Demarkus Wayne Ruckman v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 25, 2023
• Docket: 22-0875
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0875 Filed January 25, 2023

DEMARKUS WAYNE RUCKMAN, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald,

Judge.

DeMarkus Ruckman appeals the dismissal of his postconviction-relief

application. AFFIRMED.

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

The State charged DeMarkus Wayne Ruckman with second-degree sexual

abuse. Ruckman pled guilty to third-degree kidnapping and assault with intent to

commit sexual abuse. The plea and sentencing hearings took place in 2013.

Ruckman did not pursue a direct appeal.

Ruckman filed his first postconviction-relief application in 2015, asserting

he did not commit sex abuse and referencing the deposition of the person he pled

guilty to abusing. The district court denied the application on the merits, and the

court of appeals affirmed the denial. See Ruckman v. State, No. 16-1029, 2017

WL 2684344, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Ruckman filed a second postconviction-relief application in 2017, which

also was denied. This court again affirmed the denial. See Ruckman v. State,

No. 19-1023, 2021 WL 811169, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021).

Ruckman filed a third postconviction-relief application in 2022, again

referencing the deposition of the person he pled guilty to assaulting. He alleged

that (1) she denied his commission of a particular sex act; (2) there was no

evidence “of any other sexual act”; and (3) a “rape kit came back negative.” The

State moved to dismiss the application on statute-of-limitations grounds. See Iowa

Code § 822.3 (2022) (requiring the filing of a postconviction relief application

“within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final” unless the

application raises “a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within

the applicable time period”). The district court granted the motion.

On appeal, Ruckman essentially concedes his third postconviction-relief

application was filed outside the three-year time bar. He argues “there is a fact 3

question which precludes summary disposition of the case,” namely “when he

knew about the forensic evidence and the deposition testimony.” He also “urges

this [c]ourt to apply” the equitable tolling doctrine to avoid application of the time

bar.

By his own admission, Ruckman learned of the deposition testimony and

forensic evidence in advance of the plea hearing. Notice of that deposition was

filed well before the plea hearing and the deposition transcript was admitted at the

first postconviction relief hearing. The deposition transcript made reference to

specific sex acts committed by Ruckman as well as the rape kit Ruckman now

alleges exonerates him. The transcript was cited in our opinion affirming the denial

of the first postconviction relief application. Ruckman, 2017 WL 2684344, at *1–

2. Because Ruckman indisputably knew of the facts underlying his third

postconviction-relief application within the three-year limitations period and,

indeed, before he pled guilty and those facts were raised and litigated in the first

postconviction-relief application, Ruckman cannot use them to circumvent the time

We are left with Ruckman’s request to have us apply the equitable tolling

doctrine. The court of appeals has declined to do so. See James v. State, 858

N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). We see no reason to deviate from James

here.

We affirm the dismissal of Ruckman’s third postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.