Dennett v. Dancy

10 S.W.2d 1057
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 31, 1928
DocketNo. 8096.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 10 S.W.2d 1057 (Dennett v. Dancy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dennett v. Dancy, 10 S.W.2d 1057 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

COBBS, J.

Appellants sued appellee, the county commissioners’ court of Cameron county, to compel the said court to use commissioners’ precinct No. 2’s pro rata share of the proceeds of the bond election held in Cameron county on January 29, 1927, in the construction and improving of roads, as designated by an order of that court on January 24, 1927, at the request of the different committees of the taxpayers asking said commissioners’ court to designate the roads to be improved, and the order of their improvement.

Hull, complete, and responsive pleadings were filed by the defendants.

It is not necessary to further refer to the pleadings of the several parties, as they are sufficient to present the case, though quite lengthy indeed. The court granted the temporary order, but, on final hearing, it was set aside, and the cause was dismissed.

That part of the order necessary for a discussion of the case is as follows:

“And, whereas, property taxpayers from said Commissioners’ precinct No. Two, together with Commissioner S. H. Bell, Jr., of said Precinct, have requested this court to designate the roads in and pertaining to said Precinct, which will be improved and constructed from the proportionate part of the proceeds of said bond issue which shall be expended in and pertain to said Commissioners’ Precinct No. Two, should the issuance of said bonds be authorized.
“Now, therefore, it is hereby expressly resolved and declared by the Commissioners’ Court of. Cameron County, Texas.
“I. That said percentage of the proceeds of said six million dollar bond issue which pertains to Commissioners’ Precinct No. 2, is hereby appropriated and set aside by the Commissioners’ Court of Cameron County to be expended when and as said bonds are issued and sold, in constructing and improving roads as hereinafter designated, situated in and pertaining to Commissioners’ Precinct No. 2 of Cameron County, which roads shall be constructed and'improved in four groups as follows:
“Group No. 1,
“(a) Prom the city limits of Brownsville on. Palm Boulevard and fourteenth street, respectively, to Boca Chica along the general line of El Jardin Boulevard and the location for said Brownsville-Boca Chica Road as heretofore made by the County Engineer.
“(b) Prom Brownsville to Point Isabel by shortest practicable connection from Brownsville-Boca Chica Road, when completed.”

*1058 Then follows said order, as recorded in the minutes of the commissioners’ court of Cameron county, five days prior to the date of said election; and, at the conclusion of said order in which a priority in the use of said trust .funds for the purpose of constructing the said roads, the following:

“The funds hereby appropriated shall be applied to the construction of the four groups of roads above designated, in the numérica! order of the several groups, but as between roads in the same group, no order or preference in construction is intended, all roads in each group being deemed equally important, and each on a parity in all respects with all other roads in the samé group.”

The commissioners’ court also entered its order prior to said bond election, in which it was provided that the proceeds of said bond issue should be prorated among the various commissioners’ precincts in the proportion that the value of the property in said precinct stood to the total valuation of the property of Cameron county.

The case was tried with a jury, who returned a verdict, under the court’s instruction, for the defendants and against the plaintiffs and each of them against the in-terveners and each of them, as to all the issues, and judgment was entered accordingly; from 'which judgment appellants appealed.

There is filed with this cause a very full statement of facts covering some 394 pages of manuscript, but, in addition thereto, the court, as it had the right to do, filed separate findings of fact and conclusions of law well supported by the testimony. As two separate findings practically cover all the material issues of fact, we copy those as the basis of this opinion, as follows:

“I find as a fact that as soon as practicable after said Six Million Dollar Bond Issue was authorized by the legal voters of Cameron County, Texas, the Commissioners’ Court of Cameron County, Texas, caused the construction of what has been referred to in the pleadings and the evidence, as the Brownsville Boca Chica road, to be begun; and I further find as a fact that the construction of said road has progressed as rapidly as was practicable under all the circumstances, but that the construction thereof has not yet been completed and that work is now being done thereon looking to the completion thereof.
“I find as a fact that the construction of what is styled in the pleadings and the evidence as the Old Military road, extending about nine miles up the River and about nine miles down the River from Brownsville, is contemplated to be begun by the Commissioners’ Court of Cameron County, Texas, before the so called Brownsville Boca Chica ioad can be completed, its completion being impracticable, from an engineering standpoint, for some twelve to eighteen months after the foundations for said road are completed, but I further find as a fact that there will be ample funds arising from the sale of portions of said Six Million Dollar bond issue, under the control of the Commissioners’ Court with which to complete the construction of the so called Brownsville Boca Chica road, as well as the construction of the so called connection between said road and the so called Brownsville Point Isabel road, as early as said construction work on said two roads will be practicable, even after the completion of said so called Military Road, as the Commissioners’ Court contemplate constructing! all of said roads.”

We recognize the doctrine laid down in Black v. Strength, 112 Tex. 188, 246 S. W. 79, and Moore v. Coffman, 109 Tex. 93, 200 S. W. 374. We see nothing in the facts of this case that shows a disobedience of that rule laid down, which makes such an order a contract between the county and its inhabitants.

The commissioners were following the order of the court and constructing the road, and, when this suit was filed, had constructed and paved some eleven miles thereof, and the work was actually going on.

It is only in cases of very extreme and arbitrary conduct on the part of the commissioners’ court that the courts are authorized to lay hands on it and restrain it in the performance of a duty or interfere with its governmental capacity or policy. In this case the appellee has never denied the legitimate construction and validity of that contract, or ever refused to follow it, but do say that now it is impossible of performance in their judgment at the present time. The building and construction of county roads, as a matter of law, is peculiarly a province of county commissioners.

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Related

Dick v. Webb County
303 S.W.2d 385 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1957)
Sterrett v. Bell
240 S.W.2d 516 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1951)

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Bluebook (online)
10 S.W.2d 1057, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dennett-v-dancy-texapp-1928.