NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2974-24
DELLA M. BOURNES,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. April 30, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION SHAWN J. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted April 14, 2026 – Decided April 30, 2026
Before Judges Firko, Perez Friscia and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FM-11-1115-06.
Shawn J. Harris, self-represented appellant (John Bonino, on the brief).
Bernstein & Manahan, LLC, attorneys for respondent (James P. Manahan, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIRKO, J.A.D.
In this post-judgment dissolution matter, defendant Shawn J. Harris
appeals from the Family Part's April 4, 2025 order partially granting plaintiff Della M. Bournes's motion to reinstate and enforce child support arrears and
denying his cross-motion to vacate the arrears. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Robert T. Lougy in his
order.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. The parties divorced in
2005 in the State of Texas after three years of marriage. They had two
children born in 2001 and 2002, who were unemancipated at the time the
Texas divorce decree was entered. In the parties' marital settlement agreement
(MSA), which was incorporated into the decree, defendant agreed to pay $600
per month in child support for ten months each year, August through May, and
plaintiff agreed to pay defendant $100 per month for two months, June and
July. Thus, defendant's child support obligation was $5,800 annually. The
MSA stated it was "intended to be the full and entire settlement and
agreement" between the parties and "should be interpreted and governed by the
laws of the State of Texas."
According to defendant, in August 2005, he and the children's
grandmother1 became the children's primary caretaker. The children attended
1 The parties do not specify whether the maternal or paternal grandmother became the children's primary caretaker. Judge Lougy presumed the children
A-2974-24 2 school in Denver, Colorado from pre-kindergarten through the sixth grade.
Plaintiff still resided in Texas. Defendant claims the children had summer
visits with plaintiff until 2007, when Texas Child Protective Services (TCPS)
was contacted and removed them from her care. Ultimately, plaintiff lost
custody of the children. 2 Defendant claimed the children had not lived with
plaintiff since 2014, when they began living with their grandmother in New
Jersey while he resided in Pennsylvania.
Defendant alleges plaintiff filed a child support enforcement action
against him in New Jersey sometime in 2016, which the court granted in
March 2016. The probation department enforced child support against
defendant as payor at $600 per month based on twelve months, or $7,200
annually, rather than $5,800 annually, as stipulated in the MSA. Defendant
maintains he was not served with the motion and attempted to "rectify" the
child support issue as a self-represented litigant but was unsuccessful.
Between 2016 and 2023, an audit revealed defendant paid $19,020.54 in
child support through probation. Defendant then retained counsel. In March
____________________ began living with their maternal grandparents. There is no evidence in the record to refute this presumption. 2 Defendant states an "unattainable protective [o]rder" was entered in the State of Texas regarding plaintiff's loss of custody.
A-2974-24 3 2024, defendant's 3 counsel filed a motion to retroactively emancipate both
children because they had attained their respective eighteenth birthdays.
Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. On May 17, 2024, the judge granted
defendant's motion and terminated defendant's child support obligation
retroactive to the date of each child's eighteenth birthday. The judge noted in
his order that defendant certified neither child attended post-secondary high
education, they had started working and were living "with their (presumptively
maternal) grandparents since 2016." The probation department was directed to
adjust its records.
On July 15, 2024, the judge entered a Uniform Summary Support Order
(USSO) stating defendant's arrears were $22,734.52 as of June 24, 2024. On
October 1, 2024, a different judge issued a second USSO, which stated, in part,
"[c]ase was arrears only and arrears were paid in full." Probation was ordered
to close the case and terminate enforcement.
On February 4, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the October 1,
2024 USSO, re-establish arrears, which existed as of each child's emancipation
date, and for counsel fees and costs. In her moving certification, plaintiff did
not challenge either child's emancipation but sought relief from probation's
3 Defendant is listed as "plaintiff" in the March 2024 New Jersey action. For the sake of clarity, we refer to him as "defendant" for consistency in our opinion.
A-2974-24 4 "mistake" in "administratively" vacating all arrears. Plaintiff certified she was
unaware the October 1, 2024 USSO was going to be entered because she had
no prior notice of it.
