Dell Products Lp v. United States

714 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 688, 34 C.I.T. 688, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1628, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 67
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJune 10, 2010
DocketSlip Op. 10-66; Court 06-00306
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 714 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (Dell Products Lp v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dell Products Lp v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 688, 34 C.I.T. 688, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1628, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 67 (cit 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Senior Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Dell Products LP’s (“Dell” or “Plaintiff’) Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant United States’ (“Defendant” or “Government”) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Dell contends that the subject batteries should be classified as “automatic data processing machines” under heading 8471 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) 1 , duty-free, the same classification as the notebook computers with which the batteries were packaged. 2 The Government maintains that United States Customs & Border Protection (“Customs”) properly classified the subject secondary batteries as “other storage batteries” under heading 8507, HTSUS, at the scheduled duty rate of 3.4% ad valorem. 3 See HQ 967364 (Dec. 23, 2004).

As discussed below, Customs properly classified the subject batteries as “other storage batteries” under heading 8507, HTSUS. Accordingly, Dell’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and the Government’s cross-motion is granted.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

At issue are Dell secondary batteries manufactured for use with Dell notebook computers. The batteries can only be used with specific Dell computer models and are compatible with multiple computer models. The secondary battery is an additional power source that enables longer unplugged operation of the notebook computer than would be possible with the primary battery included with, and encased in, the computer. The primary and secondary battery cannot be used simultaneously by the same computer.

*1255 The batteries at issue were initially “admitted” 4 into a Foreign Trade Zone (“FTZ”) as non-privileged foreign (“NPF”) merchandise. 5 The Dell notebook computers were first imported into the United States and entered for consumption 6 under subheading 8471.30.00, HTSUS, as “portable digital automatic data processing machines,” then later were admitted into the FTZ in “domestic status.” 7

Through websites and other means, Dell offered retail customers the option of purchasing a notebook computer, including a primary battery and power adapter, with or without other merchandise. This other merchandise option included the subject secondary batteries. Dell then filled the individual orders by packaging the items ordered by each customer in the FTZ. Dell placed a box containing a notebook computer that already encased a primary battery, into a larger box, along with operational manuals, a power adapter, and any additional items, such as a secondary battery, that the customer opted to purchase. The price that a customer paid consisted of the cost of the notebook computer, which included the primary battery and power cord, plus the cost of any optional items ordered. Dell customers could also purchase secondary batteries' independent from a Dell computer. This action consists of Dell secondary batteries purchased and packaged together with notebook computers.

Both parties agree that the subject batteries entered into the commerce of the United States when they were withdrawn from the FTZ and delivered to Dell’s U.S. customers and are to be classified based on their condition at this time. Upon entry, Dell classified the secondary batteries with the Dell notebook computers as “automatic data processing machines” under subheading 8471.30.00, HTSUS, duty-free. Customs disagreed and, upon liquidation, classified the subject batteries as “other storage batteries” under subheading 8507.80.80, HTSUS, at the duty rate of 3.4% ad valorem. Customs classified the computer, primary battery, and power cord together under subheading 8471.30.00, HTSUS. Dell then filed this action challenging Customs’ classification of the subject batteries.

*1256 II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). Because the nature of the merchandise at issue is not in question, there are no disputed material facts in this case. The propriety of summary judgment, therefore, turns on the proper construction of the HTSUS. See E.T. Horn Co. v. United States, 27 CIT 328, 331 (2003)(quoting Clarendon Marketing, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 1464, 1466 (Fed.Cir.1998)).

The Court employs a two-step process in analyzing a Customs classification. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998). “[F]irst, [it] construe[s] the relevant classification headings; and second, [it] determine^] under which of the properly construed tariff terms the merchandise at issue falls.” Id.; see also Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed.Cir.1997). The proper scope and meaning of a tariff classification term is a question of law; whether the subject merchandise falls within a particular tariff term as properly construed is a question of fact. Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002). Where the nature of the merchandise is undisputed, as in this case, “ ‘the classification issue collapses entirely into a question of law,’ and the court reviews Customs’ classification decision de novo.” Id. (quoting Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2006)). 8

A Customs classification ruling receives deference proportional to its “power to persuade” under the principles of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). 9 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001); Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

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714 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 688, 34 C.I.T. 688, 32 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1628, 2010 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dell-products-lp-v-united-states-cit-2010.