IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATHLEEN DELLAVALLE, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-1974 : Plaintiff : : v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : KILOLO KIJAKAZI, : Acting Commissioner of Social Security : : Defendant :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our substantive review when considering Social Security appeals, noting that: The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial- evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) 1 (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly- erroneous standard). Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Kathleen Dellavalle applied for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on March 5, 2019, alleging an onset date of
disability of July 12, 2009. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and the ALJ found that Dellavalle was not disabled during the relevant period between her alleged onset of disability and her date last insured of December
31, 2013 and denied Dellavalle’s application for benefits. Dellavalle now appeals this decision, arguing that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. However, after a review of the record, and mindful of the fact that substantial
evidence “means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings in this case. Therefore, for the
reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
Dellavalle filed her claim for supplemental security income on March 5, 2019, alleging an onset date of July 19, 2009. (Tr. 19). Dellavalle alleged disability due to a host of issue, including three strokes, atrial fibrillation, and memory issues. (Tr. 2 74). She was 53 years old at the alleged onset of disability and had past relevant work experience as a nurse. (Tr. 27, 73).
With respect to Dellavalle’s impairments,1 the medical record revealed the following: Dellavalle suffered a stroke in July of 2009, and again in April 2010 and May 2010. (Tr. 423, 1285-86). At a follow up appointment in May 2010, Dellavalle
reported some minor memory issues. (Tr. 499). In June 2011, the plaintiff reported some difficulty with word finding and speech. (Tr. 410). A mental status examination revealed that Dellavalle missed the recall of three words, which was noted to be consistent with her report of some minor memory issues. (Tr. 412).
However, her memory was noted as normal. (Id.) At a June 22, 2011 appointment, Dellavalle denied forgetfulness or confusion. (Tr. 403). In December of 2011 and January of 2012, treatment notes indicate that
Dellavalle’s memory appeared to be grossly intact. (Tr. 375, 380). At a follow up appointment in January, Dellavalle denied forgetfulness or confusion. (Tr. 372). In February 2012, Dellavalle similarly denied headaches, dizziness, or memory problems. (Tr. 365-66).
1 Because Dellavalle’s challenge on appeal solely relates to the ALJ’s alleged failure to address her memory issues and any mental limitations from those issues, our analysis will focus on the medical records relating to those alleged limitations. 3 Roughly six years after the date last insured, from December 2018 through March of 2019, treatment notes and examinations indicated that Dellavalle’s
memory was normal. (Tr. 1473, 1481, 1489, 1520). In September of 2020, Sarah Runyan, FNP, filled out a Treating Provider Questionnaire. (Tr. 1866-77). Nurse Runyan opined that Dellavalle had memory and concentration issues that have
persisted since at least 2009. (Tr. 1866, 1876). She opined that memory and concentration were very important in a nursing career. (Id.) Nurse Runyan noted that her findings were based on Dellavalle’s subjective reports regarding her baseline and what she could tolerate. (Tr. 1869). Although Nurse Runyan opined that Dellavalle
had memory and concentration issues, her own treatment notes from a visit in July of 2020 note that Dellavalle did not have a memory impairment and that her memory was normal. (Tr. 1909-10).
It is against this medical backdrop that the ALJ held a telephonic hearing on Dellavalle’s claim on September 24, 2020. (Tr. 34-72). At the hearing, both Dellavalle and a Vocational Expert testified. (Id.) By a decision dated October 15, 2020, the ALJ denied Dellavalle’s application for benefits. (Tr. 19-29).
In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that Dellavalle had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity in the period between her alleged onset date of July 12, 2009 through her date her last insured, December 31, 2013. (Tr. 21). At Step 2
4 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Dellavalle had the following severe impairments: atrial fibrillation, history of stroke,
and asthma. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Dellavalle did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 22).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity (“RFC”), considering Dellavalle’s limitations from her impairments: After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds; frequently lift and carry ten pounds; sit for up to six hours; and stand or walk for six hours, all in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks. Additionally, she could occasionally climb ramps or stairs; should have avoided working at unprotected heights, climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and working in close proximity to dangerous machinery or moving mechanical parts of equipment; perform occasional balancing on uneven terrain, but was not limited in the ability to maintain balance on even terrain; perform occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and should have avoided exposure to excessive amounts of respiratory irritants such as dust, odors, fumes, and gases and extreme hot and cold temperatures.
(Tr. 22). The ALJ did not include any mental limitations in this RFC determination. (Id.) Specifically, in making the RFC determination, the ALJ considered the medical evidence, medical opinions, and Dellavalle’s testimony regarding her impairments. On this score, the ALJ found persuasive the opinions of the state 5 agency medical consultants—Dr. William Anzalone, Ph.D., Dr. John Chiampi, Ph.D., and Dr. Kurt Maas, M.D. (Tr. 26). With respect to the finding of no mental
limitations, the ALJ noted that Drs. Anzalone and Chiampi found no medically determinable mental impairments based on the claimant’s treatment notes which showed no psychiatric abnormalities during the relevant time period. (Id.) The ALJ
further found the opinion of Dellavalle’s treating nurse, Nurse Runyan, not persuasive. (Id.) The ALJ reasoned that while Nurse Runyan had treated the plaintiff since 2009, her 2020 opinion was rendered nearly seven years after Dellavalle’s date last insured, and the opinion was based on Dellavalle’s subjective complaints rather
than the nurse’s own treating notes. (Id.) The ALJ also considered Dellavalle’s testimony but ultimately found that Dellavalle’s complaints were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence of
record. (Tr. 22). With respect to her alleged mental impairment, Dellavalle testified that she had stopped driving due to memory issues and dizziness. (Tr 69). She stated that after her strokes in 2009 and 2010, her memory was very poor. (Tr. 63). She testified that she has to write things down, and that her short-term memory was poor.