On February 19, 2025, Judge Lougy conducted a case management
conference and distributed a probation audit dated February 12, 2025 to the
parties. On March 20, 2025, defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to: deny
plaintiff's motion, relieve him of any child support obligations, award
reimbursement of $654 from plaintiff for alleged child support overpayments,
and for counsel fees and costs.
On April 4, 2025, the judge held oral argument on the motions and
entered an order that day partially granting plaintiff's motion and denying
defendant's cross-motion. In his Rules 1:6-2(f) and 5:5-4(f) findings of fact
and conclusions of law included with the order, the judge determined the May
17, 2024 order terminated defendant's child support obligation retroactive to
each child's emancipation date but did not vacate the arrears he owed as of that
date.
The judge rejected defendant's argument that he should not have paid
child support because the children have lived with him since 2016. The judge
emphasized "the record is clear" and noted defendant never made a "successful
application to modify his child support obligation." The judge reasoned
A-2974-24 5 defendant essentially requested "an impermissible retroactive reduction in his
child support." Accordingly, the judge ordered probation to reinstate the
arrears in defendant's account as of the date of termination of his child support
obligation—December 20, 2020—and enforced repayment at the rate of $100
per week.
The judge considered both parties' applications for counsel fees and
costs and analyzed the Rule 5:3-5(a) factors, RPC 1.5(a), and the relevant case
law. In denying the applications, the judge found both parties "asserted largely
reasonable positions." The judge held plaintiff was successful and defendant
was not. However, the judge held plaintiff should be responsible for her own
fees because defendant did not seek the relief granted in the October 2024
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2974-24
DELLA M. BOURNES,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. April 30, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION SHAWN J. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted April 14, 2026 – Decided April 30, 2026
Before Judges Firko, Perez Friscia and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FM-11-1115-06.
Shawn J. Harris, self-represented appellant (John Bonino, on the brief).
Bernstein & Manahan, LLC, attorneys for respondent (James P. Manahan, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIRKO, J.A.D.
In this post-judgment dissolution matter, defendant Shawn J. Harris
appeals from the Family Part's April 4, 2025 order partially granting plaintiff Della M. Bournes's motion to reinstate and enforce child support arrears and
denying his cross-motion to vacate the arrears. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Robert T. Lougy in his
order.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. The parties divorced in
2005 in the State of Texas after three years of marriage. They had two
children born in 2001 and 2002, who were unemancipated at the time the
Texas divorce decree was entered. In the parties' marital settlement agreement
(MSA), which was incorporated into the decree, defendant agreed to pay $600
per month in child support for ten months each year, August through May, and
plaintiff agreed to pay defendant $100 per month for two months, June and
July. Thus, defendant's child support obligation was $5,800 annually. The
MSA stated it was "intended to be the full and entire settlement and
agreement" between the parties and "should be interpreted and governed by the
laws of the State of Texas."
According to defendant, in August 2005, he and the children's
grandmother1 became the children's primary caretaker. The children attended
1 The parties do not specify whether the maternal or paternal grandmother became the children's primary caretaker. Judge Lougy presumed the children
A-2974-24 2 school in Denver, Colorado from pre-kindergarten through the sixth grade.
Plaintiff still resided in Texas. Defendant claims the children had summer
visits with plaintiff until 2007, when Texas Child Protective Services (TCPS)
was contacted and removed them from her care. Ultimately, plaintiff lost
custody of the children. 2 Defendant claimed the children had not lived with
plaintiff since 2014, when they began living with their grandmother in New
Jersey while he resided in Pennsylvania.
Defendant alleges plaintiff filed a child support enforcement action
against him in New Jersey sometime in 2016, which the court granted in
March 2016. The probation department enforced child support against
defendant as payor at $600 per month based on twelve months, or $7,200
annually, rather than $5,800 annually, as stipulated in the MSA. Defendant
maintains he was not served with the motion and attempted to "rectify" the
child support issue as a self-represented litigant but was unsuccessful.
