Denetta Kaye Cornett v. Jack Wayne Cornett

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0028
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: DECEMBER 12, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0028-MR

DENETTA KAYE CORNETT APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MARCUS L. VANOVER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-01062

JACK WAYNE CORNETT APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Denetta Cornett appeals the Pulaski Family Court’s ruling that

her antenuptial agreement with Jack Cornett is not unconscionable. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The family court conducted a hearing to determine the enforceability

of the parties’ antenuptial agreement. The video of that hearing was not made a

part of the certified record. However, Denetta in her primary and reply briefs and

Jack in his responsive brief carefully cite and quote the video record with little or no contradiction either of the other party or of the family court’s factual findings.

Our grasp of the facts is based on those uncontradicted references, as follows.

Jack was previously married and divorced. The main dispute in that

case was over Jack’s interest in a family-owned business, Cornett Machine Shop,

Inc. Ultimately, that asset was ruled a gift from Jack’s parents and therefore

nonmarital property. The contest over that nonmarital asset was sufficiently

vexatious that Jack vowed he would never again marry before protecting it with an

antenuptial agreement to avoid waging the same legal battle again.

After dating a while, Denetta moved into Jack’s home and Jack

described for her the property issue with his prior spouse. He told Denetta that,

should their relationship lead to marriage, he would expect an antenuptial

agreement. After living together about a year, they did marry in 1995.

About a week before the wedding, Denetta was told the antenuptial

agreement was prepared or being prepared. Three days before the wedding she

met with attorney Mark Knight who drafted the agreement. She then executed it.

Jack filed for divorce in 2019. Prior to the final hearing, the family

court held a separate hearing to determine the antenuptial agreement’s validity,

taking testimony from the parties and from attorney Mark Knight.

The family court rendered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an

order ruling the antenuptial agreement was enforceable. The November 2023

-2- decree of dissolution incorporated that interlocutory order. Denetta appeals the

decree only to the extent it found the antenuptial agreement enforceable. We will

address specific findings of facts and conclusions of law in our analysis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A family court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly

erroneous. CR1 52.01; Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. App. 2009).

“Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence”

which, “when taken alone or in the light of all the evidence, has sufficient

probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.”

Ehret v. Ehret, 601 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Ky. App. 2020) (citation omitted).

We review a family court’s legal conclusions de novo. Carroll v.

Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001).

ANALYSIS

Denetta presents two arguments: (1) Jack failed to make a “full

disclosure” of material facts before Denetta executed the antenuptial agreement;

and (2) a substantial change in circumstances makes the agreement’s enforcement

unconscionable even presuming full disclosure. Neither argument persuades us.

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-3- I. Trial court’s finding “that [Denetta] was fully apprised of [Jack’s] assets at the time of the signing of the [antenuptial] agreement” is supported by substantial evidence.

The factual question the trial court was required to answer is, “Was

the agreement obtained through . . . non-disclosure of material facts?” Gentry v.

Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 936 (Ky. 1990). “The first limitation upon parties to an

antenuptial agreement is the requirement of full disclosure . . . [which means] it

should appear [to the trial court] that the agreement was free of any material

omission or misrepresentation.” Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945

(Ky. 1990).

We first address Denetta’s very narrow argument that “[t]he trial court

incorrectly substitutes the term ‘fully apprised’ for the standard of full and

complete disclosure, and for that reason alone, the trial court should be reversed.”

(Appellant’s Br. 8.) We are not persuaded by this semantic argument. The

standard has not taken on a specialized legal definition beyond the general

explanation in Edwardson, supra. We find no legally meaningful distinction

between the word “disclose” or “apprise,” nor between those words and other

synonyms such as divulge, reveal, inform, notify, tell, advise, or enlighten.

“The law is clear that the burden of proof regarding the question of

full disclosure of assets at the time of the agreement rests on the party relying on

the agreement.” King v. King, 638 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Ky. App. 2021) (citations

-4- omitted). Citing Luck v. Luck, 711 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. App. 1986), Denetta argues

that, to satisfy that burden, “a prenuptial agreement must include an accurate

listing of the assets it purports to cover.” (Appellant’s Br. 6.) Again, we disagree.