(Tr. 69). However, the ALJ observed that treatment notes indicated Dellavalle’s symptoms from her strokes had fully resolved after two months, and that physical examinations during the relevant period were negative for ongoing deficits,
6 including memory. (Tr. 24-25). The ALJ ultimately found that Dellavalle’s statements were not consistent with the medical evidence of record that showed no
problems with her memory during the relevant period. (Id.) Having arrived at this RFC assessment, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Dellavalle could perform her past relevant work as a nurse, office. (Tr. 27-28). The ALJ
alternatively found at Step 5 that Dellavalle could perform other work available in the national economy as a nurse, school and public health nurse. (Tr. 28). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Dellavalle did not meet the stringent standard for disability set by the Act and denied her claim. (Tr. 28-29).
This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Dellavalle asserts one claim of error and contends that the ALJ failed to consider her memory impairments when crafting the RFC.2 This case is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. III. Discussion A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
2 The plaintiff additionally challenged the ALJ’s decision based on a separation of powers argument but has since withdrawn her separation of powers challenge. (Doc. 22). 7 findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our review in this field, noting that:
8 The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial- evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly- erroneous standard). Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal 9 matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets
the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score: In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
10 Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review. B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous
work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on
which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a). In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,
11 the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(2). There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the
physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical
12 opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an
assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any
credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.
Pa. 2015). These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in
the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other
13 evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration
when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s
activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either
event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).
14 At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
15 C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions The plaintiff filed this disability application in March of 2019, after a
paradigm shift in the manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However,
in March of 2017, the Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating
opinions was changed from a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly observed: The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded. According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”), 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness” based on the following five factors: supportability; consistency; relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c).
Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning 16 “weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability,” which are the “same factors” that formed the foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 at 5853.
An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c (b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). With respect to “supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5). Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020). 17 Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions. Judicial review of this aspect of ALJ decision-making is still guided by several
settled legal tenets. First, when presented with a disputed factual record, it is well- established that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, when evaluating medical opinions “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066). Therefore, provided that the decision
is accompanied by an adequate, articulated rationale, it is the province and the duty of the ALJ to choose which medical opinions and evidence deserve greater weight. Further, in making this assessment of medical evidence:
An ALJ is [also] entitled generally to credit parts of an opinion without crediting the entire opinion. See Thackara v. Colvin, No. 1:14–CV– 00158–GBC, 2015 WL 1295956, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2015); Turner v. Colvin, 964 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) (agreeing that “SSR 96–2p does not prohibit the ALJ from crediting some parts of a treating source's opinion and rejecting other portions”); Connors v. Astrue, No. 10–CV–197–PB, 2011 WL 2359055, at *9 (D.N.H. June 10, 2011). It follows that an ALJ can give partial credit to all medical opinions and can formulate an RFC based on different parts from the different medical opinions. See e.g., Thackara v. Colvin, No. 1:14–CV– 00158–GBC, 2015 WL 1295956, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2015). 18 Durden v. Colvin, 191 F.Supp.3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Finally, where there is no evidence of any credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of
disability “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings, 129 F.Supp.3d at 214–15. D. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of a Claimant’s Alleged Symptoms
The interplay between the deferential substantive standard of review that governs Social Security appeals, and the requirement that courts carefully assess whether an ALJ has met the standards of articulation required by law, is also illustrated by those cases which consider analysis of a claimant’s reported pain. When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported degree of pain and
disability, we are reminded that: [T]he ALJ must necessarily make certain credibility determinations, and this Court defers to the ALJ's assessment of credibility. See Diaz v. Comm'r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir.2009) (“In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support an administrative law judge's decision, we owe deference to his evaluation of the evidence [and] assessment of the credibility of witnesses....”). However, the ALJ must specifically identify and explain what evidence he found not credible and why he found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Education and Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983)); see also Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.2006) (stating that an ALJ is required to provide “specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”). An ALJ cannot reject evidence for an incorrect or unsupported reason. Ray v. Astrue, 649 F.Supp.2d 391, 402 (E.D.Pa.2009) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993)). 19 Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2014).
Yet, it is also clear that: Great weight is given to a claimant's subjective testimony only when it is supported by competent medical evidence. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979); accord Snedeker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App’x 470, 474 (3d Cir. 2007). An ALJ may reject a claimant's subjective testimony that is not found credible so long as there is an explanation for the rejection of the testimony. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p; Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). Where an ALJ finds that there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's pain or other symptoms, however, the severity of which is not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a finding on the credibility of the individual's statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.
