Demotte, Julie v. UPS

2018 TN WC 46
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedApril 11, 2018
Docket2017-06-1778
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 TN WC 46 (Demotte, Julie v. UPS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Demotte, Julie v. UPS, 2018 TN WC 46 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2018).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT NASHVILLE

JULIE DEMOTTE, ) Employee, ) Docket No. 2017-06-1778 v. ) UPS, ) Employer, ) State File No. 89793-2016 ) and ) LIBERTY INSURANCE CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER AWARDING FUTURE MEDICAL BENEFITS AND DENYING TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS

The parties appeared for a compensation hearing on March 14, 2018, to determine Ms. Demotte’s entitlement to permanent disability, temporary disability, and future medical benefits for her workplace injury. The Court holds UPS must provide Ms. Demotte with lifetime medical benefits for her workplace injury but denies her claim for temporary and permanent disability benefits.

History of Claim

With the exception of Ms. Demotte’s impairment rating, the parties stipulated to almost all the material facts in this case. On November 11, 2016, Ms. Demotte fell and broke her hip and leg while retrieving packages from a clogged package-transport conveyor at a UPS-distribution facility.1 UPS accepted the claim, and Ms. Demotte chose Dr. Jason Evans as the authorized treating physician. She also, however, received treatment from Dr. Philip Kregor, Dr. Evans’ partner.

1 Only Ms. Demotte testified at trial, and the Court summarized this history from the stipulations and her testimony.

1 On March 9, 2017, Ms. Demotte saw Dr. Evans and requested he release her to return to work. However, for reasons unclear, Dr. Kregor, instead of Dr. Evans, signed her release.

Before her release, UPS paid Ms. Demotte temporary disability benefits at two different rates. For the first twelve weeks, UPS paid Ms. Demotte at a rate of $186.67 per week. Because of an overpayment, UPS lowered the rate to $134.18 per week on February 8 and continued payments at that rate until her release.2

Ms. Demotte worked for a few days and then left UPS on March 21. She testified she left because she could not physically perform the job. On April 10, Dr. Evans placed Ms. Demotte at maximum medical improvement (MMI). He issued a form C-30A Final Medical Report assigning Ms. Demotte a three-percent whole-person impairment rating and releasing her to return to work at full duty.

UPS stipulated to Ms. Demotte’s entitlement to future medical benefits but objected to admission of the form C-30A to establish Ms. Demotte’s permanent impairment rating. UPS argued that the medical report was inadmissible to prove impairment because Ms. Demotte failed to give proper notice of her intent to use it, which deprived UPS of the opportunity to depose Dr. Evans. Ms. Demotte opposed the objection, arguing that UPS presented no medical proof rebutting Dr. Evans’ opinion. She further argued that the Court should admit the form C-30A as a medical record, and that requiring her to submit a form C-32 contravenes a central goal of the reform by fomenting unnecessary litigation. The Court admitted the form but sustained UPS’ objection concerning its use to prove Ms. Demotte’s permanent impairment rating.

After the trial, the Court reviewed the scheduling order and noticed it contained no deadlines regarding expert witnesses. The Court then reviewed the recording from the hearing to determine why the order omitted these deadlines. At the scheduling hearing, the following exchange occurred between the Court and defense counsel, David Hooper:

Court: It almost seems to me like ADR might be a good thing for you all?

Hooper: Well, I don’t have any, um, unrealistic expectation about that. Based on things up to this point, I doubt that that’s helpful in this case. I’ll go through it if the Court wishes it because I realize that it’s, at least on, under the rules, it’s mandatory but I don’t know that there’s a reasonable expectation this will work. Honestly, the issues here, however they’ve been, and I think they’ve been skewed a bit by Zach [Wiley], but I think the issue here is what she’s entitled to receive in terms of permanency.

2 The parties stipulated to a compensation rate of $141.96 per week.

2 Court: So there is a dispute over that? There’s a three-percent and a one— is there an agreement on the rating?

Hooper: There is.

Court: Okay, okay, so then the issue is whether there’s additional benefits that she’s entitled to?

Hooper: Right, well there’s a, well it actually is skewed a bit because of the, of um, of the overpayment of temporary disability benefits.

Court: Okay, okay. I’ve gotcha, I’ve gotcha.

Hooper: But there is no dispute about the three-percent rating.

Later in the hearing, the Court questioned the parties about discovery needed before the compensation hearing:3

Court: Do we need to take any expert witness depositions?

Mr. Goodman: No your honor.

Court: Mr. Hooper?

Mr. Hooper: I don’t think so.

The scheduling order identified permanent disability benefits and temporary disability benefits as disputed issues for trial. Additionally, the pretrial statement contained no stipulation as to the impairment rating.

Legal Principles and Analysis

At a compensation hearing, Ms. Demotte must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Willis v. All Staff, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Nov. 9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2017). She has the burden of proof on all essential elements of her claim. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Aug. 18, 2015).

3 Attorney David Goodman appeared at the scheduling hearing in place of counsel of record, Zachary Wiley.

3 At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated to most of the essential elements of the claim. They agreed Ms. Demotte suffered a compensable injury, and UPS paid for all treatment to date. They also agreed Ms. Demotte is entitled to continuing medical benefits with Dr. Evans. In the end, the only disputed issues concerned Ms. Demotte’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits and additional temporary disability benefits.

The dispute concerning permanent disability benefits centered on the admissibility of form C-30A as proof of Ms. Demotte’s impairment rating. UPS objected to admissibility of the rating, and the Court sustained the objection. The Court provides the following analysis to address the admissibility of medical reports at a compensation hearing. To that end, the analysis focuses on three legal pronouncements: statutory law, regulatory law, and evidentiary rules.

Admissibility of Medical Reports Under Statute

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235(c)(1) allows for introduction of direct testimony “through a written medical report on a form established by the administrator.” The administrator adopted form C-32 for this purpose. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-01-.16(2). When completed by a physician, form C-32 satisfies the requirements for a signed medical report contained in section 50-6-235(c)(1). A party may introduce a form C-32, in lieu of deposition testimony, at any stage of litigation upon giving the opposing party at least twenty days’ notice of its intent to rely on it. The opposing party may object to the report’s introduction but must depose the physician within a “reasonable period of time,” or the objection is waived. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-235(c)(2).

Ms. Demotte attempted to introduce form C-30A instead of form C-32. While both are technically medical reports, the difference in the amount of information contained in form C-32 as opposed to form C-30A is overwhelming.

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Related

§ 50
Tennessee § 50
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(c)(6)

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2018 TN WC 46, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/demotte-julie-v-ups-tennworkcompcl-2018.