IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00919-COA
DENISE RAWLINGS APPELLANT
v.
RON S. RAWLINGS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BRADLEY WAYNE ESKINS BRIE DANIELLE WALLACE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN GLEN ROBERTS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/21/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.
WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Ron Rawlings has been paying alimony to his ex-wife, Denise Rawlings, since their
divorce in 2006. After Ron lost his job in 2020, he filed a complaint requesting a
modification of alimony. Following a trial, the chancellor denied Ron’s request and denied
Denise’s request for attorney’s fees. Denise appealed. Denise argues that the chancellor
erred by denying her request for attorney’s fees pursuant to a provision of the parties’ 2006
marital dissolution agreement. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Denise and Ron were divorced in 2006 in Tennessee. Their divorce decree
incorporated a marital dissolution agreement that required Ron to pay Denise alimony as follows: (a) $1,000 per month until Denise refinanced or sold the marital home and paid Ron
$3,000 toward a credit card debt; (b) then $1,200 per month until August 2008; and (c) then
$1,500 per month until Denise died, remarried, or obtained income of $45,000 per year. In
addition, section 26 of the parties’ agreement stated:
26. ENFORCEMENT. The law of the state of Tennessee shall govern this Agreement in all respects. Should litigation be necessary to enforce any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees.
¶3. At the time of the divorce, Ron earned approximately $100,000 per year. Between
2006 and 2022, Ron made all required alimony payments. Sometime after the divorce,
Denise moved to DeSoto County, Mississippi. Ron now resides in Pennsylvania.
¶4. In October 2020, Ron filed a complaint to enroll and modify the parties’ divorce
decree in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. Ron alleged that his job had been eliminated
in a corporate restructuring, that he was unemployed, and that his income was insufficient
to pay the alimony required by the parties’ divorce decree and marital dissolution agreement.1
Denise filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, which the chancellor later denied.
¶5. Ron’s complaint was tried in July 2022. During trial, Denise attempted to testify
regarding her attorney’s fees. Ron objected on the ground that Denise had not requested
attorney’s fees. The chancellor sustained Ron’s objection after confirming that Denise had
not made such a request.
¶6. Denise filed a post-trial motion to amend her answer to add a request for attorney’s
1 In April 2021, Ron found a new job paying $15 per hour, which later increased to $18 per hour.
2 fees. However, before a hearing was held on Denise’s motion, the chancellor entered an
order denying Ron’s request to modify alimony. That order further stated that “[e]ach party
shall pay their respective attorney’s fees.” Following a hearing, the chancellor denied
Denise’s motion to amend her answer. Denise filed a notice of appeal.2
ANALYSIS
¶7. Denise argues (1) that the chancellor erred by denying her request for attorney’s fees
because she is entitled to such fees under section 26 of the parties’ marital dissolution
agreement and (2) that the chancellor abused his discretion by denying her motion to amend
her answer. Because we conclude that Denise is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the
parties’ agreement,3 we need not address the latter issue.
¶8. Denise argues that she is entitled to attorney’s fees based on the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s decision in Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467 (Tenn. 2017).4 In that case, an
ex-wife filed an action against her ex-husband to enforce a provision of the parties’ marital
dissolution agreement that required the ex-husband to pay their children’s uncovered medical
expenses. Id. at 472-73. The parties’ agreement also provided, “In the event it becomes
2 Denise filed her notice of appeal after the chancellor had orally denied her motion to amend her answer but prior to the entry of the chancellor’s written order. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), her notice of appeal is treated as timely filed after entry of the final judgment. 3 The interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement presents a question of law that we review de novo. Bryant v. Bryant, 348 So. 3d 309, 313 (¶9) (Miss. 2022). 4 Denise argues that Tennessee law applies based on the choice-of-law provision of the marital dissolution agreement. Ron does not argue otherwise. In any event, we conclude that the result would be the same under either Tennessee law or Mississippi law.