McKean v. Colvin, 150 F.Supp.3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (footnotes omitted). Thus, we are instructed to review an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective reports of pain under a standard of review which is deferential with respect to the ALJ’s well-articulated findings but imposes a duty of clear articulation upon the ALJ so that we may conduct meaningful review of the ALJ’s conclusions. In the same fashion that medical opinion evidence is evaluated, the Social Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework under which the severity of a claimant's reported symptoms are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16–3p. It is important to note that though the “statements of the 20 individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required to credit them.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363
(3d. Cir. 2011) (referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”). It is well settled in the Third Circuit that “[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be
supported by objective medical evidence.” Hantraft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (referring to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must follow a two-step process in which the ALJ resolves whether a medically determinable impairment could be the cause of the symptoms
alleged by the claimant, and subsequently must evaluate the alleged symptoms in consideration of the record as a whole. SSR 16-3p. First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a
claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–
21 3p. This includes but is not limited to medical signs and laboratory findings, diagnoses, and other medical opinions provided by treating or examining sources,
and other medical sources, as well as information concerning the claimant's symptoms and how they affect his or her ability to work. Id. The Social Security Administration has recognized that individuals may experience their symptoms
differently and may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory findings. SSR 16–3p. Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms, the
Social Security Regulations identify seven factors which may be relevant to the assessment of the severity or limiting effects of a claimant's impairment based on a claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). These factors
include: activities of daily living; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant's symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate his or her symptoms; treatment, other than medication that a claimant has
received for relief; any measures the claimant has used to relieve his or her symptoms; and, any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions. Id.; see Koppenaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL
22 1995999, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Koppenhaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL 1992130 (M.D. Pa.
May 6, 2019); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1090, 2015 WL 5781202, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015); George v. Colvin, No. 4:13–CV–2803, 2014 WL 5449706, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014).
E. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
In this setting, we are mindful that we are not free to substitute our independent assessment of the evidence for the ALJ’s determinations. Rather, we must simply ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a quantum of proof which is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla, Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401, and “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. Judged against these deferential standards of review, we find that substantial evidence supported the decision by the ALJ that Dellavalle was not disabled. Therefore, we will affirm this decision.
Dellavalle asserts one alleged claim of error in the ALJ’s decision, arguing that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not adequately take into account her memory limitations that she claims to have suffered as a result of the strokes in 2009 and
23 2010. She points to two visits in May of 2010 and June of 2011, as well as Nurse Runyan’s opinion that she had memory and concentration issues, to support her
alleged claim of error. She further contends that the ALJ’s statement that Dellavalle testified to her inability to drive due to her memory problems was an actual finding by the ALJ that Dellavalle did, in fact, have memory problems.
At the outset, we note that while the ALJ considered Dellavalle’s testimony that she was unable to drive due to her memory problems, the ALJ also considered the treatment notes from the relevant time period that indicated Dellavalle’s stroke symptoms had resolved in the two months following her stroke, and that physical
examinations revealed no ongoing deficits, including focusing and remembering. Ultimately, the ALJ credited these treatment notes and found that Dellavalle’s testimony was not wholly consistent with the medical records. Indeed, as we have
noted, with the exception of the two visits in May of 2010 and January of 2011, physical examinations during the relevant time period noted her memory as normal, and Dellavalle denied forgetfulness or confusion. As we have explained, it is well settled that “[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported
by objective medical evidence.” Hantraft, 181 F.3d at 362. In the instant case, we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment that did not
24 include mental limitations, as the medical evidence of record did not support such limitations.
Moreover, to the extent Dellavalle is challenging the ALJ’s consideration of Nurse Runyan’s opinion, we again note that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. On this score, the ALJ found Nurse Runyan’s opinion unpersuasive. The ALJ noted that this opinion was rendered roughly seven years after the plaintiff’s date last insured, was not supported by her own clinical findings or the medical evidence in the record, and was based on
Dellavalle’s subjective reports of her symptoms. Indeed, as we have noted, while Nurse Runyan opined that Dellavalle had memory and concentration issues dating back to 2009, the medical evidence during the relevant period indicated only two
instances where Dellavalle reported minor memory problems, and the majority of the medical record during this period showed Dellavalle’s memory was normal. Moreover, Nurse Runyan’s opinion that Dellavalle continued to experience these symptoms was contradicted by her own records in July of 2020, where she noted
that Dellavalle did not have a memory impairment. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ’s RFC assessment, which did not include mental limitations based on memory issues, is supported by substantial evidence.
25 In closing, the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence in this case complied with the dictates of the law and was supported by substantial evidence. This is all that the
law requires, and all that a claimant can demand in a disability proceeding. Thus, notwithstanding the argument that this evidence might have been viewed in a way which would have also supported a different finding, we are obliged to affirm this
ruling once we find that it is “supported by substantial evidence, ‘even [where] this court acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.’ ” Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, under the deferential
standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case.
IV. Conclusion Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner denying these claims will be AFFIRMED. An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 28th day of November 2022. s/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge 26