Luck was decided nearly a decade before our Supreme Court decided

“the burden of proof on the issue of full disclosure of assets at the time the

agreement was signed in a prenuptial contract rests on the party relying on such

agreement.” Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1995). Although Luck did not

expressly say who should bear the burden on the issue of full disclosure, the trial

court seems to have placed it on the appellee wife who wanted the agreement

declared void. “The appellee testified that . . . she was not aware of the extent of

[her deceased husband’s] assets.” Luck, 711 S.W.2d at 863. That was the only

affirmative evidence presented. The appellant estate of the deceased husband

presented nothing but the agreement itself “which fail[ed] to set out any specific

assets of either party.” Id. No other evidence rebutted the wife’s testimony.

Although, as we now know from Lawson, supra, the burden of proof was

erroneously placed on the appellee wife, what carried the day for her was not the

absence of a “specific listing of assets.” Rather, it was the appellee wife’s sworn

testimony, the only substantial evidence on this point in the record. If the appellant

presented evidence to the contrary, it is likely our opinion would have set it forth,

but it did not. “Consequently,” this Court held, “the agreement must fail.” Id.

-5- There is no single method for convincing the trial court that the parties

made full disclosure of assets and values. We will affirm the family court’s

factfinding of full disclosure if the party seeking to enforce the agreement presents

substantial evidence eliminating any reasonable presumption that the agreement

was the product of “non-disclosure of material facts[.]” Gentry, 798 S.W.2d at

936. Meeting that standard will save the trial court’s finding from a claim on

appeal that it is clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. Here is the substantial evidence that

convinced the family court of full disclosure in this case.

The court heard Denetta testify that Mark Knight went over the terms

of the agreement with her and she acknowledged reading at least some of it before

signing it; she also testified she signed the agreement voluntarily and no one lied to

her or forced her to sign it. (Appellee’s Br. 7 (citing Video Record (VR) 1/11/2023

3:07:05–3:10:30).) The court specifically noted her acknowledgment that “she was

not forced or coerced into signing the agreement.” (Transcript of Record (TR) 84.)

Of course, “one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents, and . . . if

he has an opportunity to read the contract which he signs he is bound by its

provisions . . . .” Clark v. Brewer, 329 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Ky. 1959). The

agreement’s provisions that bind Denetta say:

1. Prior to their marriage, Jack and Denetta each “accumulated a separate estate and acquainted the other with the nature, extent, and full value thereof . . . .”;

-6- 2. Each desired to “retain[] his or her respective properties as separate and distinct estates . . . .”;

3. “Property the title to which is in the name of one of the parties shall be that party’s separate property. Property, the title to which is in the name of both parties, shall be joint property.”

4. “Any appreciation of, improvements to, or income earned by separate property shall be separate property and belong to the owner of the property which produced it.”

5. “In the event the parties divorce, each party agrees that all separate property shall be deemed nonmarital property, as defined by KRS Chapter 403, and neither party shall assert any claim to the other’s property.”

6. “In the event the parties divorce[,] each hereby waives any right he or she may have to receive maintenance, support or alimony payments from the other, regardless of the length of the marriage.”

7. “Each party has made to the other a full, candid, and truthful disclosure of his or her property interest, both real and personal, and the estimated value thereof.”

8. “Second party [Denetta] acknowledges that: (1) She is fully acquainted with the business and resources of [first party [Jack]; (2) She understands that [Jack] has separate property interests which he wishes to segregate and maintain as his separate property; (3) [Jack] has answered all of the questions [Denetta] has asked about [Jack’s] income, assets, and property; . . . (5) [Denetta] has had the opportunity at all times to obtain and receive the advice of counsel of her own choosing . . . .”

(TR 67-70, 73-75.) The agreement thus memorializes Denetta’s belief at the time

she executed it that Jack fully disclosed to her every necessary bit of knowledge

about Cornett Machine Shop. She has identified nothing she knows about it now

that she did not know about it then.

-7- The parties knew each other a year and a half and lived together for a

year before marrying. Denetta re-affirmed in testimony she knew Jack owned a

part interest in Cornett Machine Shop before she signed the agreement.

(Appellee’s Br. 7 (citing VR 1/11/2023 3:11:00–3:11:40).) See Appellant’s Br. 9

(“Denetta indicated she was aware of assets”).

Jack testified his ownership interest in the machine shop was a

contentious issue in his first divorce. Importantly, the trial court that adjudicated

his prior divorce determined his interest in Cornett Machine Shop was nonmarital

property, a gift from his parents long before he married Denetta. (Id. (citing VR

1/11/2023 1:55:30-1:56:30).) He also testified that the value of his interest in the

machine shop was less than when the parties married. Denetta presented no

evidence to the contrary.

