RENDERED: JULY 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0642-MR
DENA WILLIAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-00302
JANET CONOVER, WARDEN OF THE KENTUCKY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Dena Williams appeals the orders of the Shelby Circuit Court
dismissing her petition for a declaration of rights, entered on April 24, 2020. After
careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Williams is an inmate at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for
Women. On December 9, 2018, Williams placed a call to her sister, Sarah
Tincher. During their recorded conversation, Williams requested Tincher place
money on another inmate’s—Maxine Jones—account, since her mother was
hospitalized. On December 10, 2018, Tincher placed money using J-Pay on
inmate Sharon Hall’s account by mistake using the pseudonym “Mike Hunt.” On
December 20, 2018, Williams was interviewed by corrections staff and admitted
the J-Pay account registered to “Mike Hunt” is Tincher’s.
On January 8, 2019, Williams was issued a Kentucky Department of
Corrections disciplinary report charging her with violating KCPP1 policy number
15.2, section II, subsection C, Category V (Major Violations),2 Item 8 (notated in
the disciplinary report form as simply a “5-08”), which prohibits “Using mail to
obtain money, goods or services by fraud[.]” The disciplinary report form noted
“J-Pay is considered a form of mail communication[.]” Williams pled not guilty to
this charge.
1 Kentucky Correction Policies and Procedures. 2 The categories of offenses and penalty ranges are Category I-VII, with Category I containing the least serious and punishable offenses and Category VII covering the most serious and punishable offenses.
-2- On January 15, 2019, a hearing was held on this matter at which
Williams was represented by a legal aid and testified as the sole witness. Williams
was declared guilty of the charge because the Adjustment Officer (AO) found that
she conspired with her sister to commit the violation based on the following: (1)
staff stated this occurred; (2) “phone recordings”3 support this result; (3) Williams
told her sister to place $25.00 on another inmate’s account; and (4) Tincher used a
fake J-Pay account to do so. The AO ordered 30 days disciplinary segregation,
suspended for 90 days, and 45 days good time loss.
On January 17, 2019, Williams appealed to the warden asserting there
was no fraudulent conduct. On January 18, 2019, the warden denied Williams’s
appeal, stating the “due process requirements appear to be in order. The evidence
is sufficient in order to establish a finding of guilt.”
On June 3, 2019, Williams tendered her pro se petition for declaration
of rights pursuant to KRS4 418.040. The respondents moved the trial court to
dismiss the petition, claiming Williams failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies, “some evidence” in the administrative record supports the AO’s
findings, and Williams was not otherwise denied due process. After Williams
responded to this motion, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding
3 Only one phone call was downloaded for the AO. 4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3- there was “some evidence” to support the AO’s finding of guilt. The trial court
stated a “fraud is generally understood as a deceit or deception.” It found the
“fraud” in this case was that Williams’s sister used an account registered to
someone else, or a fake name, to transfer money for Williams to another inmate.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
is well-established.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “admits as true the material facts of the complaint.” So a court should not grant such a motion “unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved. . . .” Accordingly, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact; “rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.
Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
Prison disciplinary actions require only “some evidence” of guilt.
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct.
-4- 2768, 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). “[C]ourts only review the decisions of the
[AO] and prison officials are afforded broad discretion.” Yates v. Fletcher, 120
S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky. App. 2003) (emphasis in original). This Court must affirm
if there is “some evidence” supporting the charge. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct.
at 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356. “The primary inquiry [in a prison disciplinary action] is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board[,]” and “[e]ven meager evidence will suffice.”
Ramirez v. Nietzel, 424 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Ky. 2014) (footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at
2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356.
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not equivalent to criminal
prosecutions, and “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings
does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41
L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). “Minimal due process is all that is required regarding a
person detained in lawful custody.” McMillen v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 233
S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007). The requirements of due process are satisfied if
the “some evidence” standard is met. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86
-5- L.Ed.2d 356. This is a low, but existent, bar which must be met to ensure inmates
are not wrongfully and arbitrarily deprived of their rights.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Williams argues she was denied minimum due process to
ensure her state-created right to good time credit was not arbitrarily abrogated
because there was no evidence she committed the offense with which she was
charged. We agree.
Absolutely no evidence was presented that Williams—acting on her
own accord or in concert with her sister—committed the charged violation of
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0642-MR
DENA WILLIAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-00302
JANET CONOVER, WARDEN OF THE KENTUCKY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Dena Williams appeals the orders of the Shelby Circuit Court
dismissing her petition for a declaration of rights, entered on April 24, 2020. After
careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Williams is an inmate at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for
Women. On December 9, 2018, Williams placed a call to her sister, Sarah
Tincher. During their recorded conversation, Williams requested Tincher place
money on another inmate’s—Maxine Jones—account, since her mother was
hospitalized. On December 10, 2018, Tincher placed money using J-Pay on
inmate Sharon Hall’s account by mistake using the pseudonym “Mike Hunt.” On
December 20, 2018, Williams was interviewed by corrections staff and admitted
the J-Pay account registered to “Mike Hunt” is Tincher’s.