Between 2016 and 2023, an audit revealed defendant paid $19,020.54 in
child support through probation. Defendant then retained counsel. In March
____________________ began living with their maternal grandparents. There is no evidence in the record to refute this presumption. 2 Defendant states an "unattainable protective [o]rder" was entered in the State of Texas regarding plaintiff's loss of custody.
A-2974-24 3 2024, defendant's 3 counsel filed a motion to retroactively emancipate both
children because they had attained their respective eighteenth birthdays.
Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. On May 17, 2024, the judge granted
defendant's motion and terminated defendant's child support obligation
retroactive to the date of each child's eighteenth birthday. The judge noted in
his order that defendant certified neither child attended post-secondary high
education, they had started working and were living "with their (presumptively
maternal) grandparents since 2016." The probation department was directed to
adjust its records.
On July 15, 2024, the judge entered a Uniform Summary Support Order
(USSO) stating defendant's arrears were $22,734.52 as of June 24, 2024. On
October 1, 2024, a different judge issued a second USSO, which stated, in part,
"[c]ase was arrears only and arrears were paid in full." Probation was ordered
to close the case and terminate enforcement.
On February 4, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the October 1,
2024 USSO, re-establish arrears, which existed as of each child's emancipation
date, and for counsel fees and costs. In her moving certification, plaintiff did
not challenge either child's emancipation but sought relief from probation's
3 Defendant is listed as "plaintiff" in the March 2024 New Jersey action. For the sake of clarity, we refer to him as "defendant" for consistency in our opinion.
A-2974-24 4 "mistake" in "administratively" vacating all arrears. Plaintiff certified she was
unaware the October 1, 2024 USSO was going to be entered because she had
no prior notice of it.
On February 19, 2025, Judge Lougy conducted a case management
conference and distributed a probation audit dated February 12, 2025 to the
parties. On March 20, 2025, defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to: deny
plaintiff's motion, relieve him of any child support obligations, award
reimbursement of $654 from plaintiff for alleged child support overpayments,
and for counsel fees and costs.
On April 4, 2025, the judge held oral argument on the motions and
entered an order that day partially granting plaintiff's motion and denying
defendant's cross-motion. In his Rules 1:6-2(f) and 5:5-4(f) findings of fact
and conclusions of law included with the order, the judge determined the May
17, 2024 order terminated defendant's child support obligation retroactive to
each child's emancipation date but did not vacate the arrears he owed as of that
date.
The judge rejected defendant's argument that he should not have paid
child support because the children have lived with him since 2016. The judge
emphasized "the record is clear" and noted defendant never made a "successful
application to modify his child support obligation." The judge reasoned
A-2974-24 5 defendant essentially requested "an impermissible retroactive reduction in his
child support." Accordingly, the judge ordered probation to reinstate the
arrears in defendant's account as of the date of termination of his child support
obligation—December 20, 2020—and enforced repayment at the rate of $100
per week.
The judge considered both parties' applications for counsel fees and
costs and analyzed the Rule 5:3-5(a) factors, RPC 1.5(a), and the relevant case
law. In denying the applications, the judge found both parties "asserted largely
reasonable positions." The judge held plaintiff was successful and defendant
was not. However, the judge held plaintiff should be responsible for her own
fees because defendant did not seek the relief granted in the October 2024
order, and there was no basis to hold him "accountable for counsel fees to fix
an administrative error he did not invite or seek." The judge denied
defendant's application for counsel fees because he failed to include an
affidavit of services as required by Rule 5:3-5(c).
On April 22, 2025, a third USSO was entered memorializing the judge's
decision. This appeal followed.
Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:
(1) the judge erred in failing to find that New Jersey lacked jurisdiction to modify defendant's child support obligation issued in the Texas divorce decree;
A-2974-24 6 (2) the judge erred in failing to enforce defendant's child support pursuant to the terms of the Texas divorce decree; and
(3) the judge erred in granting plaintiff's request to enforce arrears based on the improperly modified child support obligation and in denying defendant's request to vacate same.