Unlike the wife’s testimony in Luck that she was not aware of the

extent of her husband’s assets when they married, 711 S.W.2d at 863, Denetta

twice acknowledged being “acquainted . . . with the nature, extent, and full value”

of Jack’s assets when they married. (TR 67). Like the trial court in Lawson, this

trial court “specifically found that the wife was aware of the husband’s financial

conditions at the time of the marriage” based on testimonial evidence. 896 S.W.2d

at 2. And, as in Lawson, “Here the trial judge correctly found as a matter of fact

that the required disclosure was complete.” Id. at 2-3.

-8- Furthermore, as Jack persuasively argues, this family court, like the

trial court in Edwardson, took into account the effect of “the divorce decree

dissolving [the husband’s] prior marriage[,]” 798 S.W.2d at 942, in which Jack’s

interest in Cornett Machine Shop, Inc., was adjudicated nonmarital property. The

family court reaffirmed and continued that status for the duration and dissolution

of Jack’s second marriage. (TR 140 (Jack “is awarded the interest in Cornett

Machine Shop, Inc. as his nonmarital property.”).)

We agree with Jack that the antenuptial agreement did not affect the

nonmarital status of that property. The agreement would have denied Denetta a

distribution of any contribution she might have made to an increase in that

nonmarital property’s value during the marriage. However, Denetta did not testify

to any value she added, and Jack testified the asset decreased in value; therefore,

the agreement had no real effect on the family court’s distribution of that asset.

We conclude the family court’s finding of full disclosure was not

clearly erroneous. The agreement was not unconscionable when executed.

II. Enforcement of the antenuptial agreement is not unconscionable.

An antenuptial agreement is not unconscionable if “the circumstances

of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the

contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its

enforcement to work an injustice.” Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. App.

-9- 2001). Denetta bore the burden of convincing the family court that such

circumstances did go beyond what the antenuptial agreement contemplated.

To carry that burden, Denetta testified she “was involved in a horrific

car wreck during the dissolution of marriage process”—after the parties separated

but before the decree’s entry—and “has a traumatic brain injury.” (Appellant’s Br.

10.) She argues, “It could not be contemplated by the parties at the time they

entered into the agreement of the traumatic injury that would befall [her] or the

medical bills that she would face.” (Appellant’s Br. 11.)

Denetta alleges the family court did not factor in this unanticipated

tragedy and “erred in that it only considered the parties’ financial condition was

not substantially different from that of 1995.” (Appellant’s Br. 10.) She does not

challenge this finding or Jack’s testimony that while his situation “probably

improved somewhat overall” owing to some nonmarital inheritances, these were

offset by the decrease in value of his interest in Cornett Machine Shop, Inc.

(Appellee’s Br. 6.)

We disagree with Denetta’s contention the family court failed to

consider further matters. Based on the parties’ testimony regarding the sale of the

marital home and the expectation that each party would receive $125,000 to

$150,000 from the sale, the court found Denetta was “likely to receive a substantial

sum of money from the sale of the parties’ home. She might also receive money as

-10- a result of her pending lawsuit” for personal injury related to the accident. (R. 84.)

Based on all these findings, the family court concluded: “No facts have arisen

during the marriage which would cause the agreement to become unconscionable.”

(R. 85.)

“[T]he fairness of [ante]nuptial agreements must be considered on a

case-by-case basis.” Blue, 60 S.W.3d at 589. And family courts “retain broad

discretion to review [ante]nuptial agreements[.]” Id. at 590. The antenuptial

agreement goes so far as to contemplate the parties’ deaths, (R. 70), leaving it

unclear as to how accidents and injuries were beyond the parties’ contemplation.

We know of no rule that accidents and resultant injuries and medical debt are

necessarily beyond the contemplation of antenuptial agreements and Denetta cites

no authority to enlighten us.

Applied here, Blue does not compel a family court to conclude that

enforcement of an antenuptial agreement will “work an injustice” in every instance

involving such circumstances as this case presents. Id. The burden of

demonstrating that injustice was Denetta’s as “[t]he opponent of the agreement.”

Id. at 589. Denetta fails to develop the injustice argument, presenting only general

reference to medical debt and physical limitations with no evidence these will or

will not be offset as compensatory damages in a settlement or civil judgment, or

that she will or will not be made whole in the end.

-11- We discern no abuse of the family court’s broad discretion in its

determination that the antenuptial agreement is not unconscionable and is

enforceable.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Pulaski Circuit Court, Family Division’s

November 30, 2023 Decree of Dissolution of Marriage is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jason Bowman Joseph Venters Louisville, Kentucky Somerset, Kentucky

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