Den ex dem. Watson v. Kelty

16 N.J.L. 517
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided November 15, 1838·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Hornblower, C. J.

1. I am of opinion that George Davis was a competent witness.

2. That the loss of the deed from Morrison and wife to Geo. Davis, was sufficiently proved to admit parol evidence of its contents.

3d. That the partition was unlawfully made; it was a void proceeding, and not in accordance with the duties and powers of the commissioners and the directions of the statute upon that subject ; and consequently that Anna Cook and Christiana Speers did not thereby become entitled to hold in severalty, the premises in question. The twelfth section of the act to ascertain the power and authority of the ordinary, &c., (Rev. Laios, 779,) authorizes the Orphans’ Courts of the several counties to appoint commissioners to make partition of lands lying in their respective counties, and the fourteenth section of the same act provides that where a person dies intestate, seized of lands in fee simple, situate in two or more counties, such partition may be made under the direction of the Surrogate General. When, therefore, the land lies partly in one county and partly in another, the heirs at law, if they wish to have one general division, must apply to the Surrogate General, for the appointment of commissioners, but the Orphans’ Court can only appoint commissioners to divide the land situate in the county over which their jurisdiction extends, and such division must be made among all the heirs. The lands lying in Salem, ought therefore to have been divided into six parts, and allotted among all the six heirs. If application was also made to the Orphan’s Court of Cumberland, the commissioners, (even if they happened to be the very same persons,) should in like manner have divided those lands among all the heirs. These proceedings seem to have been a device to super-[523] cede the jurisdiction of the Surrogate General, and to show the absurdity of the attempt, it is only necessary to inquire, what would have been the result, if the Orphans’ Court of one county hasl affirmed, and the other had disaffirmed and vacated the report ?

In this case, the application to the Orphans’ Court of Salem county, was for a partition of all the lands lying in that county, among all the heirs of Abel Cook, and the commissioners by the very terms of their commission, were instructed to make sueh partition, instead of which, they have allotted the whole of the lands lying in that county, to two of the heirs only, referring the other heirs by a memorandum at the foot of their report, to the record of Cumberland county, for their shares of the inheritance. If, therefore, the lessors of the plaintiff, had no other grounds to rest upon, but the matter of partition, they could only recover in this action two undivided sixths of the premises in question, in one sixth of which they would have a fee, and in the other only an estate, during the life of their uncle, George Davis. But,

4th. It appears that Abel Cook died seized, previous to the year 1799 — that in June 1799,- the premises in question were set off to his daughters Anna and Christiana, as their shares of his estate, and that they and those claiming under them, continued in possession for nearly twenty years, and perhaps for more than that period. William Davis, the father of the lessors of the plaintiff, died in possession in 1814, which was fifteen years after the partition. His widow, the mother of the lessors of the plaintiff” continued in possession until she married Smith, which was three or four years after the death of her husband, William Davis. If four years, then the possession had continued nineteen years, under the partition. After her marriage with Smith, he undertook to rebuild the house though he never completed it, nor moved into it; but Mrs. Smith survived her husband William Davis, about ten years, and as t-here was no evidence of any change of possession, or at' least of any adverse possession, it may fairly be presumed, that she died in possession, and consequently that the premises have been possessed under the partE tion, however erroneous that may have been, for at least twenty years. And as the defendant has entirely failed to shew any adverse title either possessory or documentary, I think the verdict ought to stand.

[524] It may be true that there has not been twenty years possession by Anna and Christiana, and those claiming under them, since all the heirs at law of their father Abel Cook, came of age; and if the defendants had shewn any right or title under any of the heirs not barred by the statute, by reason of their minority, they might have set up the disability of those under whom they claimed, in avoidance of the plaintiff’s right to recover on the ground of possession. But the disability that saved from the operation of the statute of limitations, is of a personal character, and can only be set up by parties and those claiming under them. A defendant may shew a title out of the plaintiff; but shewing that a third person might defeat the plaintiffs’ title, if he chose to set up his minority or other disability, is a very different thing. In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff ought to have judgment.

Ford, J.

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Den ex dem. Watson v. Kelty, 16 N.J.L. 517 (N.J. 1838).

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