delivered.

The Chancellor.

1. The first and most essential object of inquiry in this case is, how far the provisions-of the statute have been disregarded or violated by the Com[337]*337missioners in the sale in question. It will accordingly be necessary to examine all the circumstances of the notice and sale, to ascertain this matter of fact.

.The commashcToms under 31? ch.’ 21&) are, in case of default on the part oi the mortgagor, whereby they became seized of the premises clear of the equity of redemption, trustees for the people to the amount due on the mortgage,"and for the mortgagor, a-to the surplus, in case of sale.

A tract of land in the town of Cairo, in Greene county,” of the value of 3,00.0 dollars, and upwards, was mortgaged to the defendants, Smith and Hollenbeck, as Commissioners under the act of the 11th of April 1808, (sess. 31 ch. 216.) to secure the repayment of a loan of 75 dollars. The interest of 5 dollars, 25 cents, due thereon in May, 1814, being unpaid, the Commissioners, by reason of the default, became forthwith, according to the declaration and words of the act, “seised of an absolute, indefeasable estate in the lands, &c. to the uses in the act mentioned, and the mortgagor, his heirs and assigns, were utterly foreclosed and barred of all equity of redemption.” They were directed in such case to sell, the lands on the third Tuesday in September following, at the court house of the county, and after retaining the principal and interest of the mortgage, and the costs, not exceeding 3 dollars, the remainder of the moneys, if any, were to he paid to the mortgagor, his heirs or assigns.

The sale was to be made in pursuance of public notice, and the Commisioners were directed, in case of such default, and within eight days after the 4th Tuesday in May, “to cause advertisements to be fixed up, at no less than three of the most public places of the county, describing the quantity and situation of the lands, and giving notice of the sale on the 3d Tuesday in September, by way of public vendue, to the highest bidder, and they were also to cause such notice to be given in, at least, one of the public newspapers in the county.”

The seisin of the Commissioners, free and clear of the equity of redemption, was nevertheless, as public agents or trustees for the People of the' state, to the amount of the [338]*338mortgage money, and for the mortgagor and his representatives, in respect to the surplus. The right of the mortgagor, and his assigns, to the surplus moneys, notwithstanding the statute bar of the equity of redemption, was explicit"ly declared in the act; and the State and the mortgagor were equally entitled to demand a due and faithful performance of the trust, with which the Commissioners were thus clothed.

We must so construe the act as to give effect to all its provisions'. The mortgagor, after the default, has no legal, (9 Johns. Rep. 129. 14 Johns. Rep. 362.) and, probably, no equitable title, which can be directly enforced, as against the land itself. But he has a valid and deep interest in the execution of the Commissioners’ trust. The State has no interest beyond the amount of their loan. All the surpuls moneys belong to the mortgagor; and we are not willing to presume such a fearful and lamentable defect of justice as the case would present, if a mortgagor could not call in question a fraudulent or irregular sale by which he was deprived of his surplus.

Let us then recur to the proofs, to see in what manner the directions of the statute were complied with.

One of the advertisements was fixed up in the village of Greenville, about seven miles northerly from the lands, in the store of Abijah Reed, and another was fixed up on the back of the writing desk of James JM’ Vichar, standing on the counter in his store at Coxsachie, about 15 miles easterly from the lands. ’ ■

The selection of these two places does not appear to have been made under the exercise of a sound discretion, and, when taken in connection with many other circumstances, it forms a very material item in the mass of testimony, going to impeach the impartiality and integrity of the sale.

The act required the notices to be put up in three “ of the most public places” in the county; the object, doubtless, was to diffuse, as widely as possible, the know[339]*339ledge of the sale, and of the cause, and the subject of it. The step was absolutely requisite in order to do justice to the parties concerned in the land, and in the moneys to arise from it; and it was a duty peculiarly pressing in this case, in respect to the mortgagor, considering the very great disproportion between the value of the pledge and the debt charged, and the general severity of the- provision, foreclosing at once, upon default, all right and equity of redemption. The Commissioners were bound to use diligence and judgment in selecting the public places best calculated to bring the notice of sale home to the ° mortgagor, and to all who were most likely to enter into' ,, competition for the purchase.

The notice of the msT’to i» ]^-cup 'pi^es, Xuld^be ‘put UP "V t.hos,c places best cat-» pniated to bring-home the notice of sale to the "°1iffgperscms likely"" attend as putcbilBers'

But here the Commissioners selected two country stores, at a great distance from the land, while it is proved that the premises were adjoining a turnpike road, and had on and adjoining them, mills, factories, and a toll-bridge, xvhich rendered them a place, of great notoriety. It is also shown, that Smith, one of the Commissioners, had frequently passed by the land, and must have been acquainted with it. It is very extraordinary, that a place of such noteas the land itself, should not have occurred to the Commissioners as very suitable for a notice. Or if the land should not have been deemed one of the most fit public places, the village of Cairo, which is within the distance of a mile and a half of the premises, was a place of great notoriety. It is at the junction of three turnpike roads,- and has a number of stores and taverns, and’ is the most central village in the county, and where county business is transacted. Why omit such a village as this, so near the lands, and resort to distant places? I apprehend no sufficient reason can be assigned.

The third notice xvas directed to be Up on the court house door. This place was, no doubt, judiciously selected. It is, in many instances, the place required by statute authority. Thus the notice of the sale of mortgaged [340]*340premises by thp mortgagee, under a power captained ÍW the mortgage, and the notice given by insolvent debtors, must be fixed upon the outward door of the court house of the county; and the notice of the general election of Got vemor and Senators, is to he given by the sheriffs in the same way. In the very loan office act, under which the sale was made, the Commissioners, were to fix up notice of their appointment, &c. at the court house. But there was a very peculiar direction given as to this notice-In the letter from the defendant Smith

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Bluebook (online)
3 Johns. Ch. 332, 1818 N.Y. LEXIS 188, 1818 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/denning-v-smith-nychanct-1818.