Denise M. Beeney v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05411
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 DENISE M. BEENEY, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-5411-KKE 10 v. ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. 15 Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in assessing her subjective 16 testimony; in assessing the medical opinion of Richard Henegan, M.D.; and in finding that she 17 could perform jobs requiring frequent reaching. Dkt. No. 12 at 1. As discussed below, the Court 18 AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES the case with prejudice. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff was born in 1967, has two years of college education, and has worked as an 21 administrative assistant and preschool teacher. Dkt. Nos. 7–8 (hereinafter Administrative Record 22 (“AR”)) at 221. Plaintiff was last gainfully employed in 2020. Id. 23 1 In January 2022, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of May 20, 2020, with 2 a date last insured of December 31, 2025. AR at 188–96. Plaintiff’s application was denied 3 initially and on reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing. Id. at 94–97, 106–11, 113–14. 4 After the ALJ conducted a hearing in February 2024 (id. at 38–66), the ALJ issued a decision

5 finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at 17–31. 6 III. THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION 7 Utilizing the five-step disability evaluation process,1 the ALJ found:

8 Step one: Plaintiff worked since her alleged disability onset date, but this work did not amount to substantial gainful activity. 9 Step two: Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; 10 degenerative joint disease and tendinopathy of bilateral shoulders; osteoarthritis; obesity; migraine headaches; and foot and ankle tendinitis. 11 Step three: These impairments do not meet or equal the requirements of a listed 12 impairment.2

13 Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”): Plaintiff can perform light work with additional limitations: she can stand and walk two hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six 14 hours in an eight-hour workday. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop, and crouch, 15 but only occasionally kneel and crawl. She can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally. She can tolerate occasional exposure to workplace vibration, and to workplace hazards 16 such as unprotected heights and exposed moving machinery.

17 Step four: Plaintiff can perform past relevant work.

18 AR at 17–31. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 19 decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR at 1–6. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of 20 the Commissioner to this Court. Dkt. No. 4. 21 22

23 1 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

2 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 1 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 3 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial 4 evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

5 As a general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 6 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 7 (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to determine whether the error 8 alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 9 “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such 10 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 11 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 12 Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 13 testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 14 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither

15 reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 16 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 17 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. at 954. 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 23 1 V. DISCUSSION 2 A. The ALJ Did Not Harmfully Err in Discounting Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony. 3 After summarizing Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the ALJ explained that he found 4 Plaintiff’s testimony not entirely consistent with the remainder of the record because Plaintiff’s

5 symptoms improved with treatment, Plaintiff’s symptoms were less limiting than she alleged, 6 Plaintiff’s daily activities were “fairly robust,” and Plaintiff was able to perform work-related 7 activities even after her alleged onset of disability. AR at 22–28. Plaintiff alleges that these 8 reasons are not clear and convincing, as required in the Ninth Circuit. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 9 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022). 10 First, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ failed to explain why her improvement with 11 treatment is inconsistent with her testimony, thereby undermining its veracity. Dkt. No. 12 at 10. 12 Indeed, the ALJ’s findings in this section describe Plaintiff’s recovery from multiple surgeries 13 since her alleged onset date, as well as Plaintiff’s report that physical therapy and injections were 14 preventing her shoulder condition from worsening. AR at 26–27. This line of reasoning does not

15 amount to a clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s alleged limitations, however. 16 Next, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ cites inapposite findings in concluding that the objective 17 medical record demonstrates that she retains greater functionality than alleged. The Court again 18 agrees with Plaintiff. The ALJ cited Plaintiff’s alert status after bariatric surgery; supple neck; 19 normal cardiovascular and pulmonary systems; lack of extremity abnormalities or focal deficits; 20 and normal mood and affect. AR at 27. These findings do not directly pertain to Plaintiff’s alleged 21 limitations, and therefore are not inconsistent with the level of functionality she described. 22 Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that her activities of daily living are 23 inconsistent with her allegations of disability. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s activities were “fairly 1 robust.” AR at 27–28. The ALJ also emphasized that Plaintiff traveled to Arizona twice to visit 2 her daughter since her alleged onset date, helping her move to Washington on one of those 3 occasions. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s ability to travel to Arizona twice since her alleged 4 disability onset—once to help her daughter move—is reasonably inconsistent with the significant

5 sitting and lifting limitations she described at the hearing. 6 Moreover, the ALJ went on to find that Plaintiff’s short-term jobs since her alleged onset 7 date of disability undermined her allegations of an inability to perform work-related activities. AR 8 at 28. Plaintiff emphasizes that this work ultimately proved too strenuous for her (Dkt. No. 12 at 9 14), and the ALJ did not disagree with this proposition. Compare AR at 21 (ALJ’s RFC 10 assessment) with id. at 282 (Plaintiff’s description of the work). Nonetheless, the ALJ did not err 11 in finding that Plaintiff’s work activity—looking for jobs, interviewing for jobs, and going to 12 work—undermined her allegation of an inability to work. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 13 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ may consider any work activity, including part-time work, in 14 determining whether a claimant is disabled[.]”).

15 Thus, although some of the ALJ’s lines of reasoning are not clear and convincing, the ALJ 16 provided independent lines of reasoning that do meet this standard. Therefore, the Court finds no 17 harmful legal error in the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of 18 Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that even where some of an 19 ALJ’s reasons to discount a claimant’s testimony are invalid, so long as the remaining reasons 20 supporting the ALJ’s determination remain valid and are not negated by the error, the error is 21 harmless). 22 23 1 B. The ALJ Did Not Harmfully Err in Finding Dr. Henegan’s Opinion Unpersuasive. 2 Dr. Henegan examined Plaintiff in May 2022 and opined, in relevant part, that she was 3 limited to standing/walking four hours in an eight-hour workday, lifting/carrying 20 pounds 4 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and could never reach. AR at 980–85. The ALJ found Dr.

