Delmar Urbanczyk v. Marvin Urbanczyk and Janet Urbanczyk Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (d/B/A Edward Jones) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 29, 2009
Docket07-07-00077-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Delmar Urbanczyk v. Marvin Urbanczyk and Janet Urbanczyk Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (d/B/A Edward Jones) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (Delmar Urbanczyk v. Marvin Urbanczyk and Janet Urbanczyk Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (d/B/A Edward Jones) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Delmar Urbanczyk v. Marvin Urbanczyk and Janet Urbanczyk Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (d/B/A Edward Jones) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

NO. 07-07-0077-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL D


JANUARY 29, 2009


______________________________



DELMER URBANCZYK, APPELLANT


v.


MARVIN URBANCZYK AND JANET URBANCZYK, APPELLEES


_________________________________


FROM THE 100TH DISTRICT COURT OF CARSON COUNTY;


NO. 9854; HON. DAVID M. McCOY, PRESIDING


_______________________________


Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant Delmer Urbanczyk sued his brother Marvin Urbanczyk and sister-in-law Janet Urbanczyk, and two brokerage firms, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., for various torts and declaratory relief arising from the handling of an account jointly owned by Delmer, his mother Isabel Urbanczyk, and his brother Arnold Urbanczyk. The claims against Edward Jones and A.G. Edwards were referred to arbitration and later severed from this case. The trial court granted Marvin and Janet a summary judgment on the ground that all of Delmer’s causes of action were barred by limitations. Asserting the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment preserved his claims, Delmer appeals. Finding the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment inapplicable, we affirm.

Background

          When a summary judgment is based on the pleadings, we assume the truth of all factual allegations in the non-movant’s pleading. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994). We therefore summarize the salient facts alleged by Delmer.

          In 1989, an account was established with Edward Jones in the name of Delmer, Isabel and Arnold as “joint tenants in common with right of survivorship.” In part, the joint account was created for the care of Arnold, should a need arise. A portion of the funds in the joint account were contributed by Delmer. The mailing address on the joint account was a post office box belonging to Isabel. In 2000, Isabel suffered a stroke. A temporary guardian was appointed and she moved to a nursing home. Delmer does not believe his mother regained “full capacity.”

          In February and March 2001, assets of the joint account were transferred into an account owned exclusively by Isabel. Delmer’s pleadings and summary judgment evidence are to the effect that signatures of Delmer, Isabel and Arnold authorizing the transfers were forged, and that Marvin and Janet orchestrated the transfers, without Delmer’s consent or knowledge. During 2002, Isabel granted Marvin and Janet a statutory durable power of attorney. Also, in November 2002, Arnold died. The funds originating in the joint account were subsequently moved to A.G. Edwards and ultimately placed in accounts owned by Isabel, Marvin and Janet.

          At a May 2004 meeting with Edward Jones, Delmer learned of the transfer of the funds to A.G. Edwards and that he was no longer named on the account. In August 2004, Delmer discovered forged signatures were used to transfer funds from the joint account. Isabel died in April 2006.

          Delmer filed the present suit in May 2006 seeking damages against Marvin and Janet for conversion and tortious interference with inheritance rights. He also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Marvin and Janet answered by general denial and affirmatively plead the applicable statute of limitations barred all of Delmer’s claims. Delmer amended his petition adding causes of action against Marvin and Janet for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment and interposed the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment in response to their limitations defense. Marvin and Janet filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on Delmer’s live petition contending that from the face of the document all claims alleged were barred by limitations and the discovery rule lacked application because as a matter of law Delmer’s claims were not inherently undiscoverable. Delmer filed a response with supporting evidence, arguing the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment in avoidance of the limitations claim. The trial court granted the motion of Marvin and Janet and severed Delmer’s claims against the brokerage firms. The court denied Delmer’s motion for new trial and this appeal followed.

Issue

Delmer presents the following single issue:

Whether Defendants negated as a matter of law both Plaintiff’s assertions of the discovery rule and of fraudulent concealment in order to establish Defendants’ defense of limitations in order to justify summary judgment in their favor as entered by the Trial Court.

          We review the granting of a traditional summary judgment motion de novo, applying familiar standards:

          A.       The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


B.In determining whether there is a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.


C.Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

          A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations must conclusively establish the defense. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). Accordingly, it is for the defendant (1) to conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2) negate the discovery rule, if pleaded and applicable, by proving as a matter of law there is no genuine issue of material fact about when the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the nature of his injury. Id. If the movant establishes the statute of limitations bars the action, the non-movant must then adduce summary judgment proof raising a fact issue. Id. Here the parties agree that Delmer’s claims are subject to two- or four-year limitations periods. Their disagreement lies with the applicability of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment.

Discovery Rule

          Unlike the tolling feature of fraudulent concealment, the discovery rule defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of facts giving rise to the cause of action. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,

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Delmar Urbanczyk v. Marvin Urbanczyk and Janet Urbanczyk Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (d/B/A Edward Jones) and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delmar-urbanczyk-v-marvin-urbanczyk-and-janet-urbanczyk-edward-d-jones-texapp-2009.