We find no merit in these arguments.
II.
"[W]e accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part
judges." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012).
This is because the family court has "special jurisdiction and expertise in
family matters." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). However, "[a]
trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from
established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty,
L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). The Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.124 to -30.201,
provides "unity and structure in each state's approach to the modification and
enforcement of child support orders," both nationally and internationally.
Youssefi v. Youssefi, 328 N.J. Super. 12, 20 (App. Div. 2000).
For enforcement purposes, New Jersey may register a support order
issued by an initiating tribunal in the current home state of the children.
N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.168. The registration process begins by one party filing a
A-2974-24 7 request to register the out-of-state order with New Jersey's Family Part.
N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.169. Pursuant to these statutes, plaintiff filed and registered
the Texas divorce decree in New Jersey in 2013.
After registration, defendant had the right to contest the validity or
enforcement of the registered order, by requesting a hearing within twenty
days after notice of the registration. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.172(b)(2). Pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.175, "[c]onfirmation of a registered support order, whether
by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the
order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of
registration." "[T]he law of the issuing state[,]" rather than the law of New
Jersey, continues to govern "the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current
payments under a registered support order." N.J.S.A. 2A:4- 30.171(a)(1).
III.
A.
We reject defendant's argument that New Jersey lacked jurisdiction
under UIFSA to enforce or modify his child support obligation set forth in the
MSA, which was incorporated into the Texas divorce decree. Consistent with
UIFSA, New Jersey properly registered the child support order on July 16,
2013, as reflected in probation's financial audit report. Defendant
acknowledges the children began living in New Jersey around that time while
A-2974-24 8 he resided in Pennsylvania. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, New
Jersey was obligated to enforce Texas's child support order.
"UIFSA governs jurisdiction over the establishment, modification, and
enforcement of a child support order when at least one of the parties to the
action in which support is requested lives outside of the State." Fall &
Romanowski, Current N.J. Family Law, Child Custody, Protection & Support
§ 33:3-1 (2026). Under UIFSA, "a court that enters an order establishing child
support retains continuing[,] exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order, and
that court's orders remain the controlling child support orders for purposes of
enforcement, until continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on another
state's tribunal by operation of the Act." Lall v. Shivani, 448 N.J. Super. 38,
46 (App. Div. 2016); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(a)(1). Therefore, a non-
issuing tribunal may register the child support order of an issuing tribunal but
may not modify it barring a finding of specific circumstances. Ibid.; see also
N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.168; N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133(c). We conclude the judge
properly found that New Jersey had jurisdiction under UIFSA to enforce and
modify defendant's child support obligation issued in the Texas divorce decree.
B.
Next, defendant contends under UIFSA, Texas was the "issuing tribunal"
and had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, and New Jersey only had
A-2974-24 9 jurisdiction to enforce the order but not modify it absent the filed written
consent of both parties, citing Lall, 448 N.J. Super. at 43. In particular,
defendant maintains the judge's enforcement of $600 per month for child
support for twelve months per year instead of ten months, and plaintiff's
obligation to pay $100 for June and July, as per the MSA, was not accurately
enforced. According to defendant, the improper enforcement amounted to a
modification of the Texas divorce decree, which exceeded this State's
jurisdiction. As such, defendant argues he improperly paid plaintiff
$19,020.54, when he was only required to pay $18,366.54, an overpayment of
$654.
Plaintiff counters defendant's appeal should be dismissed as untimely
because he failed to appeal from the May 17, 2024 order within the required
forty-five-day timeframe because that order granted a vacation of arrears
arising after each child's emancipation, citing Rule 2:4-1(a). Plaintiff avers
defendant is equitably estopped from challenging the arrears that accrued
before the emancipation events by virtue of his March 22, 2024 filing because
he waited "nine years" to challenge enforcement, which would result in
prejudice to her and the children. Plaintiff also contends defendant waived his
right to pursue his claims. In that regard, plaintiff argues defendant accepted
the judge's ruling when he sought to vacate only the arrears that accrued after
A-2974-24 10 each child's emancipation, citing Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J.
