Demetrius Sanchez Slaughter v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 9, 2025
• Docket: 23-0853
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0853 Filed January 9, 2025

DEMETRIUS SANCHEZ SLAUGHTER, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief from two convictions

and the denial of his actual-innocence claims. AFFIRMED.

Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Chicchelly, P.J., Langholz, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

VOGEL, Senior Judge.

While on probation for a prior offense, Demetrius Slaughter was charged

with willful injury causing serious injury. His counsel negotiated a plea deal that

again imposed probation, but while he was awaiting sentencing Slaughter was

charged with two more offenses—third-degree theft and assault causing bodily

injury. His counsel negotiated a global plea agreement that suspended eight years

of prison, to run consecutive to his prior suspended four year sentence, and again

kept him on probation, which he accepted. Later, Slaughter committed new crimes

and his probation was revoked. Aggrieved to now be serving a prison sentence,

Slaughter applied for postconviction relief (PCR) from his theft and assault

convictions, alleging his counsel should have investigated his mother’s potential

testimony, which he believes would have exonerated him of both offenses had he

chosen to go to trial. He also alleged he is actually innocent of both assault and

theft. After a hearing on the issues, the PCR court denied his claims and Slaughter

appeals.

On his ineffective-assistance claim, Slaughter and his counsel were well

aware of his mother’s potential testimony at the time he chose to plead guilty and

made a strategic decision to accept a favorable plea offer in lieu of risking the

outcome of a trial. Thus, Slaughter failed to show a breach by counsel or any

resulting prejudice. As for his actual-innocence claim, Slaughter has not shown

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of either offense. Slaughter’s

narrow focus on his own version of events overlooks conflicting evidence in the

minutes of testimony, which would be sufficient for jurors to convict him of both

offenses. Accordingly, we affirm the PCR court. 3

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

This case arises from three different criminal proceedings. In early 2021,

while Slaughter was on probation for a prior offense, he was charged with willful

injury causing serious injury. See Iowa Code § 708.4(1) (2021). To resolve the

charge, Slaughter’s counsel negotiated a plea agreement that kept him on

probation for the prior offense; suspended a five-year prison sentence; and allowed

him to plead to a lesser offense of willful injury causing bodily injury.

While awaiting sentencing, the State charged Slaughter with two new

offenses—third-degree theft and assault causing bodily injury. See id.

§§ 714.29(3), 708.2(2). According to the minutes of testimony, a man left his

iPhone outside of his home and when he returned to retrieve it, the phone was

gone. The man used the iPhone’s location tool, which showed his phone at a

nearby Walmart kiosk. Investigation revealed Slaughter presented the phone to

the kiosk and sold it. When an officer called Slaughter to ask about the stolen

phone, he hung up. A follow-up call went to voice mail, where the officer left a

message and phone number for Slaughter to call back; he failed to do so.

As for the assault charge, Slaughter and his ex-girlfriend were arguing

outside of her apartment when Slaughter punched her and slammed her onto the

ground. The victim reported it to the police, who also interviewed the victim’s

neighbor. The neighbor reported hearing the fighting and “a loud thud” when the

victim “had been slammed.” The neighbor went outside and saw the victim on the

ground and a man get into a car and drive away.

Slaughter’s counsel resumed plea negotiations with the State on all three

charges. The parties reached a global plea agreement for consecutive prison 4

terms totaling eight years to run consecutive to his prior four-year sentence. The

State agreed to suspend all sentences and keep Slaughter on supervised

probation for three years, including completion of the Fort Des Moines Residential

Facility program. Slaughter accepted the plea agreement and pleaded guilty to all

three charges. The district court imposed the agreed-to sentence.

A few months later, Slaughter committed new offenses. Consequently, his

probation was revoked and his eight-year prison sentence was imposed.

Slaughter then applied for postconviction relief from his theft and assault

convictions. He argued his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

investigate potentially exonerating testimony from his mother.1 Slaughter also

asserted he was actually innocent of both offenses, arguing no reasonable juror

would have convicted him of theft or assault in light of his exculpatory information.

See generally State v. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 2018).

His application proceeded to trial, where both Slaughter and his mother

testified. Slaughter’s mother explained she was present when Slaughter found—

not stole—an iPhone on the street. She also testified that on the day of the assault,

she arrived outside of the victim’s apartment to pick him up. As he was leaving,

she saw the victim try to stab him with a screwdriver, which prompted Slaughter to

push her down. He then got into his mother’s car and the two drove home. The

mother confirmed she told this information to Slaughter’s counsel—that she

witnessed Slaughter find the phone and she saw him push the victim in self-

defense.

1 Slaughter’s application raised other instances of alleged ineffective assistance,

but he does not renew those grounds on appeal. 5

Slaughter’s testimony echoed much of his mother’s testimony. He

explained he found the iPhone on the street, he only pushed the victim after she

swung at him first, and that his mother witnessed both events. Slaughter relayed

this to his plea attorney and recalled his attorney telling him his mother would not

be a viable witness because of their close relationship. On cross-examination,

Slaughter confirmed he indeed pleaded guilty to both offenses and he only became

unhappy with the plea agreement after his probation was revoked.

