Den Ex Dem. of Oneal v. Butler

14 N.C. 94
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided June 5, 1831·Published

Opinion

Henderson, Chief-Justice.

The first exception goes m a mere matter of form. We think it should be dis *95 allowed, for we cannot but know, that the lessor of John Ben is the party complaining, and that John Ben is a fictitious person, used for the purpose of bringing the merits before the court; we must also know that the tenant in possession is the substantial defendant, and that Bichará, Fen is likewise a fictitious person, introduced as tbe defendant, for the same reasons that John Ben is made plaintiff. We think the award is made in the suit submitted. This disposes of the first and second exceptions ; for they arc substantially the same, presented in different forms.

We cannot perceive any uncertainty in the award, to sustain the third exception.

The judgment must tie reversed, and judgment according to the award entered for the defendants. We should also confirm the award in the suit in equity between The same parties ; hut the papers are not sent up, or not a. sufficiency of them to enable us to form a decree.

Per Curiam. — Judgment according to award.

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Den Ex Dem. of Oneal v. Butler, 14 N.C. 94 (N.C. 1831).

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