Dengel v. Brown
This text of 1 App. D.C. 423 (Dengel v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of ejectment brought against the defendant by the children, answering to the description of heirs at law, of Mary Ann Dengel, deceased, to recover part of lot No. 13, in square 400, in the city of Washington. The case comes before the court on an agreed statement of facts, and [425]*425the only questions for decision are, first, as to the true construction of a deed of Sarah Moore to Joseph F. Hodgson, dated the nth day of March, 1868;1 and, second, as to the true construction of the will of said Sarah Moore, dated the 3d of April, 1868, and admitted to probate on the 16th of October, 1869.2
[427]*4271. As to the construction of the deed. That instrument was made by Mrs. Moore to Hodgson, as trustee, for the sole and separate use of Mary Ann Dengel, wife of Valentine Dengel. The limitation of the legal estate was to the grantee, “his heirs and assigns forever”; but there was no limitation of the trust estate, or declaration of the trust, other than in the description of the trustee, and the direction that he, and his heirs and assigns, should hold the property conveyed for the sole and separate use of Mary Ann Dengel, “ free from the control or liability of her present or any future husband.” There is nothing said as to what should become of the property after the death of Mary Ann Dengel. Her children are not made beneficiaries, nor is there any limitation of the trust estate to her heirs; and, in the absence of such limitation, it would seem to be clear that she took but a life interest in the trust estate; and that upon her death the legal estate reverted to the heirs or devisees of Mrs. Moore.
There is a distinction made in the cases in respect to trusts by implication, between the construction of deeds and the construction of devises. In respect to devises, it has been held in several cases, and would seem to be established, that if an estate be devised to A and his heirs, in trust for B, without other limitations, in such case B will take an equitable fee; for it is supposed, on such a devise, to be the intention that B shall take an equitable estate as large as the legal estate that passed to A and his heirs. In other words, that the estate of the cestui que trust should be commensurate with the legal estate devised to the trustee. In support of this rule of construction, as applied to devises, the authorities would seem to be clear. Moore v. Cleghorn, 10 Beav., 423 ; Doe v. Cafe, 7 Exch., 675; 1 Perry on Trusts, Sec. 357. But this rule of construction does not apply in the case of deeds. In this latter case, if an estate be conveyed by deed to A and his heirs, in trust for a cestui que trust named without limitation to heirs, or without words of equivalent import, the cestui que trust takes but a life estate, and the fee [428]*428in the legal estate results or reverts to the grantor or his heirs. Holliday v. Overton, 15 Beav., 480; Doe v. Cafe, 7 Exch., 675; 1 Perry on Trusts, Sec. 357, and cases cited. See, also, the case of Tatham v. Vernon, 29 Beav., 604.
Therefore, on the construction of this deed, we are of opinion that Mrs. Mary Ann Dengel took but an equitable life estate in the property conveyed to Hodgson and his heirs; and that the estate given to the trustee, Hodgson, and his heirs was restricted to the life of Mrs. Mary Ann Dengel, upon the principle that, unless a different intention clearly appears, the trustee, though the estate be conveyed to him and his heirs, takes that quantity of estate only which the purposes of the trust require. Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S., 782. Mary Ann Dengel died in 1887, and her husband in 1881.
2. Then, as to the construction of the will of Mrs. Moore. By this will the testatrix gave and devised to Mary Ann Dengel the part of lot No. 13, in square 400 (the same conveyed and described in the deed to Hodgson, trustee), free and clear of and from all control of her then husband, or any other husband she might have; “the said premises at her decease to descend to her lawfod heirs; and should she die without legal issue, then, and in that case, the aforesaid premises shall revert to my estate, to be disposed of as best my executors may think proper, for the carrying out my desire hereinbefore expressed, or hereinafter named.” There is nothing in the after part of the will that in any way reflects upon the construction of the foregoing clause.
But for the limitation over, upon the dying of Mary Ann Dengel “ without legal issue,” the preceding devise to Mary Ann Dengel would be plainly a devise in fee simple. The devise to her, and at her decease “ the said premises to descend to her lawful heirs,” is clearly within the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 1 Co., 94. This has been so ruled in many cases. Steiner v. Kolb, 57 Penn. St., 123 ; Quillman v. Custer, 57 Penn. St., 125 ; McCray v. Lipp, 35 Ind., 116; Andrews v. Spurlin, 35 Ind., 262 ; Brown v. Lawrence, 3 Cush., [429]*429390; Brown v. Lyon, 6 N. Y., 419; and see 3 Jarm. on Wills, 100 to 107, and cases collected in note. But, in what follows, it appears that the word “ heirs ” was intended to be restricted to mean heirs of the body, or issue of the body; and, therefore, instead of a fee simple, an estate in fee tail general, according to the common law, was devised. Jarm. on Wills, 94; Dallam v. Dallam, 7 H. & J., 220; Watkins v. Sears, 3 Gill, 492. And this estate tail general, by operation of the act of Maryland of 1786, Ch. 45, to direct! descents, and which is in force in this District, is converted into a fee simple estate; and, consequently, Mary Ann Den-gel took by the devise to her an estate in fee simple. Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G., 111, 127; Hoxton v. Archer, 3 G. & J., 212.
Such being the title of Mary Ann Dengel, she, together with the trustee, Hodgson, under the déed of trust before referred to, and after the death of Mrs. Moore, conveyed the property, deeded and devised as aforesaid, to trustees to secure certain debts due by Mary Ann Dengel, and for the satisfaction of which the property was sold by such trustees; and the defendant holds the title that was so sold and conveyed by the trustees. Her title is valid as against the plaintiffs; and the judgment of the court below, rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, must be reversed with costs, and judgment rendered on the statement of facts for the defendant.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendant.
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1 App. D.C. 423, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 3055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dengel-v-brown-cadc-1893.