Slaughter also offered his plea counsel’s deposition testimony. Counsel

explained he “would have been happy to try” Slaughter’s case, but that Slaughter

wanted a plea deal to avoid prison. Counsel also emphasized the favorability of

the plea agreement. Slaughter “had a criminal record from Alabama, a violent

criminal record. He had multiple new criminal charges [while counsel] represented

him. He was on probation when [counsel] represented him. The State could have

easily proven out and then revoked his probation. And we still preserved his

freedom.” Counsel reasoned that once Slaughter was charged with assault and

theft, “there was a very real threat” of Slaughter “going to prison,” and the plea kept

him on probation for all three offenses.

The PCR court rejected Slaughter’s ineffective-assistance and actual-

innocence claims. Relying on an unpublished decision from this court, the PCR

court found that counsel did not breach any duty to investigate because all of

Slaughter’s mother’s information was known to Slaughter and his counsel at the

time. See Poole v. State, No. 21-1232, 2023 WL 2396418, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Mar. 8, 2023) (“Counsel’s conduct in failing to further investigate topics already

well known to [the defendant] was not a breach of a duty and did not prejudice 6

[him].”). The court further found Slaughter could not show prejudice, as Slaughter

received a “substantial benefit by pleading guilty” and could not tie any of counsel’s

actions to a different outcome. Finally, the PCR court reviewed the minutes of

testimony and found that even with Slaughter and his mother’s testimonies,

Slaughter failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror

would convict him of the theft or assault charges.

II. Analysis.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Criminal defendants are entitled to assistance of counsel, which in turn

requires counsel to render effective assistance throughout the criminal proceeding.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Our statutory PCR scheme

allows defendants to apply for relief from their convictions if they received

constitutionally deficient representation. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a). To obtain

relief, defendants must show “both that counsel breached an essential duty and

that constitutional prejudice resulted.” Smith v. State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 726 (Iowa

2024). Consistent with effective-assistance’s constitutional station, our review is

de novo. Id. at 725.

Counsel breaches an essential duty by failing to “meet the standard of

performance required of a reasonably competent practitioner.” Id. (citation

omitted). This element is demanding—Slaughter “must overcome the presumption

that the counsel was competent and demonstrate that, when considering the

totality of the circumstances, the counsel’s performance was not within the normal

range of competency.” Irving v. State, 533 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 1995). To show

prejudice, Slaughter must further demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but 7

for counsel’s errors, he . . . would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted

on going to trial.” Id. at 541 (citation omitted).

First considering breach, Slaughter faults his counsel for not further

investigating his mother’s testimony. Yet all of his mother’s information was known

to Slaughter and his counsel at the time he pleaded guilty—he knew his mother

would testify she witnessed both events and was willing to testify about what she

observed. See Poole, 2023 WL 2396418, at *3. Therefore Slaughter was not

deprived of any crucial information when he chose to plead guilty in lieu of trial.

Moreover, Slaughter offers only a conclusory assertion that extra investigation was

needed. He “does not propose what an investigation would have revealed or how

anything discovered would have affected the result obtained below.” Dunbar v.

State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). Thus, while Slaughter styles his ineffective-

assistance claim as a failure to investigate, Slaughter’s true grievance is with

counsel’s advice that his mother would not have been a compelling witness. Yet

that is precisely the kind of strategic decision that we will not second-guess. See

Smith v. State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 733 (Iowa 2024).

Slaughter also cannot show prejudice. At most, Slaughter has shown that

he regrets pleading guilty now that his probation has been revoked. He does not

point to any new information that, had it been discovered by counsel, generates a

reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea agreement that kept

him out of prison—his primary motivation. See State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574,

579 (Iowa 2002) (noting an applicant’s “conclusory claim of prejudice, that [he]

‘was ready to insist on going to trial,’ is not a sufficient assertion of prejudice”). We

therefore affirm the denial of Slaughter’s PCR application. 8

B. Actual Innocence.

In 2018, our supreme court authorized PCR applicants to raise freestanding

claims of actual innocence even if they pleaded guilty. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at

795. Like ineffective-assistance, our actual-innocence standard is demanding—

Slaughter must show “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence

of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the

applicant.” Id. 797. To that end, he must show “factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted).

Slaughter cannot meet this high bar. First considering the theft conviction,

Slaughter insists that no witness could say Slaughter “took the phone from a place

where it obviously belonged to somebody.” Yet Slaughter overlooks the

statements from the iPhone’s owner, who stated he left his phone outside of his

home, not abandoned in the middle of the street. Thus, had the matter gone to

trial, the jury would be left to decide which version of events was more plausible.

Because a jury could decline to find Slaughter or his mother credible, Slaughter

has not proven factual innocence of third-degree theft.

Next considering the assault charge, Slaughter likewise has not shown clear

and convincing evidence of innocence. Slaughter again insists there were “no

witness[es] that could discredit [his] version of events,” despite the victim expressly

refuting his version of events. The victim relayed to officers that the two were

fighting about money and Slaughter became enraged and assaulted her. There

was no mention of a screwdriver in her statement, nor any screwdriver recovered

on the scene. As with the theft charge, the jury would therefore be left to weigh 9

Slaughter and his mother’s version against the victim’s testimony. Without more,

Slaughter has not proven factual innocence of assault causing bodily injury.

Because Slaughter has not shown any breach of duty or resulting prejudice

by counsel’s investigation prior to Slaughter’s acceptance of the plea agreement,

nor has he proven actual innocence of either offense, we affirm the PCR court.

AFFIRMED.