Della Sue Markwell v. American Conven., Inc.
This text of Della Sue Markwell v. American Conven., Inc. (Della Sue Markwell v. American Conven., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
DELLA SUE MARKWELL MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1572-97-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III APRIL 28, 1998 AMERICAN CONVENIENCE, INC. AND UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Peter J. Jones for appellant.
Diane C.H. McNamara for appellee American Convenience, Inc.
No brief or argument for appellee Uninsured Employers' Fund.
Della Sue Markwell contends that the Workers' Compensation
Commission erred in finding that (1) there was no compensable
injury after January 20, 1995 and (2) American Convenience, Inc.,
was not required to pay for counseling services rendered by Melba
Hendrix. American Convenience appeals on the issue of whether
the claimant sustained a compensable injury by accident. Upon
reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
that the cross-appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm
the commission's decision.
The claimant worked as a clerk at American Convenience,
Inc., when she was robbed December 1, 1994. She claims
compensable injuries from that date until September 3, 1996. The * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. deputy commissioner found that the claimant had an injury by
accident (post-traumatic stress syndrome) which rendered her
totally disabled from work from December 8, 1994 through June 6,
1995 and from January 23, 1996 through September 3, 1996. He
also found that the employer was not responsible for the
claimant's counseling costs because Melba Hendrix's services were
not medical attention. The compensation commission found that
the claimant had sustained a compensable injury, but entered a
modified award for temporary total disability from December 8,
1994 through January 20, 1995 only. It based the decision on the
finding that the claimant's medical evidence failed to prove the
disability continued beyond January 20, 1995. The commission
affirmed the opinion that the employer was not responsible for
Melba Hendrix's services. The claimant was referred to Melba Hendrix, a licensed
professional counselor, by the Victim-Witness Coordinator of the
Commonwealth's Attorney's Office. Ms. Hendrix referred the
claimant to Dr. Ralph Robinson, a general practitioner. Dr.
Robinson prescribed medicine for the claimant and last saw her on
January 20, 1995. Dr. Robinson did not supervise Ms. Hendrix's
work.
The claimant contends that the commission erred in not
considering the testimony and records of Ms. Hendrix as expert
testimony on the issue of disability. Relying on Broschinski v.
Alcoa Building Products, No. 0651-95-3 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 19,
1995), and Neff v. Houff Transfer Inc., VWC File No. 165-33-84
- 2 - [95/1 WC 1653384] (January 31, 1995), the commission ruled that
Ms. Hendrix's office notes were not a "medical report" for
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. Code § 65.2-603. The
commission found that Ms. Hendrix's notes were not relied upon by
any medical expert.
The claimant distinguishes Broschinski, and argues that
Hendrix's notes can be treated as medical reports, because
Hendrix testified at the hearing and thus overcame the hearsay
objection. Broschinski is not a case based upon hearsay
objections to evidence. The case stands for the proposition that
a licensed professional counselor's report is not a "medical
report" as defined in Code § 65.2-603.
The commission's ruling is one of expertise, the ability of
a licensed professional counselor to diagnose a medical
condition. There was no showing that Ms. Hendrix had the
expertise to give the opinion offered at the hearing. While Ms.
Hendrix has a master's degree in counseling, she is not a
physician. Nor are her opinions or reports incorporated into a
treating physician's opinion.
On appeal, the commission's construction of the Act is
entitled to great weight. City of Waynesboro v. Harter, 1 Va.
App. 265, 269, 337 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1985). Commission findings
are binding on appeal if supported by credible evidence. Code
§ 65.2-706(A); Fairfax Hospital v. DeLaFleur, 221 Va. 406, 410,
270 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1980). Absent some showing that a licensed
professional counselor is competent to give opinions in this area - 3 - of medicine, the commission did not err in declining to rely on
that evidence.
The claimant also contends that the commission erred in
refusing to order the employer to pay for services rendered by
Ms. Hendrix. An employer's liability for paying for medical
treatment is limited to treatment provided by a physician or
treatment which is "rendered under the supervision of, or in
conjunction with treatment rendered by, a physician." Neff, at
3; Code § 65.2-603. The claimant argues that evidence that Ms.
Hendrix's name was written on a prescription pad by Dr. Robinson
indicates that he referred the claimant to Ms. Hendrix. However,
there was other evidence, including testimony of both the
claimant and Ms. Hendrix, that showed the Victim-Witness
Coordinator referred the claimant to Ms. Hendrix and that Ms.
Hendrix suggested that the claimant contact Dr. Robinson. There
was also clear evidence that the doctor did not supervise Ms.
Hendrix and only conferred with her to advise on what medicines
he was giving to the patient. Dr. Robinson did not treat the
claimant after January 20, 1995, and after that date no doctor
dealt with Ms. Hendrix until January 1996. The commission's
ruling that the employer is not liable for the counseling fees is
supported by credible evidence. Finally, the claimant argues that there is no evidence to
support the commission's finding that there was no disability
after January 20, 1995. The claimant alleges she suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder which made her have panic attacks - 4 - whenever she saw an African-American. She claimed that this
continued from December 4, 1994 through the date of the
commission's hearing on September 3, 1996. The employer
presented several witnesses who stated that the claimant did not
exhibit this condition.
There is no medical evidence of the claimant's condition
from January 20, 1995 until Dr. Chua opines that she has
continued to be disabled in April, 1996. 1 The commission did not
find Dr. Chua's opinion regarding disability persuasive because
it lacked medical corroboration. In view of all the evidence,
the commission was entitled to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence and to reject Dr. Chua's unsubstantiated assessment.
Because the claimant failed to present evidence to support her
claim of continuing disability after January 20, 1995, the
decision of the commission will be affirmed. Employer contends that the commission erred in finding a
compensable injury beginning December 8, 1994 because there was
no competent medical evidence to support that conclusion. The
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