DeMartino v. City of New York

36 Misc. 3d 653
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 29, 2012
StatusPublished

This text of 36 Misc. 3d 653 (DeMartino v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeMartino v. City of New York, 36 Misc. 3d 653 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Manuel J. Mendez, J.

It is ordered and adjudged that this CPLR article 78 petition is granted, and personnel orders No. 2012/1 and 2012/2 dated April 11, 2012 are annulled.

Respondents’ administrative actions resulted in personnel orders No. 2012/1 and 2012/2 dated April 11, 2012, which approve and result in an amendment to rule X of the Personnel Rules and Regulations of the City of New York (55 RCNY Appendix A). The amendments to rule X reclassify 106 ungraded prevailing rate titles into 14 new occupational titles, with four grade levels within each service classification affecting salaries and benefits. Petitioners, pursuant to Labor Law § 220, engaged in prevailing wage bargaining as ungraded civil service titles. They had entered into consent orders with the Comptroller of the City of New York, which expired prior to the amendment to rule X. Petitioners seek judicial review of the administrative action and to annul personnel orders No. 2012/1 and 2012/2, claiming the determinations were unilateral, arbitrary and capricious, in violation of Labor Law § 220 and the reclassification provisions of Civil Service Law § 20.

An administrative decision will withstand judicial scrutiny if it is supported by substantial evidence, has a rational basis and is not arbitrary and capricious (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222 [1974]). Deference is generally given to an administrative agency’s decision; however, a decision that “runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision . . . should not be accorded any weight” (Matter of Metropolitan Movers Assn., Inc. v Liu, 95 AD3d 596, 598 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 285 [2009]).

The legislative intent of Labor Law § 220 is to impose upon the state and municipal corporations the same obligations of paying the prevailing rate of wages to laborers, workmen and mechanics employed in public works in ungraded or noncompetitive employment as private employers (Matter of Gaston v Taylor, 274 NY 359 [1937]). The scope of obligation under Labor [655]*655Law § 220 is for the state to hold its territorial subdivisions to a standard of social justice for dealing with laborers, workmen and mechanics (Austin v City of New York, 258 NY 113 [1932]). Labor Law § 220 is to be construed “with the liberality needed to carry out its beneficent purposes” (Bucci v Village of Port Chester, 22 NY2d 195, 201 [1968]). Salary based grading of titles is used to establish the type and quality of work performed based on merit and to avoid automatic promotion. Salary fixation is ineffectual where there is no valid classification (Matter of Corrigan v Joseph, 304 NY 172 [1952], rearg denied 304 NY 759 [1952]).

A reclassification of titles is lawful “where it conforms the civil service structure to the situation which actually existed in the operation of the agency prior to the reclassification” (Matter of Joyce v Ortiz, 108 AD2d 158, 163 [1st Dept 1985]). A civil service title may be abolished in good faith based on economy and efficiency, but not as subterfuge for avoiding statutory protections provided to civil servants (Matter of Hartman v Erie 1 BOCES Bd. of Educ., 204 AD2d 1037 [4th Dept 1994]; Matter of Gorman v Von Essen, 294 AD2d 209 [1st Dept 2002]). Reclassification is not to be used as a means of circumventing the constitutional mandates for appointment to a civil service title or validating out of title work (Matter of C.S.E.A. v County of Duchess, 6 AD3d 701 [2d Dept 2004]; Matter of Criscolo v Vagianelis, 50 AD3d 1283 [3d Dept 2008]).

The New York State Constitution, article V, § 6 requires that appointments and promotions made in the civil service be based on merit and fitness, which to the extent it is practicable is to be ascertained by competitive examination. Civil Service Law § 20 (2) requires notice, hearing, and approvals to promote consistency and statewide adherence to the constitutional provisions of article V, § 6 (1998 Ops Atty Gen No. 98-F3 at 4, citing Matter of Klipp v New York State Civ. Serv. Commn., 42 Misc 2d 35 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1964], affd 22 AD2d 854 [2d Dept 1964], affd 15 NY2d 880 [1965]). Reclassification can only be accomplished in the manner set forth in Civil Service Law § 20, which requires notice, a hearing, review and approval by the State Civil Service Commission. There is no merit to the contention that the New York City Charter, in conjunction with Civil Service Law § 20 (1), exempts the procedural mandates of Civil Service Law § 20 (2) (Matter of Joyce v Ortiz, 108 AD2d 158 [1985], supra).

Petitioners claim that personnel orders No. 2012/1 and 2012/2 are the result of unilateral actions taken by the respondents to [656]*656classify ungraded civil service titles which are subject to Labor Law § 220 application of prevailing rate wages and supplemental benefits. Petitioners have engaged in prevailing wage collective bargaining in a manner that has been established for over 100 years, and as part of the bargaining process they entered into consent orders with the City Comptroller. After the most recent consent orders expired, the respondents acted by effectively deleting their classifications and reclassifying the 106 ungraded prevailing rate titles affecting approximately 10,000 employees into 14 new “Maintenance and Operation Services” titles. Personnel orders No. 2012/1 and 2012/2 were adopted and immediately made effective after the Mayor’s signature, altering many of the provisions of the consent orders. Petitioners claim that respondents’ reclassification is arbitrary and capricious because it massively restructures the classification system without any effort to comply with either the provisions of Labor Law § 220 or the requirements of Civil Service Law § 20 (2) regarding notice, public hearings, and approval from the New York State Civil Service Commission.

Respondents oppose the petition claiming that they complied with Civil Service Law § 20 (1) when they allocated titles within a salary grade construct because they did not change a jurisdictional classification. They claim that Civil Service Law § 20 only applies when a title is changed from competitive to noncompetitive or exempt class. Respondents claim that the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) has authority to act as a municipal civil service commission pursuant to the New York City Charter, to review salaries and titles, grade and classify them, and remove them from the scope of Labor Law § 220, subject to the Mayor’s approval. Respondents state that the regrading removes the prevailing rate titles from the scope of Labor Law § 220. They claim that the grading of competitive class titles was rational because it is within the City’s managerial prerogative, and therefore notice, public hearings and New York State Civil Service Commission approval are not required.

DCAS conducted an investigation without consulting the Comptroller’s Office, the State Civil Service Commission, or conducting a hearing. DCAS determined that the prevailing rate applicable to petitioners’ titles through negotiations conducted by the Comptroller’s Office resulted in inequitably high salaries, and should be replaced with competitive titles which would then be negotiated through the collective bargaining process [657]

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Related

Austin v. City of New York
179 N.E. 313 (New York Court of Appeals, 1932)
Matter of Gaston v. Taylor
9 N.E.2d 9 (New York Court of Appeals, 1937)
Corrigan v. Joseph
106 N.E.2d 593 (New York Court of Appeals, 1952)
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P.
918 N.E.2d 900 (New York Court of Appeals, 2009)
C.S.E.A. v. County of Dutchess
6 A.D.3d 701 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2004)
Criscolo v. Vagianelis
50 A.D.3d 1283 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
Metropolitan Movers Ass'n v. Liu
95 A.D.3d 596 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012)
Joyce v. Ortiz
108 A.D.2d 158 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1985)
Hartman v. Erie 1 Boces Board of Education
204 A.D.2d 1037 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Klipp v. New York State Civil Service Commission
42 Misc. 2d 35 (New York Supreme Court, 1964)
Bucci v. Village of Port Chester
239 N.E.2d 335 (New York Court of Appeals, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
36 Misc. 3d 653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/demartino-v-city-of-new-york-nysupct-2012.