5 Henegan’s testimony unpersuasive because the record showed that Plaintiff was more limited than 6 Dr. Henegan indicated as to standing/walking, and because Dr. Henegan’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s 7 inability to reach was unsupported by his examination findings, which showed normal sensation 8 and reflexes, and normal range of motion as to the elbow, wrist, thumb/fingers, hips, knees, and 9 ankles. Id. at 29. The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Henegan observed some reduced range of 10 motion in Plaintiff’s shoulders. However, the ALJ found that the many normal findings—as well 11 as Plaintiff’s ability to work part-time since her alleged onset date—are inconsistent with an 12 opinion that Plaintiff could never reach. Id. 13 Under regulations applicable to this case, the ALJ is required to articulate the 14 persuasiveness of each medical opinion, specifically with respect to whether the opinions are

15 supported and consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)–(c). An ALJ’s consistency 16 and supportability findings must be supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 17 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 18 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Henegan’s reaching limitation to be 19 unsupported by examination findings, and that the ALJ “ignored” findings regarding Plaintiff’s 20 limited range of motion in her neck, back, and shoulders. Dkt. No. 12 at 6. But the ALJ did not 21 ignore those findings: he explicitly discussed them in his summary of Dr. Henegan’s findings. See 22 AR at 28. The ALJ also acknowledged Plaintiff’s reduced range of shoulder motion in assessing 23 the supportability of Dr. Henegan’s opinion. See id. at 29. That Plaintiff would weigh the evidence 1 differently does not establish error in the ALJ’s conclusion that the examination findings did not 2 support “extreme” postural limitations, such as a complete inability to reach. See Molina, 674 3 F.3d at 1111 (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [this 4 Court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from

5 the record.”). Because the ALJ’s supportability finding is supported by substantial evidence, the 6 Court finds that this line of reasoning supports the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Henegan’s opinion. 7 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s consistency finding, arguing that the ALJ unreasonably 8 found, in conclusory fashion, that a short period of part-time work was inconsistent with Dr. 9 Henegan’s reaching opinion. Dkt. No. 12 at 7. But Plaintiff herself described this job as requiring 10 her to reach for 4–8 hours per day (AR at 282), and therefore the record supports the ALJ’s finding 11 of inconsistency between the record and Dr. Henegan’s opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755 12 (“As a reviewing court, we are not deprived of our faculties for drawing specific and legitimate 13 inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.”). Because the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s past work vis 14 a vis Dr. Henegan’s reaching opinion is supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no

15 harmful error in this portion of the ALJ’s decision. 16 C. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Four. 17 Plaintiffs bear the burden at step four of demonstrating that they can no longer perform 18 their past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 404.1520(f); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 19 20, 25 (2003). In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled at step four because she 20 could perform her past work as a billing clerk, a procurement clerk, and a service clerk. AR at 30. 21 The ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) that a person with Plaintiff’s RFC 22 would be able to perform these jobs. Id. 23 1 Here, Plaintiff accurately asserts that according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 2 (“DOT”), all three of the step-four jobs require frequent reaching, yet the ALJ had found that 3 Plaintiff could perform only occasional overhead reaching bilaterally. See AR at 21. Indeed, the 4 VE testified that the DOT does not distinguish between reaching generally and reaching in specific

5 directions, and that the VE relied on his own education and training to support his testimony that 6 a person with a limitation to occasional overhead reaching bilaterally could nonetheless perform 7 the step-four jobs.3 Id. at 63. It is Plaintiff’s position that the ALJ was required to explicitly 8 discuss the conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT and to explain why he credited the 9 VE over the DOT. Dkt. No. 12 at 4. 10 Plaintiff is correct that “an ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the DOT, 11 but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.” Johnson v. 12 Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995). “Evidence sufficient to permit such a deviation 13 may be either specific findings of fact regarding the claimant’s residual functionality, or inferences 14 drawn from the context of the expert’s testimony.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 794

15 (9th Cir. 1997). 16 But here, contrary to Plaintiff’s briefing, the record contains an explanation for the 17 discrepancy between the DOT and the VE’s testimony. The VE explained that although the DOT 18 defines the reaching requirements of jobs, it does not distinguish between reaching in different 19 directions. AR at 63. Thus, when opining that someone with a restriction to occasional overhead 20 reaching could nonetheless perform a job requiring frequent reaching, the VE explained that he 21 relied on his education and training to inform his understanding of the types of reaching required 22 by these jobs. Id. Plaintiff cites no authority holding that an ALJ cannot rely on VE testimony as 23 3 The VE’s testimony is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s observation that “not every job that involves reaching requires the ability to reach overhead.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 support for a step-four finding under these circumstances, and the Court is aware of authority 2 holding the opposite. See, e.g., Joseph N. v. Kijakazi, No.: 3:21-cv-01608-AHG, 2023 WL 3 5635826, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2023) (finding no error in the ALJ’s reliance on VE testimony 4 that a job defined to require frequent reaching could nonetheless be performed by a person limited

5 to occasional overhead reaching); M.d.H. v. Berryhill, No. 6:17-cv-0049-SI, 2018 WL 3970504, 6 at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2018) (same). 7 VI. CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and this case 9 is DISMISSED with prejudice. 10 Dated this 3rd day of December, 2025. 11 12 A 13 Kymberly K. Evanson 14 United States District Judge

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