On January 8, 2019, Williams was issued a Kentucky Department of
Corrections disciplinary report charging her with violating KCPP1 policy number
15.2, section II, subsection C, Category V (Major Violations),2 Item 8 (notated in
the disciplinary report form as simply a “5-08”), which prohibits “Using mail to
obtain money, goods or services by fraud[.]” The disciplinary report form noted
“J-Pay is considered a form of mail communication[.]” Williams pled not guilty to
this charge.
1 Kentucky Correction Policies and Procedures. 2 The categories of offenses and penalty ranges are Category I-VII, with Category I containing the least serious and punishable offenses and Category VII covering the most serious and punishable offenses.
-2- On January 15, 2019, a hearing was held on this matter at which
Williams was represented by a legal aid and testified as the sole witness. Williams
was declared guilty of the charge because the Adjustment Officer (AO) found that
she conspired with her sister to commit the violation based on the following: (1)
staff stated this occurred; (2) “phone recordings”3 support this result; (3) Williams
told her sister to place $25.00 on another inmate’s account; and (4) Tincher used a
fake J-Pay account to do so. The AO ordered 30 days disciplinary segregation,
suspended for 90 days, and 45 days good time loss.
On January 17, 2019, Williams appealed to the warden asserting there
was no fraudulent conduct. On January 18, 2019, the warden denied Williams’s
appeal, stating the “due process requirements appear to be in order. The evidence
is sufficient in order to establish a finding of guilt.”
On June 3, 2019, Williams tendered her pro se petition for declaration
of rights pursuant to KRS4 418.040. The respondents moved the trial court to
dismiss the petition, claiming Williams failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies, “some evidence” in the administrative record supports the AO’s
findings, and Williams was not otherwise denied due process. After Williams
responded to this motion, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding
3 Only one phone call was downloaded for the AO. 4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3- there was “some evidence” to support the AO’s finding of guilt. The trial court
stated a “fraud is generally understood as a deceit or deception.” It found the
“fraud” in this case was that Williams’s sister used an account registered to
someone else, or a fake name, to transfer money for Williams to another inmate.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
is well-established.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “admits as true the material facts of the complaint.” So a court should not grant such a motion “unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved. . . .” Accordingly, “the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.” This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact; “rather, the question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.
Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
Prison disciplinary actions require only “some evidence” of guilt.
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct.
-4- 2768, 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). “[C]ourts only review the decisions of the
[AO] and prison officials are afforded broad discretion.” Yates v. Fletcher, 120
S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky. App. 2003) (emphasis in original). This Court must affirm
if there is “some evidence” supporting the charge. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct.
at 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356. “The primary inquiry [in a prison disciplinary action] is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board[,]” and “[e]ven meager evidence will suffice.”
Ramirez v. Nietzel, 424 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Ky. 2014) (footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at
2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356.
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not equivalent to criminal
prosecutions, and “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings
does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41
L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). “Minimal due process is all that is required regarding a
person detained in lawful custody.” McMillen v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 233
S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007). The requirements of due process are satisfied if
the “some evidence” standard is met. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86
-5- L.Ed.2d 356. This is a low, but existent, bar which must be met to ensure inmates
are not wrongfully and arbitrarily deprived of their rights.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Williams argues she was denied minimum due process to
ensure her state-created right to good time credit was not arbitrarily abrogated
because there was no evidence she committed the offense with which she was
charged. We agree.
Absolutely no evidence was presented that Williams—acting on her
own accord or in concert with her sister—committed the charged violation of
“Using mail to obtain money, goods or services by fraud.” KCPP 15.2, II.C.V.8
(emphasis added). We first note, no evidence was put forth that Williams obtained
anything as a result of funds being placed in another inmate’s account. This reason
alone is grounds for our reversal. Secondly, no evidence of “fraud,” as the term is
commonly understood or used as a legal term of art, was presented.
An essential element that defines “fraud” is that a false statement is
made to induce another to act to his or her detriment. The Merriam Webster
Dictionary defines “fraud” as: “intentional perversion of truth in order to
induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal
right.” Fraud, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fraud (emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
-6- “fraud” as: “A knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material
fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has declared:
in Kentucky such a claim requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of the following six elements: (1) that the declarant made a material representation to the plaintiff, (2) that this representation was false, (3) that the declarant knew the representation was false or made it recklessly, (4) that the declarant induced the plaintiff to act upon the misrepresentation, (5) that the plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation, and (6) that the misrepresentation caused injury to the plaintiff. [United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert,] 996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999).
Flegles, Inc. v. TruServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2009) (emphasis added).
Here, no evidence was presented that Williams—through her sister or otherwise—
made a false statement to induce anyone to act to their detriment. Thus, fraud was
neither properly alleged nor was any evidence concerning fraud presented to find
Williams guilty of this charge. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing
Williams’s petition because there was no evidence to support the AO’s
determination that Williams was guilty.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Shelby
Circuit Court is REVERSED.
-7- ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Andrea Reed Angela T. Dunham Kieran J. Comer Frankfort, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-