Delong v. MaineGenderal Med. Ctr.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedSeptember 25, 2008
DocketKENcv-07-85
StatusUnpublished

This text of Delong v. MaineGenderal Med. Ctr. (Delong v. MaineGenderal Med. Ctr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delong v. MaineGenderal Med. Ctr., (Me. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION D.~~ket No.C~-O~.-~~ . v ~ .. ,

/\,c\-IJCN- '-, (./ ( ''oJ I " \ r, / DONNA DELONG and CHARLES DELONG,

Plaintiffs v. DECISION AND ORDER

MANIEGENERAL lVIEDICAL CENTER, and PADlATH A. ASLAM, M.D.,

Defendants

This case is before the court on the defendant MaineGeneral Medical Center

(MaineGeneral)'s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims that

MaineGeneral is directly or vicariously liable for any negligence regarding the plaintiff

Donna Delong's diagnosis, treatment, or care. For the following reasons, the

defendant's motion is granted.

FACTS

The parties' statements of material facts, submitted pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.

56(h)(1), include the following undisputed material facts. On or about June 29, 2001,

plaintiff Donna Delong was admitted to MaineGeneral for a "Roux-en-Y" laparoscopic

gastric bypass procedure. (Def.'s SUMF

performed by Dr. Padiath A. Aslam, M.D. (Dr. Aslam), an attending physician at

MaineGeneral. (Id.

MaineGeneral as an attending physician. (PIs.' SAMF

esophagus and small intestine (the anastomosis) was leaking. (Def.'s SUMF «JI 4Y On

July 3, 2001, the third postoperative day, plaintiff was discharged from MaineGeneral.

(Id. «JI 6.) Plaintiff was readmitted to MaineGeneral on July 4, 2001 because of

abdominal pain and was discharged on July 23, 2001. (Id. «JI 7.) Between the end of July

and October 2001, plaintiff elected to receive care from Dr. Guess at the Aroostook

Medical Center, rather than MaineGeneral, for complications due to her gastric bypass

surgery. (Id. «JI 8.) The plaintiff Donna Delong sent Dr. Aslam a letter on July 25, 2001,

informing Dr. Aslam that Dr. Guess would be managing her care and that she no longer

would be under the care of Dr. Aslam. (W. «JI 9.) Plaintiff suffered complications after

the June 29, 2001 surgery, including abscess, empyema, and underwent a splenectomy.

(Id. «JI 10.)

On March 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and alleged that, as a result of

the defendants' conduct, the plaintiffs suffered injuries. (Compl. «JI 19.) In the

complaint, the plaintiffs allege that MaineGeneral was negligent in its supervision of

hospital employees. (Def.'s SUMF «JI 12.) Plaintiffs also allege, based on an actual or

apparent agency theory, that MaineGeneral is vicariously liable for the alleged

negligence attributable to Dr. Aslam in connection with his care of the plaintiff Donna

Delong because of a relationship between MaineGeneral and Dr. Aslam. (Id. «JI 13.) The

plaintiff Donna Delong acknowledges that she selected Dr. Aslam because he

represented himself as "a competent practitioner in the field of medicine," and not

because of any affirmative representations made by MaineGeneral regarding Dr.

Aslam's skill, qualifications, or relationship to the hospital. ago «JI 14.)

1 The parties dispute whether Dr. Aslam properly reinforced the anastomosis during surgery. (Def.'s SUMF 1 5; PIs.' RSUMF 1 5.)

2 STANDARD OF REVIEW

[A]lthough summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy, it is not a substitute for trial. It is, at base, "simply a procedural device for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without fact­ finding." If facts material to the resolution of the matter have been properly placed in dispute, summary judgment based on those facts is not available except in those instances where the facts properly proffered would be flatly insufficient to support a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party as a matter of law.

Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, <[[ 18, 917 A.2d 123, 127 (quoting

Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, <[[ 7, 784 A.2d 18,21-22).

DISCUSSION

MaineGeneral's motion for summary judgment concerns only MaineGeneral's

liability for the alleged negligence of Dr. Aslam. Specifically, MaineGeneral asserts that

judgment should be entered in its favor on counts I, II, and IV2 of the plaintiffs'

complaint to the extent that the allegations in these counts are based on theories of

liability that hold MaineGeneral liable for plaintiffs' injuries because of a relationship

between Dr. Aslam and MaineGeneral. 3 (Def. Rep. Mem. at 1.)

The allegations in count II of plaintiffs' complaint are premised on the theory of

vicarious liability. (Compl. <[[ 30.) Generally, an employer may be vicariously liable for

the negligence of its employees, but not for the negligence of independent contractors.

Legassie v. Bangor Publ'g Co., 1999 ME 180, <[[ 5, 741 A.2d 442, 444; (citing Bonk v.

McPherson, 605 A.2d 74, 78 (Me. 1992) (referring to Restatement (Second) of Torts §§

409-429 (1965)). The power to control is the most important factor in determining

whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor. See Timberlake v.

2 Plaintiffs' complaint does not include a "count IlL" 3 The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint are apparently not premised on theories of "negligent supervision" or "corporate liability." (See PIs.' Mem. at 4.); see also Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, lJIlJI 6, 10, 802 A.2d 391, 392-93 (declining to recognize tort of negligent supervision); Gafner v. Down East Cmty. Hosp .. 1999 ME 130, lJIlJI 31, 42, 44, 735 A.2d 969, 976, 979-80 (declining to recognize a "corporate liability" cause of action against hospitals and other medical facilities).

3 Frigon & Frigon, 438 A.2d 1294, 1296 (Me. 1982) (finding "the vital issue in proving an

employee-employer relationship is whether or not the employer has the power of

control or superintendence over" the other person); see also Taylor v. Kennedy, 1998

ME 234,

(1931) (listing eight "commonly recognized" tests to be considered in examining

whether an employee or independent contractor relationship exists). The right to

control the "details of the performance," found in an employment relationship must be

distinguished from the right to control the result to be obtained, usually found in

independent contractor relationships. See Lewiston Daily Sun v. Hanover Ins. Co., 407

A.2d 288, 292 (Me. 1979).

The plaintiffs rely on the undisputed facts that Dr. Aslam was granted privileges

to practice medicine at MaineGeneral and that MaineGeneral requires Dr. Aslam to be

insured to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding whether an employment

relationship existed between Dr. Aslam and MaineGeneral. (PIs.' SAMF

fact that a physician has been granted privileges is insufficient to raise such a genuine

issue of material fact, particularly in light of the fact that physicians are generally

considered independent contractors. See Gainer v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 1999 ME

130,

liability partly because "creating a duty on the part of hospitals to control the actions of

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Related

Taylor v. Kennedy
1998 ME 234 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Gafner v. Down East Community Hospital
1999 ME 130 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Timberlake v. Frigon & Frigon
438 A.2d 1294 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1982)
Lewiston Daily Sun v. Hanover Insurance Co.
407 A.2d 288 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)
Libby v. Concord General Mutual Insurance
452 A.2d 979 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1982)
Williams v. Inverness Corp.
664 A.2d 1244 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1995)
Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland
2002 ME 108 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2002)
Bonk v. McPherson
605 A.2d 74 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1992)
Curtis v. Porter
2001 ME 158 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc.
2007 ME 34 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)
Legassie v. Bangor Publishing Co.
1999 ME 180 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Murray's Case
154 A. 352 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1931)

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