Den v. Hill

7 F. Cas. 456, 1 McAll. 480
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of California
DecidedJanuary 15, 1859
StatusPublished

This text of 7 F. Cas. 456 (Den v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Den v. Hill, 7 F. Cas. 456, 1 McAll. 480 (circtdca 1859).

Opinion

McALLISTER, Circuit Judge.

This is an action brought* for the recovery of damages for the detention and conversion of certain live stock, and other personal property. The damages are laid at $50,000. A jury has been waived, and the cause left by consent of parties, on the law and facts, to the court.

[457]*457It appears that defendants, as the highest bidders at jrablic outcry, became on the 4th December, 1845, the lessees for the term of nine years, of the mission of Santa Barbara, together with the live stock and personal property; which arrangement was made in conformity with the decree of the 25th May, 1S45, and the regulations of 28th October, in the same year. At the expiration of the lease, the plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the personal property, and demanded possession of a portion of it 'The defendants refused to recognize the ownership of plaintiff; whereupon he brought this suit. To •sustain his title, he produced a paper purporting to be made on the 10th June, 1846, by Pio Pico, constitutional governor, and which professes to convey the reversionary interest of Mexico to the mission of Santa Barbara, after the expiration of the lease, with all its property, tenements, and stock, to the plaintiff. To prove the due. execution -of this document, the plaintiff relies on the admission of the genuineness of the signature ■of Pio Pico. This is doubtless presumptive •evidence of due execution at the time it bears date. It is but a presumption, however, and may therefore be rebutted by evidence. Neither Pico nor Moreno the secretary whose signature is on the grant, was sworn as a witness, although the latter certifies officially on the grant, that an entry of it had been made in the proper book; and such official statement has been falsified by the fact that no such entry has been found in the proper book, or in any of the records or archives of the government. This grant purports to have been made on the 10th June, 1846. a period near the time when the government of the territory had passed from his (Pico’s) hands, and, indeed, during the very heat and conflict of the struggle in which his power was overthrown. Add to this, that this grant never saw the light, so far as the evidence ascertains, until 1S48, after the return of Pio Pico to California, from his visit to Mexico; and it is much to be regretted, that the plaintiff lias been content to rest solely on the genuineness of the signature of Pio Tico, in a case the circumstances of which render the admonition of the highest judicial tribunal of our country peculiarly impressive, namely, that in such a case careful inquiry and scrutiny is necessary as to the authority of the governor, and the bona-fide exercise of it. U. S. v. Cambuston, 20 How. [61 U. S.) 64.

Now, in this case it is urged, that there are facts elicited by the testimony which dis-affirm the presumption arising from the fact of the genuineness of the signature of Pico, and facts independently of the time and the condition of Pio Pico when he exercised the granting power, which show that the grant was made long after its apparent date.

These facts are, that the government archives contain no “espediente” note, or memorandum, of this grant, while there are record-notices of other grants of similar character issued about the same time. That the certificate that an entry .of the grant was made in the proper book, is false. That none such has been produced, and its non-production is not satisfactorily accounted for. That the sale of this property itself being public; was at a private sale. That this grant was not only not archived, but its existence unknown to witnesses who, it was to be supposed, must have known of it had it been in existence. That plaintiff in 1848 and 1850 disclaimed by his acts and declarations having any interest in the mission of Santa Barbara. • L. T. Burton swears, he was assessor of Santa Barbara county in the latter year, and applied to the plaintiff for a list of his property; that he received a list of particulars from him; that no mention was made of any interest or claim in the mission of Santa Barbara. That in that year the property was not assessed, for the reason that he believed it to be government property. In 1848, I. D. Stephenson was also in an official position, and "received orders to look into the tenures of the mission property, cattle, &c.; was instructed to send a secretary for the documents and titles. I received information that Dr. Den and Mr. Hill (the defendants) were the lessees of the mission in Santa Barbara. The only gentleman I knew of the name of Dr. Den, is the gentleman in court. He was riding by my quarters. I applied to him. He referred me to his brother, as having possession of the mission of Santa Barbara. I went immediately to the mission, saw Den and Hill, received the requisite information, and communicated it to my superior. Dr. Bichard Den said he had no interest in the mission, and referred me to his brother.” An additional circumstance, which is ascertained by the expediente of Thomas H. Bobbins, is invoked, which shows that a portion of the same lands alleged to have been granted to plaintiff, was granted some twenty days after that time, to the said Bobbins, with full knowledge by Pico that they belonged to the mission of Santa Barbara. Now, the foregoing circumstances afford intrinsic testimony which create no inconsiderable doubt as to the due .execution of the grant and lead to the conclusion that the grant was ante-dated, and was, in fact, ushered into existence at a much later period than the date it bears, and-when any authority which had existed was at an end. This question, as to the valid execution of the deed, was a legitimate issue for a jury; and had this court • anticipated this question would have arisen, it would not have assumed the responsibility of a jury in deciding it. The court will not undertake to determine this question, as it proposes to place the disposition of this casei, on a ground independent of it. If the decision of the court shall be found to be correct, there is no necessity to decide whether the execution of the grant has been satisfactorily proved. If [458]*458.deemed to have committed error, the party ..aggrieved will have an opportunity of ex- . plaining the circumstances of this case.

The questions arise, 1st. At the time, and in the position in which Pio Tico was, and in the then condition of the country, did he possess the power to grant the reversionary interest of Mexico in the mission of Santa Barbara, and its live stock, and other personal property? 2d. Apart from the peculiarity of his position, did he, as governor, have the power to sell the personal property, cattle, &c., of a mission?

As to the first question. In the case of U. S. v. Palmer [Case No. 15,989], decided some months since in the district court of the United States, sitting as a land court under the act df 3d March, 1S31 (Brightly, U. S. Dig. Ill), a grant made by Pio Pico, as governor (and Moreno, the secretary, in this case), came under consideration. In relation to that grant, the court had occasion to discuss the power of Governor Pico to grant anything at the time, and in the position he then held; and as the presiding officer of that court, I had occasion to say, “It must have been with a knowledge that hostilities between the United States and Mexico had commenced on the Rio Grande, that the American squadron was on the coast awaiting orders to take possession of this county, which they did immediately. It was at such a time, and in such a condition of affairs, that Pio Pico undertook to grant” &c.

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7 F. Cas. 456, 1 McAll. 480, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/den-v-hill-circtdca-1859.