3 reasonably necessary for either party to institute legal proceedings to procure the enforcement
of any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall also be entitled to a judgment
for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in prosecuting the action.” Id.
at 471-72. The ex-wife requested attorney’s fees pursuant to this provision, and the trial
court granted her a judgment against the husband for uncovered medical expenses and
attorney’s fees. Id. at 473. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed and held that the ex-wife
was also entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal. Id. at 479-80. The court stated that “parties
are contractually entitled to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees when they have an
agreement that provides the prevailing party in a litigation is entitled to such fees.” Id. at
478. The court held that the ex-wife was entitled to attorney’s fees under the parties’
agreement because she was the “prevailing party” in an action that “she instituted . . . to
procure the enforcement of” the agreement. Id. at 480.
¶9. However, this case is distinguishable from Eberbach, and Denise is not entitled to
attorney’s fees under section 26 of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Section 26
states, “Should litigation be necessary to enforce any provision of this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees.” (Emphasis added). Denise is not
entitled to fees under this provision because she was not required to bring or defend an action
“to enforce” the parties’ agreement. Ron never breached or threatened to breach any
provision of the agreement. Rather, Ron continued to make all payments required by the
agreement. This distinguishes the case from Eberbach, where the ex-husband breached his
obligation to pay his children’s uncovered medical expenses, forcing the ex-wife to institute
4 legal proceedings to enforce the parties’ agreement. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 473.
¶10. Ron did not breach the parties’ agreement by filing this action seeking a modification
of his obligation to pay alimony. A marital dissolution agreement is indeed a contract under
Tennessee law. Id. at 474; accord Bryant, 348 So. 3d at 313 (¶9) (Mississippi law).
However, once such an agreement is incorporated into a final divorce decree, “issues . . .
such as child support . . . and alimony[] lose their contractual nature and become a judgment
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00919-COA
DENISE RAWLINGS APPELLANT
v.
RON S. RAWLINGS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BRADLEY WAYNE ESKINS BRIE DANIELLE WALLACE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN GLEN ROBERTS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/21/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.
WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Ron Rawlings has been paying alimony to his ex-wife, Denise Rawlings, since their
divorce in 2006. After Ron lost his job in 2020, he filed a complaint requesting a
modification of alimony. Following a trial, the chancellor denied Ron’s request and denied
Denise’s request for attorney’s fees. Denise appealed. Denise argues that the chancellor
erred by denying her request for attorney’s fees pursuant to a provision of the parties’ 2006
marital dissolution agreement. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Denise and Ron were divorced in 2006 in Tennessee. Their divorce decree
incorporated a marital dissolution agreement that required Ron to pay Denise alimony as follows: (a) $1,000 per month until Denise refinanced or sold the marital home and paid Ron
$3,000 toward a credit card debt; (b) then $1,200 per month until August 2008; and (c) then
$1,500 per month until Denise died, remarried, or obtained income of $45,000 per year. In
addition, section 26 of the parties’ agreement stated:
26. ENFORCEMENT. The law of the state of Tennessee shall govern this Agreement in all respects. Should litigation be necessary to enforce any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees.
¶3. At the time of the divorce, Ron earned approximately $100,000 per year. Between
2006 and 2022, Ron made all required alimony payments. Sometime after the divorce,
Denise moved to DeSoto County, Mississippi. Ron now resides in Pennsylvania.
¶4. In October 2020, Ron filed a complaint to enroll and modify the parties’ divorce
decree in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. Ron alleged that his job had been eliminated
in a corporate restructuring, that he was unemployed, and that his income was insufficient
to pay the alimony required by the parties’ divorce decree and marital dissolution agreement.1
Denise filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, which the chancellor later denied.
¶5. Ron’s complaint was tried in July 2022. During trial, Denise attempted to testify
regarding her attorney’s fees. Ron objected on the ground that Denise had not requested
attorney’s fees. The chancellor sustained Ron’s objection after confirming that Denise had
not made such a request.
¶6. Denise filed a post-trial motion to amend her answer to add a request for attorney’s
1 In April 2021, Ron found a new job paying $15 per hour, which later increased to $18 per hour.
2 fees. However, before a hearing was held on Denise’s motion, the chancellor entered an
order denying Ron’s request to modify alimony. That order further stated that “[e]ach party
shall pay their respective attorney’s fees.” Following a hearing, the chancellor denied
Denise’s motion to amend her answer. Denise filed a notice of appeal.2
ANALYSIS
¶7. Denise argues (1) that the chancellor erred by denying her request for attorney’s fees
because she is entitled to such fees under section 26 of the parties’ marital dissolution
agreement and (2) that the chancellor abused his discretion by denying her motion to amend
her answer. Because we conclude that Denise is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the
parties’ agreement,3 we need not address the latter issue.
