DeMeo v. Grimaldi

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

DeMeo v. Grimaldi

279 A.D.2d 445, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 211

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 8, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 279 A.D.2d 445 (DeMeo v. Grimaldi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

DeMeo v. Grimaldi, 279 A.D.2d 445, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 211 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

— In an action, inter alia, for the partition of real property, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.), dated December 20, 1999, as denied his motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to enforce the partnership agreement entered into by the parties. The plaintiff’s opposition papers failed to demon[446]*446strate, by evidentiary proof, the existence of a material issue of fact requiring a trial. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims should have been granted (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320).

However, since the defendant is also seeking an attorney’s fee for breach of the partnership agreement, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for a hearing on that issue. Bracken, Acting P. J., O’Brien, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

— In an action, inter alia, for the partition of real property, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.), dated December 20, 1999, as denied his motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to enforce the partnership agreement entered into by the parties. The plaintiff’s opposition papers failed to demon[446]*446strate, by evidentiary proof, the existence of a material issue of fact requiring a trial. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims should have been granted (see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320).

However, since the defendant is also seeking an attorney’s fee for breach of the partnership agreement, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court for a hearing on that issue. Bracken, Acting P. J., O’Brien, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

279 A.D.2d 445, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/demeo-v-grimaldi-nyappdiv-2001.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack