Delossa v. Riley

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 5, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-06285
StatusUnknown

This text of Delossa v. Riley (Delossa v. Riley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delossa v. Riley, (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HERIBERTO HERNANDEZ DELOSSA, Case No. 24-cv-06285-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE; 9 v. DISMISSING PROPOSED CO- PLAINTIFFS; DISMISSING 10 BASS, et al., DEFENDANT CASTILLO WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants. 11

12 Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at San Quentin Rehabilitation Center (“SQRC”) has 13 filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this order, the Court screens Plaintiff’s 14 complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to 15 proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. 16 DISCUSSION 17 A. Standard of Review 18 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 21 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 23 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 24 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 27 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 7 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 8 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 9 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Complaint 11 The complaint states that it is brought on behalf of Plaintiff, inmates John Riley and Jesse 12 Rose, and “over 100 plaintiffs.”1 The complaint names as defendants SQRC correctional officials 13 Lieutenant Bass; Sergeants Simpson and Taylor; and Officer Castillo. The complaint alleges that 14 on October 8, 2022, defendants Bass, Simpson, and Taylor ordered a correctional officer to 15 perform an unclothed body search of Plaintiff as various female correctional officers watched. 16 Plaintiff was traumatized emotionally and mentally by this event. The attachments to the 17 complaint indicate that the strip search was conducted without the benefit of privacy shields and 18 required that Plaintiff expose his genitals and anus. The complaint seeks monetary damages. See 19 generally ECF No. 1. 20 The Court dismisses proposed co-plaintiffs inmates John Riley and Jesse Rose from this 21 action. Neither of these inmates has signed the complaint, filed applications for leave to proceed 22 in forma pauperis, or otherwise indicated that they wish to bring this action. In any event, this 23 action may not proceed with co-plaintiffs. Generally, a pro se plaintiff is prohibited from pursuing 24 claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 25

26 1 The complaint in this action appears to be identical to the complaints filed in the following cases: C No. 24-cv-5348 JST, Sierra v. Bass, et al.; C No. 24-cv-6262 JST, Yepez v. Bass, et al.; C No. 27 24-cv-6286 JST, Hernandez v. Bass, et al.; C No. 24-cv-6420 JST, Dominguez v. Bass, et al.; C 1 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (“a 2 litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than himself”); see 3 also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“Ability to protect 4 the interests of the class depends in part on the quality of counsel, and we consider the competence 5 of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of 6 others.”) (citation omitted). This dismissal of inmates John Riley #BR4912 and Jesse Rose 7 #A43064 from this action is without prejudice to each inmate filing a separate action should they 8 so wish. The Clerk is directed to send inmates John Riley #BR4912 and Jesse Rose #A43064 two 9 copies of the court’s complaint form. 10 The Court also DISMISSES defendant Castillo from this action. Although defendant 11 Castillo is named as a defendant, the complaint makes no allegations regarding defendant Castillo. 12 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint bringing claims against 13 defendant Castillo. 14 Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable claim against Lieutenant Bass and 15 Sergeants Taylor and Simpson for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Byrd v. 16 Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Byrd I”) (cross- 17 gender strip search that involves touching inmate’s genitalia and searching inside anus 18 unreasonable as matter of law in non-emergency situation); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of 19 Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922-24 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Byrd II”) (whether cross-gender strip search 20 violates Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure depends on (1) scope 21 of particular intrusion, (2) manner in which it is conducted, (3) justification for search, and 22 (4) place in which it is conducted; whether cross-gender search violates Fourteenth Amendment 23 right to bodily privacy depends on (1) whether there is valid, rational connection between search 24 and legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative 25 means of exercising Fourteenth Amendment right; (3) impact accommodation of Fourteenth 26 Amendment right will have on guards and other inmates, and on allocation of prison resources; 27 and (4) availability of ready alternatives); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1 regularly or frequently observe unclothed inmates without legitimate reason).

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Related

Tucker v. Oxley
9 U.S. 34 (Supreme Court, 1809)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Department
629 F.3d 1135 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Morales-Machuca
546 F.3d 13 (First Circuit, 2008)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
845 F.3d 919 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Oxendine v. Williams
509 F.2d 1405 (Fourth Circuit, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
Delossa v. Riley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delossa-v-riley-cand-2025.