¶8. Denise argues that she is entitled to attorney’s fees based on the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s decision in Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467 (Tenn. 2017).4 In that case, an
ex-wife filed an action against her ex-husband to enforce a provision of the parties’ marital
dissolution agreement that required the ex-husband to pay their children’s uncovered medical
expenses. Id. at 472-73. The parties’ agreement also provided, “In the event it becomes
2 Denise filed her notice of appeal after the chancellor had orally denied her motion to amend her answer but prior to the entry of the chancellor’s written order. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), her notice of appeal is treated as timely filed after entry of the final judgment. 3 The interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement presents a question of law that we review de novo. Bryant v. Bryant, 348 So. 3d 309, 313 (¶9) (Miss. 2022). 4 Denise argues that Tennessee law applies based on the choice-of-law provision of the marital dissolution agreement. Ron does not argue otherwise. In any event, we conclude that the result would be the same under either Tennessee law or Mississippi law.
3 reasonably necessary for either party to institute legal proceedings to procure the enforcement
of any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall also be entitled to a judgment
for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in prosecuting the action.” Id.
at 471-72. The ex-wife requested attorney’s fees pursuant to this provision, and the trial
court granted her a judgment against the husband for uncovered medical expenses and
attorney’s fees. Id. at 473. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed and held that the ex-wife
was also entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal. Id. at 479-80. The court stated that “parties
are contractually entitled to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees when they have an
agreement that provides the prevailing party in a litigation is entitled to such fees.” Id. at
478. The court held that the ex-wife was entitled to attorney’s fees under the parties’
agreement because she was the “prevailing party” in an action that “she instituted . . . to
procure the enforcement of” the agreement. Id. at 480.
¶9. However, this case is distinguishable from Eberbach, and Denise is not entitled to
attorney’s fees under section 26 of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Section 26
states, “Should litigation be necessary to enforce any provision of this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees.” (Emphasis added). Denise is not
entitled to fees under this provision because she was not required to bring or defend an action
“to enforce” the parties’ agreement. Ron never breached or threatened to breach any
provision of the agreement. Rather, Ron continued to make all payments required by the
agreement. This distinguishes the case from Eberbach, where the ex-husband breached his
obligation to pay his children’s uncovered medical expenses, forcing the ex-wife to institute
4 legal proceedings to enforce the parties’ agreement. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 473.
¶10. Ron did not breach the parties’ agreement by filing this action seeking a modification
of his obligation to pay alimony. A marital dissolution agreement is indeed a contract under
Tennessee law. Id. at 474; accord Bryant, 348 So. 3d at 313 (¶9) (Mississippi law).
However, once such an agreement is incorporated into a final divorce decree, “issues . . .
such as child support . . . and alimony[] lose their contractual nature and become a judgment
of the court.” Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 474. “The trial court retains the power and
discretion to modify terms contained in [a marital dissolution agreement] relating to
[alimony] upon sufficient changes in the parties’ factual circumstances.” Id.; accord
Penland v. Penland, 521 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tenn. 1975).5 Based on Ron’s job loss and
reduction in income, he had a right to return to court and request a modification of his
obligation to pay alimony. Ron’s request was not a breach of the agreement and did not
require Denise to take any action “to enforce” the agreement. Accordingly, Denise was not
entitled to attorney’s fees under the parties’ agreement, and the chancellor did not err by
denying Denise’s request for attorney’s fees.
¶11. AFFIRMED.
5 See also McDonald v. McDonald, 683 So. 2d 929, 931 (Miss. 1996) (“The rule of law providing for the modification of periodic alimony awards arises from the nature of alimony itself, which is based upon the inherently changing financial ability of the husband to support his wife in the manner to which she is accustomed. As a result, the Chancellors of this state have the authority to modify periodic alimony awards upon a finding of a substantial change in circumstances, regardless of any intent expressed by the parties to the contrary.”); Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1990) (holding that “parties may not by contract, court-approved or otherwise, deprive the court of authority to hear a plea for modification of periodic alimony”).
5 BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.