Denais v. Secretary of Health & Human Services

820 F. Supp. 278, 1993 WL 139377
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 22, 1993
DocketCiv. A. No. 91-2007
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 820 F. Supp. 278 (Denais v. Secretary of Health & Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Denais v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 820 F. Supp. 278, 1993 WL 139377 (W.D. La. 1993).

Opinion

JUDGMENT

HAIK, District Judge.

This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mildred E. Methvin for her Report and Recommendation. After an independent review of the record in this case, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate’judge is correct and this Court adopts the conclusions of the magistrate judge.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted and that De-nais be awarded appropriate benefits consistent with an onset date of December 9, 1988, the date Dr. Marler diagnosed sarcoidosis and concluded that Denais was disabled due to pulmonary insufficiency.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

METHVIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This social security appeal was referred to me for the purpose of review, report and [279]*279recommendation pursuant to this court’s standing order of December 9, 1991.

BACKGROUND

Gloria Denais was born on June 16, 1937, has a tenth grade education, and has worked in the past as a cashier and restaurant manager (Tr. 285; 66; 174). On October 21, 1987, Denais applied for supplemental security income and on November 4, 1987, she applied for disability insurance benefits alleging disability since October 23, 1987 due to lung disease (Tr. 126-135; 122-125).

An administrative hearing was held on July 28, 1988 and on November 28, 1988, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an opinion denying benefits (Tr. 44-60; 278-284). Denais did not appeal.

On January 25, 1989, Denais filed her current application for disability insurance benefits claiming disability since October 23, 1987 (Tr. 285-287). An administrative hearing was held on December 28, 1989 (Tr. 61-93). Following the hearing, the ALJ submitted written interrogatories to a vocational expert. Denais’ attorney requested the opportunity to cross-examine the vocational expert. On July 19, 1990, a supplemental hearing was held and on September 28, 1990, the ALJ issued an opinion denying benefits (Tr. 94-119; 17-23). On July 17, 1991, the Appeals Council denied Denais’ request for review making the findings of the ALJ the final decision of the Secretary from which Denais appeals (Tr. 5-6).

The ALJ found as follows: the medical evidence establishes that Denais has severe sarcoidosis and hypertension, but she does not have an Appendix 1 impairment; Denais’ subjective complaints of pain and other occupational impediments of such severity as to limit Denais’ work ability to only sedentary work are medically supported and considered credible; Denais has the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements of work except for working at heights and around moving machinery, chemicals, dust and fumes; Denais is unable to perform her past relevant work; Denais’ residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work is reduced by the aforementioned environmental restrictions; if Denais had the capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work, then Table No. 1 of Appendix 2 would direct a conclusion that Denais is not disabled; if Denais’ ability to perform the full range of sedentary work was significantly compromised, then § 201.00(h) of Appendix 2 indicates that a finding of disabled would be, appropriate; although Denais’ exer-tional limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of sedentary work, using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework for decision making, there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy and in the region in which Denais lives which Denais can perform, such as food checker, food tabulator, medical voucher clerk, appointment clerk, circulation clerk, and telephone answering service worker; Denais therefore is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Tr. 21-23).

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether there is substantial evidence to uphold the finding that Denais is not disabled.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court’s review “is limited to a determination that the Secretary’s decision was supported by substantial evidence existing in the record as a whole and that no errors of law were made.” Neal v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir.1987); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

* * * However, we may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary, even if the evidence preponderates against the Secretary’s decision ...

Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.1988). See also Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1169 (5th Cir.1986); Neal, supra, 829 F.2d 528 at 530. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is:

... such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. • It must do more than create a suspicion- of the existence of [280]*280the fact to be established, but “no substantial evidence” will be found only where there is a “conspicuous absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.”

Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Res Judicata

The last denial of Denais’ applications before the current application was on November 28, 1988 (Tr. 278-284). Denais contends that her previous applications should be reopened.

The ALJ in this case considered evidence only pertaining to Denais’ current application. Generally, the ALJ’s decision not to reopen the prior determination is not reviewable by the courts. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Federal courts do, however, have subject matter jurisdiction over a petition to reopen a previous application if a colorable constitutional claim is asserted. Id., 430 U.S. at 109, 97 S.Ct. at 986. Denais raises no such claim. Therefore, the previous decision denying disability is res judicata and Denais is not eligible for benefits prior to November 28, 1988.

2. Medical Records

On December 9, 1988, Dr. Philip Marler, an internal medicine specialist, reported that Denais had a “definite diagnosis of Sarcoido-sis” (Tr. 352).1 He concluded that Denais was disabled due to pulmonary insufficiency. Id.

On January 24,1989, Denais complained of headaches and low back pain. Dr. Marler stated that test results were negative.

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Bluebook (online)
820 F. Supp. 278, 1993 WL 139377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/denais-v-secretary-of-health-human-services-lawd-1993.