479, 503-04 (1996), and therefore, the equitable doctrine of laches applies.
We have already addressed New Jersey's obligation to enforce the child
support award entered in Texas. Plaintiff's argument that defendant's appeal is
untimely under Rule 2:4-1(a) has merit because he failed to challenge the May
17, 2024 order, which vacated only arrears arising after the children's
emancipation within the forty-five-day period. Defendant asserts he was
unaware of his overpayment until the February 19, 2025 case management
conference when he received the audit. In any event, we consider the merits of
defendant's appeal.
Here, defendant began accruing arrears in 2016. Defendant had access
to the probation account and the child support being charged at all times before
he filed his May 17, 2024 emancipation motion. Moreover, defendant could
have requested a financial audit at any time and requested probation to verify
the amount charged, but he failed to do so. Accordingly, we perceive no basis
to disturb the April 4, 2025 order.
C.
Finally, we consider defendant's argument that the judge erred in
granting plaintiff's request to enforce arrears and denying defendant's request
to vacate arrears. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a, the anti-retroactive support statute,
A-2974-24 11 prohibits the retroactive vacation or modification of accumulated child support
arrears, and provides:
No payment or installment of an order for child support, or those portions of an order which are allocated for child support . . . shall be retroactively modified by the court except with respect to the period during which there is a pending application for modification, but only from the date the notice of motion was mailed either directly or through the appropriate agent.
The statute "was enacted to insure that ongoing support obligations that
became due were paid." Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. Super. 638, 643 (App.
Div. 1995). We have held that the statute's applicability "is limited to
prevent[ing] retroactive modifications decreasing or vacating orders allocated
for child support." Keegan v. Keegan, 326 N.J. Super. 289, 291 (App. Div.
1999); see also Walles v. Walles, 295 N.J. Super. 498, 514 (App. Div. 1996)
(finding the trial court's decision to retroactively reduce child support
payments "violated the statutory mandate"). Moreover, we noted in Diehl v.
Diehl, 389 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 2006), that retroactive modification
is limited to the date of the moving party's "first motion for modification." See
also Ibrahim v. Aziz, 402 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2008).
However, while N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a as a general matter prohibits the
retroactive reduction of court-ordered child support, the statute's anti-
retroactivity requirement has been construed to be inapplicable to a reduction
A-2974-24 12 of child support based on a child's emancipation. Bowens v. Bowens, 286 N.J.
Super. 70, 73 (App. Div. 1995) (holding the statute "does not bar the
cancellation of child support arrearages which accrued subsequent to the date
of the emancipation of the minor"); see also Mahoney, 285 N.J. Super. at 643
(emancipating and terminating child support for two children two years apart
in age, with each emancipation effective retroactive to each child's eighteenth
birthday and holding "[w]here there is no longer a duty of support by virtue of
a judicial declaration of emancipation, no child support can become due").
Here, the second USSO erroneously directed probation to close
defendant's account in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a, because it
amounted to a retroactive reduction. Thus, the judge correctly granted
plaintiff's motion to reinstate arrears. We reject defendant's characterization
that the judge modified the obligation in the April 4, 2025 order. Rather, the
judge properly reinstated improperly vacated arrears.
"The trial court has substantial discretion in making a child support
award." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). "If
consistent with the law, such an award 'will not be disturbed unless it is
manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other
evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at 315-16 (quoting Raynor v.
A-2974-24 13 Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 605 (App. Div. 2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Regarding defendant's request for reimbursement for the overpayment of
$654, the judge duly noted:
[T]he record is clear[.] Defendant made no successful application to modify his child support obligation. Thus, [d]efendant effectively requests an impermissible retroactive reduction in his child support. Probation shall reinstate these arrears in [d]efendant's account as of the date of termination of his child support obligation—December 20, 2020[,]— and enforce repayment at a rate of $100 per week, which will allow for full repayment in approximately three years.
The record supports that determination.
To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments,
we find they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2974-24 14