Dempsay v. Phoenix, City of

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedAugust 14, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00503
StatusUnknown

This text of Dempsay v. Phoenix, City of (Dempsay v. Phoenix, City of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dempsay v. Phoenix, City of, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Christopher Dempsay, No. CV-22-00503-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Phoenix, et al.,

13 Defendant. 14 15 16 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff Christopher Dempsay accuses Defendant the 17 City of Phoenix (“City”) of violating his Fourth Amendment rights by entering and 18 removing Mr. Dempsay from a hotel room he had reserved. (Doc. 14.) The City has moved 19 for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 20 16.) It also has moved to strike Mr. Dempsay’s response brief because it was filed six days 21 after the deadline. (Doc. 23.) The Court will address these motions in reverse order. 22 The City’s motion to strike is denied. Motions to strike are disfavored, and courts 23 generally deny them absent a showing of prejudice. See Martinez v. Alltran Fin. LP, No. 24 CV-18-04815-PHX-DLR, 2019 WL 1777300, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2019). Here, Mr. 25 Dempsay filed his response six days late, apparently because he was incarcerated at the 26 time. The City has not demonstrated prejudice by the relatively minor delay. The Court 27 sees no reason to strike Mr. Dempsay’s response, especially when the City already has 28 replied to it. 1 The City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. A motion for judgment 2 on the pleadings “is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving 3 party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 4 Fajardo v. Cty. of L.A., 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally 5 identical’ to Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of review’ applies to motions brought 6 under either rule.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 7 2011) (quoting Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989)). 8 A motion for judgment on the pleadings therefore should not be granted if the complaint is 9 based on a cognizable legal theory and contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 10 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 11 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, Mr. Dempsay has named only the City as a 12 defendant; he has not named the individual officers who he claims entered and removed 13 him from his hotel room. But a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for 14 constitutional violations committed by its employees. Instead, to pursue such a claim 15 against the City, Mr. Dempsay would need to allege that his injury resulted from some 16 policy, custom, or practice of the City. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of City of New 17 York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Lockett v. Cnty. of L.A., 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). 18 Mr. Dempsay has not alleged any such policy, custom, or practice. For these reasons, his 19 amended complaint fails to state a claim as currently written. 20 When granting a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court has discretion to dismiss with leave 21 to amend instead of entering judgment. See Special District Risk Mgmt. Authority v. 22 Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 562 F.Supp.3d 989, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2021). Here, the defects 23 the City has identified could be cured. For example, Mr. Dempsay could name the 24 individual officers he claims committed the constitutional violation, or he could allege facts 25 demonstrating that the officers were acting pursuant to a City policy, custom, or practice. 26 Given the Ninth Circuit’s liberal policy favoring amendments and the leniency generally 27 afforded self-represented litigants, the Court finds dismissal with leave to amend 28 appropriate. Accordingly, 1 IT IS ORDERED as follows: 2 1. The City’s motion to strike (Doc. 23) is DENIED. 3 2. The City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 16) is GRANTED. 4 3. Mr. Dempsay’s amended complaint (Doc. 14) is DISMISSED with leave to 5 amend. 6 4. Mr. Dempsay shall have until September 5, 2023 in which to file an amended 7 complaint that cures the defects identified in this order, if he so chooses. If Mr. 8 Dempsay does not file an amended complaint by that deadline, the Clerk is 9 directed to terminate this case without further order. 10 Dated this 14th day of August, 2023. 11 12 13 , {Z, 14 _- Ae 15 Usted States Dictric Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
637 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Sheldon Lockett v. County of Los Angeles
977 F.3d 737 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles
179 F.3d 698 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)

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